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Packing, Scheduling and Covering Problems
in a Game-Theoretic Perspective
By: Elena Kleiman
Abstract
The fairly recent appearance of modern distributed network systems such as the Internet
and P2P applications has raised many challenging and principally new questions, both of
algorithmic and socio-economic nature. The rapidly gained popularity of such systems as
well as their extensive usage and the undeniable impact that they have on almost every as-
pect of our everyday life, has created a need to address the raised issues systematically, and
analyze the underlying computational and economic processes occurring in these systems.
This required of us to make a major shift in our traditional view of system design, as
besides their enormous scale and novel nature, the formation as well as various computa-
tion and maintenance tasks in such systems are executed by a multitude of uncoordinated
and economically interested autonomous agents (such as Internet Service Providers, end-
users, etc.), as opposed to having a single central unit that controls and regulates the entire
network and all of its participants.
These agents have diverse personal goals, each aiming at optimizing his own objective
without taking into consideration the global welfare of the system. They compete each
other for expensive and scarce network resources, such as bandwidth and service time.
This prompted establishing the Algorithmic Game Theory discipline, that uses concepts
borrowed from the classic Game Theory and applies newly developed techniques to study
various algorithmic problems, in particular, networking problems that involve interactions
of rational strategic agents.
A topical issue for this line of study considers the effect of the “anarchistic” and un-
coordinated behavior of the system participants on the overall performance of the system.
The discrepancy between the personal goals of the agents and the global social goal often
v
has a negative effect on the system. The inefficiency suffered by the system is expressed
by a measure called the Price of Anarchy. Other directions of research include considering
different quality measures and various computational aspects concerning the algorithmic
and economic concepts in the setting in question.
To explore the different algorithmic aspects of modern computing systems, we study
models that are simplification of problems arising in real networks, which seem appropriate
for describing basic network problems.
Many packing, scheduling and covering problems that were previously considered by
computer science literature in the context of various transportation and production prob-
lems, appear also suitable for describing and modeling various fundamental aspects in
networks optimization such as routing, resource allocation, congestion control e.t.c..
Various combinatorial problems were already studied from the game theoretic stand-
point, and we attempt to complement to this body of research.
Specifically, we consider the bin packing problem both in the classic and parametric
versions, the job scheduling problem and the machine covering problem in various ma-
chine models. We suggest new interpretations of such problems in the context of modern
networks and study these problems from a game theoretic perspective by modeling them as
games, and then concerning various game theoretic concepts in these games by combining
tools from game theory and the traditional combinatorial optimization. In the framework
of this research we introduce and study models that were not considered before, and also
improve upon previously known results.
We believe that the study of these combinatorial problems under the game theoretic
framework contributes to enhancing our understanding of various processes occurring in
modern decentralized systems and providing us with new insights on their effect on the
functionality of these systems. This knowledge will allow us to design more efficient
network algorithms and protocols, that are robust against the inherent constraints in the
modern networks which are now taken into account.
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The natural state of man is a state of pure selfishness
CHARLES G. FINNEY (1792-1875)
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Context and motivations
From the dawn of computing era, the prevalent paradigm in system design assumed ex-
istence of a central authority which constructed and managed the computational system
and its participants, with a purpose of optimizing a well-defined global objective. System
designers developed algorithms for network problems under the implicit assumption that
the algorithm can make definitive decisions which are always carried out by the entities (or
agents) participating in the system.
Emergence of large-scale distributed information and communication systems about
two decades ago, with the Internet being the most prominent example, put these traditional
assumptions into question, creating a major shift in our view of computational networking
systems.
The Internet is built, managed and used by an enormous number of autonomous and
self-interested entities (such as network operators, service providers, designers, end-users,
etc.), in different levels of competition and cooperation relationships with one another.
These entities have diverse sets of interests and they compete each other over expensive
network resources such as link bandwidth, storage space or processing time, while aiming
at achieving their individual goals (maximize their payoffs or interchangeably, minimize
their costs), as opposed to obtaining a global optimum of the system.
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Such entities may have no incentive to cooperate and follow a predefined protocol and
may prefer to selfishly deviate from protocols if it is beneficial for their personal interests.
For example, Internet service providers (ISPs) who often have competing interests need
to cooperate in order to provide global connectivity. In presence of selfish considerations
each ISP selects paths that are optimal within his own network. The result is that paths
spanning across multiple networks can be poor from a global perspective.
On the other hand, the tremendous size and complexity of such networks, as well as
their socio-economic nature, make it impossible to introduce a single centralized authority
that can enforce a protocol or regulation on all participants of the system.
Obviously, the outcomes of such unregulated self-interested behavior often have prop-
erties that are very different from the centrally designed or managed networks which tra-
ditional system design have focused on. Therefore, traditional algorithmic and distributed
systems approaches are insufficient to understand and solve various important design prob-
lems that arise in the modern networks. This requires quite different set of methods and
considerations.
From the economics side, the appearance of large scale distributed computing systems
such as the Internet and electronic commerce applications raised many principally new
and challenging problems related to computational aspects in resource management, multi
agent markets, auction theory and many other fields of economics, which traditional net-
working research could answer only partially.
Complex problems of strategic interaction and confrontation between multiple rational
participants are usually considered by the classical Game Theory discipline, which offers
formal framework for studying the results of such interactions. Network optimization
problems that describe situations with selfish strategic agents in an environment which
lacks a central control authority can be often modeled as non-cooperative games, which
are the primary objects studied in Game Theory, by considering these agents to be the
players in the game.
However, because of the novel nature of the problems encountered in modern computer
network not all the issues could be handled by simply combining tools from computer
science and game theory. While pure economic and game-theoretic literature concerned
itself mainly with incentives and economic qualities that the proposed solution should
satisfy without concerning the computational efficiency of the attained methods, traditional
computer science puts a special emphasis on efficient identification and finding of solutions
satisfying the required qualities.
This had motivated the development of an appropriate joint CS and economic frame-
work that could embody the new paradigm in which distributed computation is performed
by self-interested agents, which is called Algorithmic Game Theory. This new discipline
which was initiated in [92, 95] studies various algorithmic issues in games, while consid-
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ering the selfishness of the players and the resulting lack of central control as an inevitable
constraint, similar to the lack of unbounded computing resources in design of approxima-
tion algorithms or the lack of information about the future when designing online algo-
rithms. For an exhaustive survey of the research in this area, we refer the reader to the
textbook by Nisan et al. [91].
Among the topical questions investigated in this context are quantifying the effect of
the selfish behavior on the performance of the system, measuring the quality of stable
states, i.e. equilibria of the induced game, considering the complexity of computing these
equilibria and designing algorithms to compute them. Another important issues concern
designing of systems with equilibria of good quality, and causing players to act in a desir-
able manner by introducing incentives.
This thesis is located within the field of Algorithmic Game Theory and considers many
of the questions that were raised above, in various settings.
1.2 Objectives and contributions
The rise of the Internet as a major economic, cultural and computational platform as well as
its broad spectrum of applications that includes among others peer-to-peer, content delivery
and social networks, had significantly influenced many aspects of our everyday life. This
makes it extremely important to understand the processes that surround the development,
structure and operation of the Internet and Internet-like systems in which selfishly-oriented
users interact.
For this purpose we seek to build and study appropriate mathematical models of the
problems that naturally occur in the multi-agent modern networks from a game-theoretic
point of view. Game-theoretic concepts and techniques were applied to study various net-
work issues like routing [95, 84, 35], network formation [4, 50], Web access [93], Quality
of Service [82, 1], bandwidth allocation [107] and congestion control [77], to name only a
few.
A commonly accepted approach is to study combinatorial problems that are abstrac-
tions of the problems that arise in real networks and are suitable for describing basic issues
in networks. The motivation behind this approach is that analyzing the simplified sce-
narios modeled by these problems will help to shed light and provide useful insights into
effects of interactions between selfish agents on the effectiveness of network protocols.
By considering the tradeoffs and proving precise guarantees regarding the performance
achievable in these models we hope to understand how to positively influence these inter-
actions which will enable the algorithmic design of efficient network protocols that are and
robust in presence of selfish and uncoordinated behavior of the agents.
3
Combinatorial problems that were considered in this context include job scheduling
and load balancing (see e.g. [79, 36, 84, 13, 61, 5, 55, 52, 25, 70, 14, 16, 20] for a partial
list), web caching [27, 85], facility location [104, 66, 21], set covering [60] etc..
It appears that a lot of packing, scheduling and covering problems are suitable for de-
scribing and modeling various fundamental aspects in networks optimization such as net-
work routing, allocation of network resources, network dynamics, performance of queuing
systems, service provision and so on.
Machine scheduling and packing problems have their origin in the optimization of
production systems and their formal mathematical treatment dates back to the 1950s (see
[35, 28] for surveys). These combinatorial problems are challenging by themselves. In
many cases they are NP-hard [62], thus it is unlikely that there are algorithms that find
optimal solutions to these problems in a computationally efficient manner (unless P=NP).
In such cases, the goal is to design approximation algorithms which are relatively simple
algorithms that are required to run in polynomial time and find feasible solutions that have
cost within a constant factor from the exact optimal solution.
This thesis attempts to contribute to the body of knowledge regarding combinatorial
optimization problems that are studied under under game-theoretic perspective in the con-
text of modern networks.
We study naturally induced game theoretic versions of packing, scheduling and cov-
ering problems from both combinatorial as well as game theoretic standpoints. We define
the models in a way that allows us to directly incorporate the structure of the relevant
combinatorial problems into the description of a game, which promises applicability of
game-theoretic reasoning, and consider different issues concerning the game-theoretic so-
lution concepts of these games. In order to investigate the various game-theoretic solution
concepts we use advanced tools and methodologies borrowed from the fields of combina-
torial optimization and approximation algorithms, such as linear and integer programming,
probabilistic analysis, primal-dual approach and the weighting functions technique.
As scheduling and packing problems naturally describe many scenarios encountered in
networks, we believe that the study of these problems under game-theoretic framework is
substantial for enhancing our understanding of various processes occurring in modern de-
centralized systems and providing us with new insights on their effect on the functionality
of these systems.
In fact, this line of research has incentives that stretch far beyond the Internet and
its applications, as such problems can be also used to model analogous issues that arise
in any given traffic network which involves selfish agents. These include transportation
and telecommunication networks, telephone and cellular networks, electric power supply
systems and other economic applications. Hence, sound analysis of the combinatorial
problems mentioned above is of practical importance for many settings.
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In the rest of the thesis, however, we stick to the terminology of a communication
network.
1.3 Preliminaries
1.3.1 Definitions and notations
To establish notation that is used throughout this thesis, we will briefly introduce the
basic concepts from Game Theory. A non-cooperative strategic game is a tuple G =
〈N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉, where N is a non-empty, finite set of rational players, each player
i ∈ N has a non-empty, finite set Si of strategies (actions) and a payoff function ui. Each
player chooses a strategy independently of the choices of the other players. The choices
of all players can thus be thought to be made simultaneously. It is assumed that each
player has a full knowledge over all possible strategies of all the players. In a setting of
pure strategies, each player chooses exactly one strategy (with probability one); in a set-
ting of mixed strategies, each player uses a probability distribution over the strategies. A
combination of strategies chosen by the players s = (xj)j∈N ∈ ×j∈NSj , is called a strat-
egy profile or a configuration. X = ×j∈NSj denotes the set of the strategy profiles. Let
i ∈ N . X−i = ×j∈N\{i}Sj denotes the strategy profiles of all players except for player i.
Let A ⊆ N . XA = ×j∈ASj denotes the set of strategy profiles of players in A. Strategy
profiles s = (xj)j∈N ∈ X will be denoted by (xi, x−i) or (xA, xN\A) if the strategy choice
of player i or of the set A of players needs stressing. The payoff function ui : X → R
specifies for each strategy profile s ∈ X player i’s payoff ui(x) ∈ R. The payoff of each
player depends not only on his own strategy but also on the strategies chosen by all other
players. In some games it is more suitable to think of the payoffs as the costs incurred by
players. In this case we have a cost function ci : X → R such that ui(s) = −ci(s) for
s ∈ X instead of the payoff function. Each strategic player i ∈ N would like to choose a
strategy that maximizes his payoff, or interchangeably, minimizes his cost.
The most prominent stability (solution) concept in a strategic game is the Nash equi-
librium (NE) [90] which was introduced by Nash in 1951. It is a stable state of the game
where no player can increase his payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy, while the
strategies of all other players remain unchanged. Formally,
Definition 1. A strategy profile s ∈ X is called a pure Nash equilibrium if for every i and
for all strategies x′i ∈ Si, ui(xi, x−i) ≥ ui(x′i, x−i) holds.
It is often more realistic to assume that players choose pure strategies rather than ran-
domizing over many strategies, which is not appropriate for many settings. Thus, when we
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mention Nash equilibria throughout the chapter we consider the setting of pure strategies,
unless it is specifically stated otherwise.
Nash equilibrium (perhaps in mixed strategies) exists in every finite game [90]. A game
can have several Nash equilibria, with different social cost values. However, if only pure
strategies are allowed, there may exist no Nash equilibrium at all. The set of pure Nash
equilibria of a game G is denoted by NE(G).
Games as defined above assume that players are independent, and do not negotiate and
cooperate with each other. Coalitional Game Theory considers cooperative games, where
the notion of players is replaced by the set of possible coalitions (i.e., groups of players)
rather than individuals. Of course, the players remain strategic, and agree to participate, if
at all, in a coalition that ensures them a benefit from participation in that coalition. Each
coalition can achieve a particular value (the best possible sum of payoffs among players in
the coalition, against worst-case behavior of players outside the coalition).
While Nash equilibria are resilient to unilateral deviations of individuals, they are usu-
ally not stable against joint deviations of two or more cooperating players.
In 1959 Aumann proposed the concept of Strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) [10], which
is resilient to coalitional deviations. This is a stable state where no subset of players can
jointly deviate by simultaneously changing strategies in a manner that increases the payoffs
of all its members, given that nonmembers stick to their original strategies. Formally,
Definition 2. A strategy profile s ∈ X is called a Strong Nash equilibrium if for every
subgroup of players S ⊆ N and for all strategy profiles yS ∈ XS, there is at least one
player i ∈ S such that ui(xS, x−S) ≥ ui(yS, x−S).
Since each player can either participate or decline to participate in a coalition, given
the strategy he will be obligated to choose in case he does, and the payoff he will receive
as a result, the Strong Nash equilibrium is typically studied only for settings that involve
no randomization, that is, only pure strategies are considered. The set of Strong Nash
equilibria of a game G is denoted by SNE(G).
Every Strong Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium (as it is resilient to deviation
by coalitions with a single player). Hence, SNE(G) ⊆ NE(G). The opposite does not
usually holds. A game can have no Strong Nash equilibrium at all. Several specific classes
of congestion games (where players compete for network resources, and the cost of using
each resource is a function of the number of players using it) were shown in [69, 102, 67]
to possess Strong Nash equilibria. For any other game, the existence of Strong equilibria
should be checked specifically in each case. Other variants of Strong equilibria that were
studied consider static predefined coalitions [68, 59, 53] and coalitions that are not subject
to deviations by subsets of their own members [106].
The social cost of a game G, is an objective function SC(s) : X → R that numerically
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expresses the aggregated “social value” or “social cost” (depends whether we use a payoff
or a cost interpretation) of an outcome of the game for a strategy profile s ∈ X . The social
optimum of a game G, is the game outcome that optimizes the social cost function. It is
denoted by OPT, and its value is defined by OPT (G) = min
s∈X
\max
s∈X
SC(s) (depending on
the model in question).
1.3.2 Measuring the efficiency of equilibria
As there is often a discrepancy between the private goals of the selfishly motivated players
and the global social goal, it may result in a negative effect on the system performance.
Even in very simple settings, selfish behavior can lead to highly inefficient outcomes (see
e.g. the well known Prisoners Dilemma).
An important matter concerns quantifying the efficiency loss incurred to the system by
the selfish and uncoordinated behavior of system participants. This is achieved by consid-
ering the quality or “efficiency” of the game-theoretic stability concepts. The analysis of
the equilibria can lead to conclusions on whether a system can survive even without a cen-
tralized protocol. There is an expansive body of work on quantifying this “efficiency” of
various types of equilibria (for a comprehensive survey, go to Part III of the text by Nisan
et al. [91]). We will concentrate herein on the measures that are relevant for the scope of
our contribution.
In their seminal paper from 1999, Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [79] proposed to
measure the quality of Nash equilibria that were reached with uncoordinated selfish players
with respect to the hypothetical social optimum, that was obtained in a fully coordinated
manner, when the methodology used is worst-case approach.
For this purpose they have introduced a measure called the Price of Anarchy (POA)
(also referred to as the Coordination Ratio (CR)), which is defined as the worst case ratio
between the social value of the worst Nash equilibrium and the value of a social optimum,
for a minimization problem (or as the worst case ratio between the value of a social op-
timum to the social value of the worst Nash equilibrium, for a maximization problem).
Formally, the Price of Anarchy of a game G is defined by
PoA(G) = sup
s∈NE(G)
SC(s)
OPT (G)
.
In this approach we are seeing the Nash equilibrium as an approximated solution to a
problem, and the quality of Nash equilibria is reflected by the closeness of the value of the
least efficient Nash equilibrium to the value of the optimal solution. If the Price of Anarchy
of a game is close to 1, we can conclude that all Nash equilibria states of this game are
good approximations of an optimal outcome.
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Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou have considered in [79] the Price of Anarchy in a job
scheduling game. In the expansive volume of work that was motivated by this paper, the
Price of Anarchy has been studied in different settings, that include selfish routing with
atomic [12, 30, 94, 58] and non-atomic [95, 33] players (that each control a nonnegligi-
ble/negligible fraction of the overall traffic, respectively), variants of job scheduling games
[36, 84, 13, 61], congestion games [24, 101, 2, 96, 34], network creation/formation games
[4, 50, 50, 32], facility location games [104] and many others.
Schulz an Stier Moses [98] suggested to take a less pessimistic approach, and consider
the worst case ratio between the value of the best Nash equilibrium and the the value
of a coordinated social optimum, for a minimization problem (or as the worst case ratio
between the value of a social optimum to the social value of the best Nash equilibrium, for
a maximization problem). This ratio was called the Price of Stability (POS) (also known as
optimistic Price of Anarchy) by Anshelevich at el. in [7, 6]. Formally, the Price of Stability
of a game G is defined by
PoS(G) = inf
s∈NE(G)
SC(s)
OPT (G)
.
The Price of Stability has a natural interpretation in many network problems, as in re-
ality, in many networking applications the players are not completely autonomous. They
interact with an underlying protocol that proposes a collective solution to all participants,
who can either accept to follow it or to defect from it. Best Nash equilibrium is an obvious
stable solution that can be proposed by the protocol designer, from which no selfish player
would want to unilaterally defect. The Price of Stability in this context measures the mini-
mum penalty in performance required to ensure a stable equilibrium outcome, quantifying
the benefit of such protocols.
The POA and POS have become prevalent measures of the quality of Nash equilibria in
the following computer science literature.
Recent research by Andelman et al. [5] has initiated a study of measures that allow
us to separate the effect of the lack of coordination among the players from the effect of
their selfishness. This is achieved by acknowledging the ability of the players to cooperate,
and analyzing the Strong Nash equilibria of the game. The measures considered are the
Strong Price of Anarchy (SPOA) and the Strong Price of Stability (SPOS). These measures
are defined similarly to the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability, but only Strong
equilibria are taken into account. For demonstration of this line of study, see e.g. [55, 3,
41, 48].
In cases where the SPOA is significantly lower than the POA, we may conclude that
the efficiency loss is caused mainly by the lack of coordination and not by the selfishness,
hence, coordination can significantly improve the situation. On the other hand, if the SPOA
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and POA yield similar results, the efficiency loss is caused from selfishness alone, and
coordination will not help. In case that the SPOS is notably greater than the POS, this
implies that coordination among selfish players may cause a deterioration in the efficiency.
1.4 Thesis outline and organization
Having motivated the results of this thesis and introduced the necessary terminology, we
sketch below the structure of the chapters, and the technical statements of each result.
Chapter 2: Strict and Weak Pareto Nash Equilibria in the Job Scheduling game. In
this chapter we consider the well-known job scheduling game, where the jobs are con-
trolled by selfish players that each wishes to minimize the load of the machine on which
it is executed, while the social goal is to minimize the makespan, that is, the maximum
load of any machine. We study this problem on the three most common machines models,
identical machines, uniformly related machines and unrelated machines, with respect to
both weak and strict Pareto optimal Nash equilibria. These are kinds of equilibria which
are stable not only in the sense that no player can improve its cost by changing its strategy
unilaterally, but in addition, there is no alternative choice of strategies for the entire set of
players where no player increases its cost, and at least one player reduces its cost (in the
case of strict Pareto optimality), or where all players reduce their costs (in the case of weak
Pareto optimality).
We give a complete classification of the social quality of such solutions with respect to
an optimal solution, that is, we find the Price of Anarchy of such schedules as a function
of the number of machines, m. We also discuss a notion of preserving deviations, which
are deviations from a Nash equilibrium where every player keeps the same cost that it had.
In addition, we give a full classification of the recognition complexity of such sched-
ules.
Chapter 3: Bin Packing of selfish items. In this chapter we consider the bin packing
game where the items are controlled by selfish players. Each player is charged with a cost
according to the fraction of the used bin space its item requires. That is, the cost of the
bin is split among the players, proportionally to their sizes. The selfish players prefer their
items to be packed in a bin that is as full as possible, whereas the social goal is to minimize
the number of the bins used in the packing.
We measure the quality of the (pure) Nash equilibria in this game using the standard
measures Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability We also consider the recently introduced
measures Strong Price of Anarchy and Strong Price of Stability, that are defined similarly,
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but consider only Strong Nash equilibria.
We give nearly tight lower and upper bounds of 1.6416 and 1.6428, respectively, on the
(asymptotic) Price of Anarchy of the bin packing game, improving upon previous result
by Bilo` [18]. As for the Strong Nash equilibria of the bin packing game, we show that a
packing is a Strong Nash equilibrium iff it is produced by the Subset Sum algorithm for bin
packing. This characterization implies that the Strong Price of Anarchy of the bin packing
game exactly equals the approximation ratio of the Subset Sum algorithm, for which a
tight bound is known [46]. Moreover, the fact that any lower bound instance for the Sub-
set Sum algorithm can be converted by a small modification of the item sizes to a lower
bound instance on the Strong Price of Stability, implies that in the bin packing game these
measures have the same value. Finally, we address the issue of complexity of computing a
Strong Nash packing and show that no polynomial time algorithm exists for finding Strong
Nash equilibria, unless P=NP.
Chapter 4: Parametric Bin Packing of selfish items. In this chapter we study the para-
metric variant of the bin packing game which was considered in Chapter 2, where the items
that are controlled by selfish players are have sizes in the interval (0, α] for some parameter
α ≤ 1.
We study the (pure) Nash equilibria of the parametric Bin Packing game and show
nearly tight upper and lower bounds on the Price of Anarchy for all values of α ≤ 1.
We also consider the Strong Nash equilibria in this game and provide tight bounds for
the Strong Price of Anarchy and Strong Price of Stability for all values of α ≤ 1.
Chapter 5: Machine Covering on identical machines. In this chapter we consider a
scheduling problem where each job is controlled by a selfish agent, who is interested in
minimizing its own cost, which is defined as the total load on the machine that its job is
assigned to. We consider the social objective of maximizing the minimum load (cover)
over the machines. We study the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability in the induced
game. Unlike the regular scheduling problem with makespan minimization objective, for
which these measures were extensively studied, they have not been considered in the set-
ting before.
Since these measures are unbounded already for two uniformly related machines (see
Chapter 5), we focus on identical machines. We show that the Price of Stability is 1, and
we derive tight bounds on the Price of Anarchy for m ≤ 6 and nearly tight bounds for
general m. Specifically, we show that the Price of Anarchy is at least 1.691 for large m
and at most 1.7. Hence, surprisingly, the Price of Anarchy for this problem is less than the
Price of Anarchy for the makespan problem, which is 2. To achieve the upper bound of
1.7, we make an unusual use of weighting functions. In addition, we consider the mixed
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Price of Anarchy and show that the mixed Price of Anarchy grows exponentially with m
for this problem, whereas it is only Θ(logm/ log logm) for the makespan [78, 36].
Finally, we consider a similar setting with a different objective which is minimizing the
maximum ratio between the loads of any pair of machines in the schedule. We show that
under this objective for general m the Price of Stability is 1, and the Price of Anarchy is 2.
Chapter 6: Machine Covering on uniformly related machines. In this chapter we con-
sider the scheduling game introduced oin Chapter 4 in a setting of uniformly related ma-
chines.
We study the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability for this setting. As on related
machines both these values are unbounded, we consider these measures as a function of
the parameter smax, which is the maximum speed ratio between any two machines.
We show that on related machines, Price of Stability is unbounded smax > 2, and the
Price of Anarchy is unbounded for smax ≥ 2. We study the remaining cases and show
that while the Price of Anarchy tends to grow to infinity as smax tends to 2, the Price of
Stability is at most 2 for any smax ≤ 2. Finally, we analyze the Price of Anarchy and Price
of Stability for the case m = 2.
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis with a short summary of our contributions. We describe
possible extensions of the models studied in the framework of this thesis that seem inter-
esting to investigate, and suggest directions for further research.
1.5 Publications related to this thesis
Some of the results presented in this thesis are published in parts as joint work in the
Proceedings of the 16th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA’08) [43], Pro-
ceedings of the 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Sys-
tems (AAMAS 2011) [44], Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and
Network Economics (WINE’09) [46, 47], and Algorithmica [45].
11
Chapter 2
Strict and Weak Pareto Nash equilibria
in the Job Scheduling game
2.1 Introduction and motivation
When we design protocols intended for use in a modern communication network such as
the Internet, we have to take into account its inherent characteristics.
The Internet consists of multiple independent users, or players, which act in their own
self-interest and strive to optimize their private objectives, as opposed to optimizing a
global social objective. Obviously, such collective behavior often leads to sub-optimal
performance of the system, which is highly undesirable.
However, because of its scale and complexity and in presence of raw economic compe-
tition between the parties involved, there is no possibility to introduce a single regulatory
establishment enforcing binding commitments on the players.
An important issue to explore in this context is the middle-ground between centrally
enforced protocols and completely unregulated anarchy.
Selfishly oriented players may have no incentive to cooperate and follow a predefined
protocol and may prefer to selfishly deviate from protocols if it is not aligned with their
interests. In light of the above, there is an increased need to design efficient protocols
that deploy economic measures that motivate self-interested agents to cooperate. Here
cooperation may be defined as any enforceable commitment that makes it rational for the
self interested players to choose a given strategic profile (which is being initially offered
by a central authority).
In the settings in discussion, any meaningful agreement between the players must be
self-enforcing. When deciding which particular strategy profile to offer to the users, the
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first and most basic requirement one has to consider is its stability, in a sense that no
player would have an interest to unilaterally defect from this profile, given that the other
players stick to it. This is consistent with the notion of Nash equilibrium (NE) [90], which
is a widely accepted concept of stability in non-cooperative game theory. The second
requirement is that the profile must be efficient. A fundamental concept of efficiency
considered in economics is the Pareto efficiency, or Pareto optimality [89]. This efficiency
criterion assures that it is not possible that a group of players can change their strategies so
that every player is better off (or no worse off) than before.
One may justifully argue that Nash stability and Pareto optimality should be minimal
requirements for any equilibrium concept intended to induce self-enforceability in pres-
ence of selfishness.
There are even stronger criteria for self-enforceability, requiring fairness in terms of fair
competition without coalitions (like cartels and syndicates), and demanding from the pro-
file to be resilient to groups (or coalitions) of players willing to coordinate their decisions,
in order to achieve mutual beneficial outcomes. This is compatible with the definition of
Strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) [10]. However, this requirement is sometimes too strong
that it excludes many reasonable profiles.
We therefore restrict ourselves to profiles that satisfy the requirements of Nash stability
and Pareto efficiency. In a sense, Pareto optimal Nash equilibria can be considered as in-
termediate concepts between Nash and Strong Nash equilibria; One may think of a Pareto
optimal equilibrium as being stable under moves by single players or the grand coalition
of all players, but not necessarily arbitrary coalitions. We distinguish between two types
of Pareto efficiency. In a weakly Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium (WPO-NE) there is no
alternative strategy profile beneficial for all players. A strictly Pareto optimal Nash equi-
librium (SPO-NE) is also stable against deviations in which some players do not benefit but
are also not worse off and at least one player improves his personal cost. Obviously, any
strictly Pareto optimal equilibrium is also weakly Pareto optimal, but not wise-versa.
In this work we consider strict and weak Pareto optimal Nash equilibria for scheduling
games on three common machine models: identical machines, uniformly related machines
and unrelated machines in the setting of pure strategies. This class of games is particularly
important to our discussion as it models a great variety of problems in modern networks.
Example applications include bandwidth sharing in ATM networks [31], market-based
protocols for scheduling or task allocation [105], and congestion control protocols [77].
We investigate the quality of these solution concepts in the job scheduling game by
comparison to an optimal solution, adopting a worst-case approach. As both papers that
originally suggested to compare the NE and SNE to an optimal solution to study their quality
([79] and [5], respectively) demonstrated this approach first in scheduling games, this gives
an additional incentive to consider these solution concepts for this particular game class.
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2.2 The model
We now define the general job scheduling problem. There are n jobs J = {1, 2, . . . . , n}
which are to be assigned to a set of m machines M = {M1, . . . ,Mm}. We study three
models of machines, that differ in the relation between the processing times of jobs on
different machines. In the most general model of unrelated machines, job 1 ≤ k ≤ n has
a processing time of pik on machine Mi, i.e., processing times are machine dependent. In
the uniformly related (or related) machine model, each machine Mi for 1 ≤ i ≤ m has a
speed si and each job 1 ≤ k ≤ n has a positive size pk. The processing time of job k on
machine Mi is then pik = pksi . If pik = pi′k = pk for each job k and machines Mi and Mi′ ,
the machines are called identical (in which case it is typically assumed the all speed are
equal to 1).
An assignment or schedule is a function A : J → M . The load of machine Mi, which
is also called the delay of this machine, is Li =
∑
k:A(k)=Mi
pik. The cost, or the social
cost of a schedule is the maximum delay of any machine, also known as the makespan,
which we would like to minimize.
The job scheduling game JS is characterized by a tuple JS = 〈N, (Mk)k∈N , (ck)k∈N〉,
where N is the set of atomic players. Each selfish player k ∈ N controls a single job and
selects the machine to which it will be assigned. We associate each player with the job it
wishes to run, that is, N = J . The set of strategies Mk for each job k ∈ N is the set M of
all machines. i.e. Mk = M . Each job must be assigned to one machine only. Preemption
is not allowed. The outcome of the game is an assignment A = (Ak)k∈N ∈ ×k∈NMk of
jobs to the machines, where Ak for each 1 ≤ k ≤ n is the index of the machine that job k
chooses to run on. Let S denote the set of all possible assignments.
The cost function of job k ∈ N is denoted by ck : S → R. The cost cik charged
from job k for running on machine Mi in a given assignment A is defined to be the load
observed by machine i in this assignment, that is ck(i,A−k) = Li(A), when A−k ∈ S−k;
here S−k = ×j∈N\{k}Sj denotes the actions of all players except for player k. The goal of
the selfish jobs is to run on a machine with a load which is as small as possible. Similarly,
for K ⊆ N we denote by AK ∈ S−K the set of strategies of players outside of K in a
strategy profile A, when S−K = ×j∈N\KSj is the action space of all players except for
players in K. The social cost of a strategy profile A is denoted by SC(A) = max
1≤k≤n
ck(A).
We will next provide formal definitions of Nash, Weak/Strict Pareto Nash and Strong
Nash equilibria in the job scheduling game, using the notations given above.
Definition 3. (Nash equilibrium) A strategy profileA is a (pure) Nash equilibrium (NE) in
the job scheduling game JS if for all k ∈ N and for any strategy A¯k ∈M , ck(Ak,A−k) ≤
ck(A¯k,A−k).
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It was shown that job scheduling games always have (at least one) pure Nash equilib-
rium [57, 49]. We denote the set of Nash equilibria of an instance G of the job scheduling
game by NE(G).
Definition 4. (Strong Nash equilibrium) A strategy profileA is a Strong Nash equilibrium
(SNE) in the job scheduling game JS if for every coalition φ 6= K ⊆ N and for any
set of strategies A¯K ∈ ×j∈KMj of players in K, there is a player i ∈ K such that
ci(A¯K ,A−K) ≥ ci(AK ,A−K).
Existence of Strong Nash equilibrium in job scheduling games was proved in [5]. We
denote the set of Strong Nash equilibria of an instance G of the job scheduling game by
SNE(G).
Clearly SNE(G)⊆NE(G), as coalitions of size 1 can not improve by changing their
strategy.
Definition 5. (Weak/Strict Pareto optimal profile) A strategy profile A is weakly Pareto
optimal (WPO) if there is no strategy profile A¯ s.t. for all k ∈ N , ck(A¯) < ck(A).
A strategy profile A is strictly Pareto optimal (SPO) if there is no strategy profile A¯
and k∗ ∈ N s.t. for all k ∈ N\k∗, ck(A¯) < ck(A) and ck∗(A¯) ≤ ck∗(A).
We denote by SPO(G) and WPO(G), respectively, the sets of strictly and weakly Pareto
optimal profiles of an instance G of the job scheduling game. Clearly, SPO(G)⊆WPO(G).
A strategy profile A ∈ NE(G)∩ WPO(G) is called Weak Pareto optimal Nash equilib-
rium (WPO-NE), and a strategy profileA ∈NE(G) ∩ SPO(G) is called Strict Pareto optimal
Nash equilibrium (SPO-NE), and these are the profiles that we put our focus on.
We note that every strong equilibrium is also weakly Pareto optimal, as the requirement
in Definition 4 applies to the grand coalition of all players. Hence SNE(G)⊆WPO(G). The
existence of Strong Nash equilibria in job scheduling games assures the existence of weak
Pareto optimal Nash equilibria.
On the other hand, in general, neither Nash equilibria nor Strong Nash equilibria are
necessarily strictly Pareto optimal. Existence of strict Pareto optimal Nash equilibria in
scheduling games (among others) was proved in [67].
An important issue concerns the quality of these solution concepts. As there is a dis-
crepancy between the private goals of the players and the global social goal, we would like
to measure the loss in the performance of the system as it is reflected by the closeness of the
costs of these concepts to the cost of the optimal solution, when the accepted methodology
is worst-case approach.
The quality measures which consider Nash equilibria are the Price of Anarchy and the
more optimistic Price of Stability, which are defined as the worst-case ratio between the
social cost of the worst/best NE schedule to the social cost of the optimal schedule, which
is denoted by OPT. Formally,
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Definition 6. (Price of Anarchy and Stability) The Price of Anarchy (PoA) of the job
scheduling game JS is defined by
PoA(JS) = sup
G∈JS
sup
A∈NE(G)
SC(A)
OPT(G)
.
If instead we consider the best Nash equilibrium of every instance, this leads to the defini-
tion of the Price of Stability (PoS):
PoS(JS) = sup
G∈JS
inf
A∈NE(G)
SC(A)
OPT(G)
.
This concept is applied analogously to Strong Nash equilibria as well as to weakly/strictly
Pareto optimal Nash equilibria yielding the Strong Price of Anarchy SPoA(JS) and the
Strong Price of Stability SPoS(JS) as well as the weak and strict Pareto Prices of Anarchy
WPO-PoA(JS), SPO-PoA(JS) and Stability WPO-PoS(JS), SPO-PoS(JS).
By definition, it is clear that SPoA(JS) ≤ WPO-PoA(JS) ≤ PoA(JS). As any
strictly Pareto optimal NE is also a weakly Pareto optimal NE, it must be the case that
WPO-PoA(JS) ≥ SPO-PoA(JS). However, we can show that in the job scheduling
game there is no immediate relation between the SPO-PoA(JS) and the SPoA(JS), as
there are Strong Nash equilibria that are not strictly Pareto optimal, while there are strictly
Pareto optimal Nash equilibria that are not strong equilibria.
Some natural questions that arise in this context are whether the Pareto Prices of Anar-
chy are significantly smaller than the standard Price of Anarchy, whether the weak Pareto
Price of Anarchy is much larger than the Strong Price of Anarchy, and finally, whether
there is any relation between the Strong Price of Anarchy and the strict Pareto Price of
Anarchy. In other words, does the requirement that the equilibrium must be Pareto optimal
leads to greater efficiency, and is the further demand that the equilibrium must be stable
against arbitrary coalitions helpful. We address these questions in our work, and provide
conclusive answers.
2.3 Related work and our contributions
Pareto efficiency of resource assignments is a well referred issue in economics, especially
in welfare economics. Pareto efficiency is a highly desirable trait, however Dubey [39]
has shown that Nash equilibria may generally be Pareto inefficient based on the difference
between the conditions to be satisfied by Nash equilibria and those to be satisfied by Pareto
optima.
Job scheduling is a classical problem in combinatorial optimization. The analysis of
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job scheduling in the algorithmic game theory context was initiated by Koutsoupias and
Papadimitriou in their seminal work [79], which was followed by many others (see e.g.
[36, 84, 5, 55]). In our overview of the known results we will limit our discussion only to
results concerning the model defined above in the setting of pure strategies. We will begin
with the results on quality measures that concern Nash equilibria of the game.
For m identical machines, the PoA is 2 − 2
m+1
which can be deduced from the results
of [56] (the upper bound) and [99] (the lower bound). For related machines the PoA is
Θ( logm
log logm
) [78, 36, 79]. In the model of unrelated machines the PoA is unbounded [13],
which holds already for two machines. From the results of [49] it is evident that in all three
models the PoS is 1.
The study of quality measures that concern Strong Nash equilibria of this game was
initiated by Andelman at el. [5]. For identical machines, they proved that the SPoA equals
the PoA, which in turn equals 2− 2
m+1
. For related machines, Fiat et al. [55] showed that
the SPoA is Θ( logm
(log logm)2
). Surprisingly, the SPoA for this problem is bounded by the
number of machines m, as shown in [55], and this is tight [5]. Andelman at el. also
showed that SPoS is 1.
The previous work on Pareto efficiency of Nash equilibria in algorithmic game theory
was mainly concerned with weak Pareto equilibria, probably since a solution which is not
weakly Pareto optimal is clearly unstable. A textbook in economics states the following:
“The concept of Pareto optimality originated in the economics equilibrium and welfare
theories at the beginning of the past century. The main idea of this concept is that society
is enjoying a maximum ophelimity when no one can be made better off without making
someone else worse off” [83]. In practice, however, the strict Pareto is a stronger and more
meaningful efficiency notion, as it captures an important aspect of human social behavior;
When something could be done to make at least one person better off without hurting
anyone else, most people would agree we should do it. Another issue is that the weak
Pareto suggests that some assignment is socially preferable to another by everyone. In
reality, such unanimity of preferences among all persons is very rare. To conclude, both
concepts are important, and we focus on both of them in this work.
Pareto optimality of Nash equilibria has been studied in the context of congestion
games, see Chien and Sinclair [23] and Holzman and Law-Yone [69]. The former gave
conditions for uniqueness and for weak and strict Pareto optimality of Nash equilibria, and
the latter characterized the weak Pareto Prices of Anarchy and Stability. The existence, and
complexity of recognition and computation of weak Pareto Nash equilibria in congestion
games was considered recently by Hoefer and Skopalik in [100].
Milchtaich [86] has considered the topology of networks having NE that are always
Pareto efficient, however his work concerns the case of non-atomic players, where the
processing time of each player is negligible compared to the total processing time.
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In [67] Harks at el. show that a class of games that have a Lexicographical Improve-
ment Property (which our game indeed has) admits a generalized strong ordinal potential
function. They use this to show existence of Strong Nash equilibria with certain efficiency
and fairness properties in these games, strict Pareto efficiency included. Which they do by
arguing that a player wise cost-lexicographically minimal assignment is also strictly Pareto
optimal (and so it is optimal with respect to the social goal function as well).
Weak Pareto Nash equilibria in routing and job scheduling games were considered
recently in [11] by Aumann and Dombb. As a measure for quantifying the distance of
a best/worst Nash equilibrium from being weakly Pareto efficient, they use the smallest
factor by which any player improves its cost when we move to a different strategy profile,
which they refer to as “Pareto inefficiency”. They do not consider however the quality of
Pareto optimal Nash equilibria with respect to the social goal.
Among other results, it is shown in [11] that any Nash equilibrium assignment is nec-
essarily weakly Pareto optimal for both identical and related machines. Moreover, for any
machine model, any assignment which achieves the social optimum must be weakly Pareto
optimal. One such assignment is one whose sorted vector of machine loads is lexicograph-
ically minimal is necessarily weakly Pareto optimal (see also [5, 49]). We consider these
issues for SPO-NE assignments. We show that while the property of identical machines
remains true, this is not the case for related machines, that is, not every Nash equilibrium
assignment is strict Pareto optimal. For unrelated machines, while there always exist an
assignment which is a social optimum and a SPO-NE, assignments with lexicographically
minimal sorted vector of machine loads are not necessarily strictly Pareto optimal. In
this chapter we fully characterize the weak and strict Pareto Prices of Anarchy of the job
scheduling game in cases of identical, related and unrelated machines. The characteriza-
tion of the Prices of Stability follows from previous work as explained above.
Next, we consider the complexity of recognition of weak and strict Pareto optimality
of NE. Note that the recognition of NE can be done in polynomial time for any machine
model by examining potential deviations of each job. As for strong equilibria, it was
shown by Feldman and Tamir [52] that it is NP-hard to recognize an SNE for m ≥ 3
identical machines and for m ≥ 2 unrelated machines. For two identical machines, they
showed that any NE is a SNE, so recognition can be done in polynomial time (for m ≥ 3,
it was shown in [5] that not every NE is a SNE). For the only remaining case of two
related machines, it was shown [42] that recognition is again NP-hard. We show that the
situation for Pareto optimal equilibria is slightly different. In fact, recognition of WPO-NE
or SPO-NE can be done in polynomial time for identical machines and related machines.
For unrelated machines, we show that the recognition of WPO-NE is NP-hard in the strong
sense and the recognition of SPO-NE is NP-hard.
We reflect upon the differences between the results for weak and strict Pareto equilibria
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also compared to strong equilibria, and make conclusions regarding the relations between
the quality measures in this game. See Table 2.1 below for a summary of the results.
We also discuss a notion of preserving deviations, which are deviations from a Nash
equilibrium where every player keeps the same cost that it had before.
# of
Strict Pareto Weak Pareto
machines SPO-PoA SPO-PoS Recognition WPO-PoA WPO-PoS Recognition
identical m 2− 2m+1 1 [67] P 2− 2m+1 1 [5, 11] P
related m Θ( logmlog logm) 1 [67] P Θ( logmlog logm) 1 [5, 11] P
unrelated
m = 2 2
1 [67] NP-hard 2 1 [5, 11] NP-hard
m ≥ 3 m ∞
Table 2.1: Summary of Results
2.4 Pareto Prices of Anarchy in the Job Scheduling game
2.4.1 Identical and Related machines
A result from [11, 86] shows that any NE schedule for identical and related machines is
weakly Pareto optimal. This result implies that WPO-PoA(JS) = PoA(JS). For the
case of identical machines, they give an even stronger result: every schedule where every
machine receives at least one job is weakly Pareto optimal. Note that if n < m, then a
schedule is weakly Pareto optimal if and only if at least one machine has a single job (to
obtain strict Pareto optimality for this case, or to obtain a NE, each job needs to be assigned
to a different machine).
In the strict Pareto case, while the general result for identical machines still holds, and
the set of NE schedules is equal to the set of SPO-NE schedules for identical machines (as
we prove next), it is not necessarily true for related machines. We exhibit an example of a
schedule which is a NE but it is not strictly Pareto optimal.
Consider a job scheduling game with two related machines of speeds 1,2 and two jobs
of size 2. There are two types of pure NE schedules: in the first one, both jobs are assigned
to the fast machine, and in the other one job runs on each machine. The first one is not
a SPO-NE, as switching to a schedule of the second type strictly reduces the cost for one
of the jobs, while not harming the other. Moreover, the sorted machine load vector of the
first type of schedules is (2, 0), while the load vector of the second type is (2, 1), so the
schedule with the lexicographically minimal machine load vector is not a SPO-NE (even
though it is a SNE).
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This difference in the results for related machines is explained by the fact that condi-
tions for weak Pareto allow Pareto improvements where not all jobs strictly improve while
the strict Pareto does not. If a NE schedule has an empty machine, and a job arrived to
such a machine as a result of a deviation to a different schedule, where all jobs strictly re-
duce their costs, then the reduction in the cost of this job contradicts the original schedule
being a NE. However, if the job only needs to maintain its previous cost, then there is no
contradiction.
We will prove the following theorem, extending the result of [11] which will allow us
to claim that for identical machines, SPO-PoA(JS) = PoA(JS).
Theorem 7. Any schedule for identical machines, where no machine is empty, is strictly
Pareto optimal.
This is a stronger result than the one in [11], since it deals with strict Pareto. The idea
of the proof goes along the lines of [11], but we need to modify it so that it applies for
the stronger conditions of strict Pareto optimal schedules. First we prove the following
property, which we will also use to characterize the WPO-PoA for related machines.
Theorem 8. Consider a schedule X that is not a SPO-NE, and denote the set of non-empty
machines (which receive at least one job) in X by µX . Let Y be a different schedule where
no job has a larger cost than it has in X and at least one job has a smaller cost. Denote
the set of non-empty machines in Y by µY . Then,∑
i∈µX
si <
∑
i∈µY
si,
where si is the speed of machine i.
Proof. Consider a transition from schedule X to schedule Y , and denote by xji the sum of
the sizes of jobs that are moved from machine i ∈ µX to machine j ∈ µY (for j = i, this
gives the sum of sizes of jobs that are assigned to this machine in both schedules). Let ℓt,
for t ∈ µX , be the sum of sizes of jobs that run on machine t in X , and let ℓ′t, for t ∈ µY ,
be the sum of sizes of jobs that run on machine t in Y . We extended the definition so that
if t /∈ µX , then ℓt = 0, and if t /∈ µY , then ℓ′t = 0.
Consider the total sum of sizes of jobs assigned to a machine in X or in Y , then the
following two claims hold:
Claim 9. For every i ∈ µX ,
∑
j∈µY
xji = ℓi or alternatively,
∑
j∈µY
xji
ℓi
= 1.
Claim 10. For every j ∈ µY ,
∑
i∈µX
xji = ℓ
′
j , or alternatively,
∑
i∈µX
xji
ℓ′j
= 1.
By the definition of the costs in Y compared to X , the following claim holds:
20
Claim 11. If xji > 0, then
ℓ′j
sj
≤ ℓi
si
,
and there exist i ∈ µX ,i ∈ µY such that
ℓ′j
sj
<
ℓi
si
.
The following holds:
Claim 12. For every i ∈ µX , j ∈ µY :
xji
ℓi
≤ sj
si
· x
j
i
ℓ′j
,
and there exist i, j such that
xji
ℓi
<
sj
si
· x
j
i
ℓ′j
.
Proof. As i ∈ µX , ℓi > 0, as j ∈ µY , ℓ′i > 0. If xji > 0, it is derived from Claim 11, if
xji = 0 it holds trivially. Since there is at least one job for which the cost in Y is strictly
smaller than its cost in X , then the second property must hold.
Summing up the inequalities in Claim 12 over all j ∈ µY , in combination with Claim
9, we get that for any i ∈ µX :
1 =
∑
j∈µY
xji
ℓi
≤
∑
j∈µY
sj
si
· x
j
i
ℓ′j
, (2.1)
where there is at least one i ∈ µX for which this inequality is strict. Equivalently,
si ≤
∑
j∈µY
xji · sj
ℓ′j
. (2.2)
Summing up the inequality in (2.2) over all i ∈ µX combined with the fact that for some i
this inequality is strict, changing the order of summation, and using Claim 10 we get:
∑
i∈µX
si <
∑
i∈µX
∑
j∈µY
xji · sj
ℓ′j
=
∑
j∈µY
∑
i∈µX
xji · sj
ℓ′j
=
∑
j∈µY
sj (2.3)
which concludes our proof.
We now return to the proof of Theorem 7.
Proof. We show that any scheduleX for identical machines where µX=M is strictly Pareto
optimal. Assume by contradiction that this is not the case, and hence there exists a different
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schedule Y where at least one job improves, while all the other jobs are not worse off. As
the machines in question are identical, s1 = s1 = . . . = sm holds, thus
∑
i∈µX
si = m and∑
j∈µY
sj ≤ m. By Theorem 8 we get that m =
∑
i∈µX
si <
∑
j∈µY
sj ≤ m, which is a
contradiction, and we conclude that such Y cannot exist.
Corollary 13. Every schedule on identical machines which is a NE is also a SPO-NE. Thus
in this case SPO-PoA=WPO-PoA=PoA.
Proof. Consider a NE schedule. If there is an empty machine, then each machine has at
most one job (otherwise, if some machine has two jobs then any of them can reduce its
cost by moving to an empty machine), and thus each job has the smallest cost that it can
have in any schedule. Otherwise, the property follows from Theorem 7.
We next consider related machines and prove that the three measures are equal in this
case as well.
Theorem 14. In the job scheduling game on related machines SPO-PoA=WPO-PoA=PoA.
Proof. As any SPO-NE is also a WPO-NE , and every WPO-NE is a NE, the following se-
quence of inequalities holds: SPO-PoA ≤ WPO-PoA ≤ PoA. We will prove that this
is actually a sequence of equalities. It is enough to prove that PoA ≤ SPO-PoA. We will
do it by showing that the lower bound example for the PoA given in [36] is also a lower
bound for the SPO-PoA, by proving that it is strictly Pareto optimal.
For completeness, we first present the lower bound of [36]. Consider a job scheduling
game on m related machines. The machines are partitioned into k + 1 groups, each group
j ,0 ≤ j ≤ k has Nj machines. The sizes of the groups are defined in inductive manner:
Nk = Θ(
√
m), and for every j < k: Nj = (j + 1) · Nj+1 (and thus N0 = k! · Nk). The
total number of machines m =
∑k
j=0Nj =
∑k
j=0
k!
(k−j)!
·Nk. It follows that k ∼ logmlog logm .
The speed of each machine in group j is sj = 2j .
A schedule is defined as follows: each machine in group j has j jobs, each with size 2j .
Each such job contributes 1 to the load of its machine. The load of each machine in group
Nj is then j, and therefore the makespan which is accepted on the machines in group Nk
is k. Note that all the machines in group N0 are empty.
We denote this schedule by X . It was proven in [36] that X is a pure NE. We claim
that it is also strictly Pareto optimal.
Claim 15. X is strictly Pareto optimal.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that X is not a SPO-NE , so there exists another schedule
Y where at least one job improves, and all the other jobs are not worse off. Observe that all
the machines in group N0 necessarily remain empty in Y ; each job that runs on a machine
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in group Nj for 1 ≤ j ≤ k pays a cost of j in X , and if it is assigned on a machine from
group N0 in Y it has to pay a cost of 2j , and 2j > j for j ≥ 1, which makes it strictly
worse off. This means that µY ⊆ µX . On the other hand, according to Theorem 8 which
we proved earlier,
∑
i∈µX
si <
∑
i∈µY
si must hold, and we get a contradiction. Hence, the
schedule in this example is strictly Pareto optimal.
An optimal schedule has a makespan of 2. To obtain such a schedule, we move all jobs
from machines in Nj (j ·Nj jobs, each of size 2j) to machines in Nj−1, for 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Ev-
ery machine gets at most one job, and the load on all machines is less or equal to 2j
2j−1
= 2.
The SPO-PoA is therefore Ω( logm
log logm
).
We conclude that SPO-PoA=WPO-PoA=PoA.
It was proved in [55] that schedule X is not a SNE, as a coalition of all k jobs from a
machine in group Nk with 3 jobs from each of k different machines from group Nk−2 can
jointly move in a way that reduces the costs of all its members. In addition to determining
the SPO-NE, this example illustrates the point that in the job scheduling game not every
SPO-NE is necessarily a SNE. We saw that for related machines, the SPO-PoA=WPO-
PoA are the same as the PoA, while the SPoA is lower.
2.4.2 Unrelated machines
We saw that already for related machines, not every SNE is a SPO-NE and vice versa.
However, the results which we find for the SPO-PoA on unrelated machines are similar
to those which are known for the SPoA, that is, the SPO-PoA is equal to m for any
number of machines m. Interestingly, the WPO-PoA for the setting m = 2 is exactly 2,
like the SPO-PoA, but for m ≥ 3 it is unbounded like the PoA.
Theorem 16. There exists a job scheduling game with 2 unrelated machines, such that
WPO-PoA ≥ 2. For any, m ≥ 3 there exists a job scheduling game with m unrelated
machines, such that WPO-PoA is unbounded.
Proof. Consider a job scheduling game with two unrelated machines and two jobs, where
p11 = p21 = p12 = 1 and p22 = 2. A schedule where job 1 is assigned to M1 and job 2
is assigned to M2 with a makespan of 2 is a WPO-NE; No job would benefit from moving
to a different machine, and job 1 will not profit by switching to a different schedule. In an
optimal schedule for this game, job k, k ∈ {1, 2} is assigned to Mk, and the makespan is
1. We get that WPO-PoA ≥ 2.
Now, consider a job scheduling game with m ≥ 3 unrelated machines and n = m
jobs, where for each job k, 1 ≤ k ≤ m: pkk = ε, and pjk = 1 for all j 6= k, for some
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arbitrary small positive ε. A schedule where job 1 is assigned to run on M1, job m is
assigned to M2 and each job k for 2 ≤ k ≤ m − 1 is assigned to Mk+1, is a WPO-NE.
It is weakly Pareto optimal since job 1 cannot decrease its cost by changing to any other
assignment. The only way that another job could decrease its cost would be by moving
to the machine where its cost is ε, but the load on all those machines is 1. Therefore, the
schedule is a NE. The makespan of this schedule is 1. An optimal schedule for this game,
where each job 1 ≤ k ≤ m is assigned to machine Mk, has a makespan of ε. In total, we
have WPO-PoA ≥ 1
ε
, which is unbounded letting ε tend to zero.
We next prove a matching upper bound for m = 2.
Theorem 17. For any job scheduling game with 2 unrelated machines, WPO-PoA ≤ 2.
Proof. Consider a schedule on two unrelated machines which is a WPO-NE. Without loss
of generality, assume that the load of M1 is not larger than the load of M2, and denote the
loads of the machines are by L1 and L2, respectively. The makespan of this schedule is
then L2. We show L2 ≤ 2OPT. We first show L1 ≤ OPT. If L2 ≥ L1 > OPT then an
optimal schedule has the property that every job has a smaller cost in it than it has in the
current schedule (a cost of at most OPT < L1 ≤ L2), in contradiction to the fact that this
schedule is a WPO-NE.
To complete the proof, we upper bound L2. If L2 ≤ OPT, then we are done, otherwise,
L2 > OPT, and there must exist a job k assigned to M2 which is assigned to M1 in an
optimal schedule (since the load resulting from jobs assigned to M2 in an optimal schedule
is no larger than OPT). Thus, p1k ≤ OPT, and in the alternative schedule, where this job
moves to M1, the new load of M1 is at most L1 + p1k ≤ 2OPT. However, we know that the
given schedule is a NE, which means that L1 + p1k ≥ L2, giving L2 ≤ 2OPT . Therefore,
WPO-PoA ≤ 2.
From Theorems 16 and 17 we conclude that for m = 2, WPO-PoA = 2, and for
m ≥ 3, WPO-PoA =∞.
We prove next that like the SPoA, the SPO-PoA is m. We should note that the
previous results for the SPoA cannot be used here. As we saw, the sets of SNE and SPO-NE
have no particular relation. The proofs used for the SPoA do not hold for the SPO-PoA
and need to be adapted. The lower bound of m on the SPoA by Andelman et al. [5] is not
strictly Pareto optimal (see below), and in the proof of the upper bound by Fiat et al. [55]
the claim is proved by considering alternative schedules where the jobs which change their
strategies are proper subsets of jobs (so other jobs may increase their costs).
Theorem 18. The SPO-PoA for m unrelated machines in any job scheduling game is at
most m.
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Proof. Consider a schedule A on m unrelated machines which is a SPO-NE . Assume that
the machines are sorted by non-increasing order of loads, that is, L1 ≥ L2 ≥ . . . ≥ Lm.
The makespan of A is therefore L1.
First, note that Lm ≤ OPT . If Lm > OPT then an optimal schedule has the property
that every job has a smaller cost in it, contradicting the strict Pareto optimality of A. Next,
we will prove thatLi−Li+1 ≤ OPT holds for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m−1. Assume by contradiction
that there exists i so that Li − Li+1 > OPT . We let Li+1 = δ. By our assumption
Li > δ +OPT holds.
Now, consider another schedule A′, where each one of the jobs from machines Mj for
1 ≤ j ≤ i in A is running on the machine on which it runs in an optimal schedule (all the
other jobs hold their positions).
We observe that none of these jobs runs on machines Mi+1, . . . ,Mm in A′ (or in the
optimal schedule under consideration); The processing time of each such job in A′ is at
most OPT, and as Lk ≤ δ for i + 1 ≤ k ≤ m, its cost in A if it switches to the machines
out of Mi+1, . . . ,Mm on which its processing time is at most OPT, then the load of this
machine would be at most δ+OPT , while its cost in A was strictly larger than δ+OPT ,
contradicting A being a NE.
We conclude that these jobs are scheduled in A′ on machines M1, . . . ,Mi, where the
load of each one of the machines is at most OPT, and that the loads and the allocations on
machines Mi+1, . . . ,Mm do not change from A to A′.
This means that in A′ the costs of all jobs from machines M1, . . . ,Mi in A are strictly
improved, and the costs of all jobs from machines Mi+1, . . . ,Mm in A do not change,
which contradicts A being a SPO-NE. Hence, such i does not exist. Applying this inequal-
ity repeatedly, we get that L1 ≤ Lm + (m − 1)OPT, which in combination with the fact
that Lm ≤ OPT gives us SPO-PoA ≤ m.
We now provide a matching lower bound.
Theorem 19. There exists an instance of job scheduling game with m unrelated machines
for which SPO-PoA ≥ m.
Proof. Consider a job scheduling game withm unrelated machines and n = m jobs, where
for each job k, 2 ≤ k ≤ m: pkk = k − kε, pk(k−1) = 1 and pik = ∞ for all i 6= k − 1, k.
For job 1, p11 = 1 − ε (for some small positive ε < 1m), pm1 = 1 and pi1 = ∞ for all
i 6= 1, m, as illustrated in the matrix below (rows describe the processing times of jobs,
entries not explicitly stated are ∞).
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P t =


1− ε 1
1 2− 2ε
1 3− 3ε
1
.
.
.
.
.
. (m− 1)− (m− 1)ε
1 m−mε


In an optimal schedule for this game each one of the jobs 2 ≤ k ≤ m runs alone on
machine Mk−1 and job 1 runs on Mm, which yields a makespan of 1.
On the other hand, a schedule where each one of the jobs 1 ≤ k ≤ m runs alone on
machine Mk has a makespan of m − mε. We will show that this schedule is a SPO-NE.
The schedule is a NE, since for each job, moving to the only additional machine on which
its processing time is not infinite increases it cost by at least ε. Consider an alternative
schedule where no job increases its cost. Job 1 is currently assigned on a machine with
load 1−ε, which is the minimal possible cost for it, and this minimum is unique. Thus any
alternative schedule must keep job 1 assigned alone to the first machine. We can prove by
induction on the indices of jobs that every job has to stay assigned to its current machine
alone; once job k must stay on its machine alone, job k + 1 does not have an alternative
machine, and adding another job to the machine that it is assigned to (Mk) would increase
its cost. Thus such a schedule does not exist. This gives that SPO-PoA ≥ m.
From Theorems 18 and 19 we conclude that for for any m, SPO-PoA = m.
This is a proper place to mention that the lower bound example from [5] showing that
SPoA ≥ m looks similar to our example at a first glance. The difference in processing
times is in the definition pkk = k, for 1 ≤ k ≤ m. However, this example does not apply
here, as the schedule of cost m which it gives is not strictly Pareto optimal; if we switch to
the optimal schedule, where job 1 runs on Mm and each job 2 ≤ k ≤ m runs on Mk−1, all
jobs 2 ≤ k ≤ m strictly improve their costs and job 1 is not worse off.
This is another example which demonstrates the fact that in the job scheduling game
we consider not every SNE is necessarily a SPO-NE. However, we showed that this is the
case already for related machines.
2.5 Preserving deviations
For an instance of the job scheduling game there may exist many strictly Pareto-optimal
schedules, and a number of them can be NE. There can be a number of schedules for which
the unsorted vector of the costs of jobs is the same, that is, for every player, its cost is the
same, and therefore the makespan is the same in all those schedules. Deciding which of
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them to achieve can be controversial among players, as these schedules are indistinguish-
able in their quality and efficiency both from the players’ and the social points of view. We
would like to investigate then how much two such schedules may vary from one to another.
For this purpose we discuss “preserving deviations”, which are deviations from a NE
to a different schedule, where every player keeps the same cost that it had. Clearly, if
the original schedule is a SPO-NE or a WPO-NE, then the new schedule resulting by such
deviation also has this property.
In this section we prove that for such deviation for identical machines, the vector of
machines loads does not change, while for related machines it can change significantly.
Theorem 20. For identical machines, a preserving deviation of a NE schedule does not
change its sorted vector of machines loads.
Proof. Let A be a NE schedule on m identical machines, and consider a deviation that
makes no one worse off which results in a different schedule A′. If there is at least one
empty machine in A then every non-empty machine has a single job (otherwise the sched-
ule is not a NE). Any preserving deviation will result in the same situation (some empty
machines, and one job assigned to each non-empty machine), so clearly the sorted machine
load vector remains the same.
Let the vector of machines loads of A be ℓ = (ℓ1, . . . , ℓm), and let the vector of strictly
positive machines loads of A′ be ℓ′ = (ℓ′1, . . . , ℓ′m′), where m′ ≤ m.
Assume that the machines in A and A′ are sorted in a non-increasing order of loads,
that is ℓ1 ≥ . . . ≥ ℓm and ℓ′1 ≥ . . . ≥ ℓ′m′ . Assume that the machines are partitioned into
k ≤ m sets of machines of the same load (load groups) having loads L1 ≥ L2 ≥ . . . ≥ Lk,
and let the number of machines in each of these load groups be mi for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We
denote the total size of jobs assigned to machines in load group 1 ≤ i ≤ k by Wi, that is,
Wi = mi · Li.
Now consider the schedule A′, and recall m′ ≤ m. We denote by Ti for 1 ≤ i ≤ k the
suffix of machines in A′ having load of at most Li, and the number of machines in Ti by
ti. As the highest cost of any job in A′ can be at most L1, t1 = m′ ≤ m holds. We denote
the total size of jobs executed by machines in Ti by W ′i .
We prove the following claim.
Claim 21. For 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, tk−i ≥
∑i
j=0mk−j .
Proof. The proof is by induction on i. We show that the property holds for i = 0, that is,
we show that tk ≥
∑0
j=0mk−j = mk holds. The work executed by machines in load group
Lk inA is Wk = mk ·Lk. The work W ′k executed by machines in Tk inA′ is at most tk ·Lk.
As the machines are identical, in order not to be worse off, all jobs running on machines
27
in load group Lk must be executed on machines of Tk in A′, which yields Wk ≤W ′k. This
gives mk · Lk ≤ tk · Lk, hence mk ≤ tk.
We assume that tk−p ≥
∑p
j=0mk−j holds for 0 ≤ p ≤ i − 1, and prove that tk−i ≥∑i
j=0mk−j . The total work executed by machines in load groups Lk−i, . . . , Lk in A is∑i
j=0Wk−j =
∑i
j=0mk−j · Lk−j . The work W ′k−i executed by machines in Tk−i in A′ is
at most
tkLk +
∑i
j=1 (tk−j − tk−j+1) · Lk−j =
∑i−1
j=0 tk−j · (Lk−j − Lk−j−1) + tk−iLk−i. As the
machines are identical, in order not to be worse off all jobs running on machines in load
groups Lk−i, . . . , Lk in A must be executed on machines of Tk−i in A′, which yields∑i
j=0Wk−j ≤W ′k−i. We get that
i∑
j=0
mk−j · Lk−j ≤
i−1∑
j=0
tk−j · (Lk−j − Lk−j−1) + tk−iLk−i.
As Lk−j − Lk−j−1 < 0 for any 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 2, applying the inductive hypothesis for any
0 ≤ j ≤ i− 1, we get
i∑
j=0
mk−j · Lk−j ≤
i−1∑
j=0
(
j∑
h=0
mk−h) · (Lk−j − Lk−j−1) + tk−iLk−i
=
i−1∑
j=0
mk−j · Lk−j − Lk−i · (
i−1∑
j=0
mk−j) + tk−i · Lk−i .
Subtracting
∑i−1
j=0mk−j · Lk−j from both sides of this inequality, and dividing the result
by Lk−i > 0 gives mk−i ≤ −
∑i−1
j=0mk−j + tk−i. Adding
∑i−1
j=0mk−j to both sides gives
us
∑i
j=0mk−j ≤ tk−i, which concludes the proof.
Applying this claim for i = k − 1, we get that t1 ≥
∑k−1
j=0 mk−j = m, which proves
that t1 = m, that is, A′ uses the same number of machines as A, and m′ = m.
We now prove that the load observed by any machine inA′ is at most the load observed
by the respective machine in A.
Claim 22. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ m, ℓ′i ≤ ℓi.
Proof. This is equivalent to proving that ℓ′i ≤ ℓi holds for the last m machines in A′.
The proof is by induction on the number of last machines in A′.
This property holds for the last mk machines in A′: as tk ≥ mk by Claim 21, and by
definition all machines in Tk have a load of at most Lk, which is exactly the load of the last
mk machines in A.
We assume that this property holds for the last
∑p−1
j=0 mk−j machines in A′ for some
1 ≤ p ≤ k − 1 , and prove that it holds for the last ∑pj=0mk−j machines.
28
The last
∑p−1
j=0 mk−j machines in A have loads of at most Lk−p. By inductive hypoth-
esis, the last
∑p−1
j=0 mk−j machines in A′ have this property, and so it is left to show that
so do the following mk−p machines. By Claim 21, tk−p ≥
∑p
j=0mk−j , hence machines in
Tk−p include these mk−p machines. As, by definition, machines in Tk−p have a load of at
most Lk−p, these mk−p machines have a load of at most Lk−p, which concludes the proof.
We now prove, that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m the inequality in Claim 22 has to be an equality.
Claim 23. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ m, ℓ′i = ℓi.
Proof. By Claim 22, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m, ℓ′i ≤ ℓi holds. Therefore,
∑m
i=1 ℓi ≤
∑m
i=1 ℓ
′
i. As
the machines are identical, the total sum of loads in A′ necessarily remains the same as in
A. However,∑mi=1 ℓi =∑mi=1 ℓ′i can hold only if ℓ′i = ℓi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
The conclusion from Claim 23 is that tk = mk, ti − ti+1 = mi and all machines in
Ti\Ti+1 for 1 ≤ 1 ≤ k − 1 have a load of exactly Li.
Since any schedule on identical machines is a SPO-NE (and therefore a WPO-NE), then
such a deviation from schedule A to A′ is a preserving deviation, since once no job is
worse off, then no job can be better off.
From Theorem 20, we can conclude that in the model of identical machines, preserving
deviations leave the schedule almost unchanged: the loads of the machines remain exactly
the same, and the only changes in the assignments of the jobs are within the load group of
the machine where each job previously ran.
For related machines though, two different schedules where all players have the same
costs, may vary greatly both in the assignments of the jobs and in their load vectors. This
is true even for schedules which are strictly or weakly Pareto optimal. We demonstrate this
by the following example. Recall the SPO-NE schedule X that gives a lower bound on the
SPO-PoA from the proof of Theorem 14 in Section 2.1. We give a similar example. We
take an instance with k = 4 and N4 = 1. There are five groups of machines, N0 = 24
machines with speed 1, N1 = 24 machines with speed 2, N2 = 12 machines with speed
4, N3 = 4 machines with speed 8 and N4 = 1 machines with speed 16. The total number
of machines is then 65. Now, consider a schedule X for this instance, as in the lower
bound. Each machine of group 0 is empty, each machine of group 1 is assigned one job
of size 2, each machine of group 2 is assigned two jobs of size 4, each machine of group
3 is assigned three jobs of size 8 and each machine of group 4 is assigned four jobs of
size 16. Each job in group 1 pays a cost of 1, each job in group 2 pays a cost of 2,
each job in group 3 pays a cost of 3 and each job in group 4 pays a cost of 4. Its vector
of machines loads is x = (
1︷︸︸︷
4 ,
4︷ ︸︸ ︷
3, . . . , 3,
12︷ ︸︸ ︷
2, . . . , 2,
24︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1,
24︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0). Now, consider a
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different schedule Y , where each machine of group 0 is empty, each machine in group
1 is assigned one job of size 4, four of machines in group 2 are assigned with one job
of size 16 and the remaining 8 machines with two jobs of size 2 each, each machine in
group 3 is assigned three jobs of size 8 and the single machine in group 4 is assigned
eight jobs of size 2. It is easy to verify that in transition to schedule Y each one of the
jobs keeps its original cost, however the vector of machines loads of schedule Y , y =
(
4︷ ︸︸ ︷
4, . . . , 4,
4︷ ︸︸ ︷
3, . . . , 3,
24︷ ︸︸ ︷
2, . . . , 2,
9︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1,
24︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0) is very different from x.
2.6 Recognition of weakly and strictly Pareto optimal equi-
libria
In this section we consider the computational complexity of SPO-NE and WPO-NE for all
machine models. Specifically, we investigate the problem of recognition of such schedules.
We prove the following theorems.
Theorem 24. There exists a polynomial time algorithms which receives a schedule on
related machines (or on identical machines) and check whether the schedule is a SPO-NE
and whether it is a WPO-NE.
Proof. Consider a schedule A, and recall that one can determine in polynomial time
whether a given schedule is a NE. Since any NE on identical machines is a WPO-NE and a
SPO-NE, the recognition of such schedules is equivalent to recognition of NE. This is also
the case for related machines and WPO-NE.
For the recognition of SPO-NE on related machines, we use the following algorithm.
First, check whether the schedule is a NE (if not, then output a negative answer). If the
schedule is a NE and it does not contain an empty machine, return a positive answer. Oth-
erwise, for every job k, such that k is assigned to a machine which has at least two jobs
assigned to it, test if moving it to an empty machine of maximum speed does not increase
its cost. If there exists a job for which the cost is not increased, return a negative an-
swer, and otherwise, a positive answer. Note that if there exists an empty machine, but no
machine has two jobs assigned to it, then the returned answer is positive.
Now we prove correctness of the last algorithm. If there are no empty machines then
any NE is a SPO-NE (by Theorem 8). For the remaining cases of the algorithm, we prove
the following claim.
Claim 25. Given A, which is a NE, there exists an alternative schedule A′ where no job
increases its cost and at least one job reduces its cost if and only if there exists a job k
which is assigned to a machine with at least one other job in A, and moving it to an empty
machine of maximum speed does not increase its cost.
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Proof. We first assume that such a job k exists. Consider the schedule A˜ in which k
is assigned to a machine of maximum speed which is empty in A, and the rest of the
assignment is the same as in A. There is at least one job which is assigned to the same
machine as k in A, whose cost is strictly reduced (since the load of its machine decreases
when k is moved to another machine). The cost of k does not increase, and any job assigned
to any machine other than the machine of k in A and the machine of k in A˜ keeps its
previous cost.
Next, assume thatA′ exists, and assume that among such schedules,A′ has a minimum
number of jobs which are assigned not to the same machine as inA. Using Theorem 8, we
get that A necessarily has an empty machine Mi′ which is non-empty in A′. Let k be a job
assigned to Mi′ in A′ and let Mi be the machine to which it is assigned in A.
If machine Mi does not have an additional job in A, and since its cost on Mi′ (possibly
with additional jobs) is no larger, we get si′ ≥ si. However, the schedule is a NE, so k
cannot reduce its cost by moving to an empty machine. Therefore, its cost on Mi′ is the
same as its cost on Mi, si′ = si and k is assigned to Mi′ alone in A′. The jobs assigned to
Mi in A′ are not assigned to Mi′ or to Mi in A. This is true since Mi′ is empty in A and
Mi only has the job k in A. We construct a schedule Aˆ where the jobs assigned to Mi and
Mi′ in A′ are swapped and the other jobs are assigned to the same machines as in A. The
number of jobs assigned to a different machine from their machines in A is reduced by 1
(due to k being assigned to the same machines in Aˆ and A), which contradicts the choice
of A′.
Thus, there exists an additional job k′ assigned to Mi in A. Since moving k to some
empty machine does not increase its cost, then moving it to an empty machine with maxi-
mum speed clearly does not increase its cost.
Given the claim, if every non-empty machine has a single job then the schedule is a
SPO-NE. Otherwise, the algorithm tests the existence of a job k as in the claim.
Theorem 26. i. The problem of checking whether a given schedule on unrelated machines
is a WPO-NE is strongly co-NP-complete. ii. The problem of checking whether a given
schedule on unrelated machines is a SPO-NE is co-NP-complete.
Proof. Given a schedule and an alternative schedule, checking whether the alternative
schedule implies that the given schedule is not a NE or not (weakly or strictly) Pareto
optimal can be done in polynomial time, and therefore the problems are in co-NP.
To prove hardness of the recognition of WPO-NE, we reduce from the 3-PARTITION
problem, which is strongly NP-hard. In this problem we are given an integer B and 3M
integers a1, a2, . . . , a3M , where B4 < ak <
B
2
for 1 ≤ k ≤ 3M ,
3M∑
k=1
ak = MB, and we are
asked whether there exists a partition of the integers into M sets, where the sum of each
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subset is exactly B. We construct an input with m = 4M machines. There are 4M jobs,
3M of them are based on the instance of 3-PARTITION and the last M jobs are dummy
jobs. For 1 ≤ k ≤ 3M , we have pik = B + 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3M , and pik = ak for
3M + 1 ≤ i ≤ 4M . For 3M + 1 ≤ k ≤ 4M , we have pik = B for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3M , and
pik = B + 1 for 3M + 1 ≤ i ≤ 4M . The given schedule is one where job k is assigned to
machine k. All machines have a load of B + 1, so the schedule is a NE. We show that the
schedule is weakly Pareto optimal if and only if a 3-partition as required does not exist.
Assume first that a 3-partition exists. We define an alternative schedule. In this schedule,
each one of the last M machines runs one subset of jobs of the first 3M jobs, out of the M
subsets of the 3-partition. The sum of the corresponding subsets of numbers in the input
of 3-PARTITION is B and therefore, their total processing time on such a machine is B.
Each dummy job runs on a different machine out of the first 3M machines, having a cost
of B. Thus, all jobs have a smaller cost in the alternative schedule, so the original one is
not Pareto optimal.
On the other hand, if there exists an alternative schedule where all jobs reduce their
costs, then all the first 3M jobs must be assigned to the last M machines (since on the
other machines even if such a job is assigned to alone it still has a cost of B). For job k, no
matter which such machine receives it, it has a processing time of ak on it, so all jobs have
a total processing time of MB. Since all numbers are integers, the only way that every
job reduces its load is that each machine will have a load of exactly B, which implies a
3-partition.
To prove hardness of the recognition of SPO-NE, we can use the reduction of [52]
showing that the recognition of SNE is hard. For completeness we present an alternative
reduction. To prove hardness of the recognition of SPO-NE, we reduce from the PARTITION
problem, which is NP-hard. In this problem we are given an integer B and N integers
a1, a2, . . . , aN , where,
N∑
k=1
ak = 2B, and we are asked whether there exists a partition of
the integers into two sets, where the sum of each subset is exactly B. We construct an
input with m = 2 machines (it is possible to use the same input for any larger number of
machines, giving all jobs infinite processing times on every machine except for the first
two machines). We have N + 2 jobs. Job k, for 1 ≤ k ≤ N , p1k = ak + 12N while
p2k = ak. Job N + 1 has p1(N+1) = B and p2(N+1) = B + 12 . Job N + 2 has p1(N+2) =∞
and p2(N+1) = B so it must be assigned to M2. We are given the schedule where the first
N jobs are assigned to M1 and the two last jobs are assigned to M2. The loads of both
machines are 2B + 1
2
, thus this schedule is a NE. If there exists a partition, consider the
alternative schedule where each machine receives one subset of jobs whose total size in
the original input is B, and job N + 1 is assigned to M1. Let K1 be the cardinality of
the set of jobs assigned to M1 in the alternative schedule. Then the resulting load of M1
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is 2B + K1−1
2N
. Since M2 receives at least two jobs, then K1 ≤ N , so the load is strictly
below 2B + 1
2
. The load of M2 is exactly 2B. Thus, the original schedule is not strictly
(or weakly) Pareto optimal. On the other hand, if the original schedule is not strictly (or
weakly) Pareto optimal, then in an alternative schedule, job N + 1 must be assigned to
M1, and the total processing time of jobs assigned with it must be strictly below B + 1.
The total processing time of jobs assigned to M2 must be strictly below B + 1 as well,
and so there are two sets whose sizes (in the original input) are at most B, which implies a
partition.
Note that this reduction can be used to prove the (weak) co-NP-completeness of the
recognition of WPO-NE schedules. Thus both problems are hard for any number of ma-
chines.
2.7 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we have studied the quality and complexity of the strict and weak Pareto
optimal Nash equilibria in job scheduling games, in the settings of identical, related and
unrelated machines.
We found that in the models of identical and related machines, strict and weak Pareto
optimal Nash equilibria can be as bad as pure Nash equilibria, however in the model of
unrelated machines, while for weak Pareto optimal Nash equilibria and m ≥ 3, this is still
the case, strict Pareto optimal Nash equilibria (and even weak Pareto optimal equilibria,
for m = 2) are as good as Strong Nash equilibria with respect to the Price of Anarchy.
This implies that for unrelated machines, cooperation between all players (as opposed to
cooperation between subsets of players) still gives solutions of high quality.
As for identical and related machines, recognition of weakly or strictly Pareto optimal
equilibria can be done in polynomial time, unlike strong equilibria. Despite the slightly
worse quality of such equilibria compared to strong equilibria (due to the results for the
Price of Anarchy on related machines), we conclude that weak and strict Pareto optimal
equilibria are of interest for identical and related machines.
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Chapter 3
Bin Packing of selfish items
3.1 Introduction and motivation
In this chapter, we consider the well-known Bin Packing problem. It was introduced in
the early 1970’s [74, 103], and was extensively studied ever since (see e.g. [75], [76], [28]
for surveys on this problem). The basic, one-dimensional Bin Packing problem consists
of packing a set of objects with sizes in (0,1] into a set of unit-capacity bins while using
as few bins as possible. Among other important real-life applications, such as multipro-
cessor scheduling, optimization of file storage on disks and stock cutting, the Bin Packing
problem can be met in a great variety of network problems arising in large-scale commu-
nication networks. For example, the packet scheduling problem (the problem of packing
a given set of packets into a minimum number of time slots for fairness provisioning), the
bandwidth allocation problem (signals have usually a small size and several of them can be
transmitted in the same frame1 so as to minimize bandwidth consumption) and the problem
of packing the data for Internet phone calls into ATM packets (filling fixed-size frames to
maximize the amount of data that they carry), to mention only a few. Other than the obvi-
ous practical significance in the study of the Bin Packing problem from a game-theoretic
perspective, there is a pure theoretical interest to this study, as Bin Packing is a problem
of fundamental theoretical significance, serving as one of the main test grounds for new
algorithmic ideas and models of analysis for several decades. In fact, Bin Packing is one
of the first problems to which approximation algorithms were suggested and analyzed with
comparison to the optimal algorithm. Therefore, the study of this important problem from
a game-theoretic standpoint is clearly well motivated.
1frame is the basic unit in media access control layer of the Internet Protocol Suite.
34
3.2 The model
The Bin Packing problem consists of packing a set N of items, each item i ∈ N having a
size ai ∈ (0, 1], into a set of unit-capacity bins while using as few bins as possible. The
induced bin packing game BP is defined by a tuple BP = 〈N, (Bi)i∈N , (ci)i∈N 〉, where N
is the set of selfish players, and the bins are of equal capacity. Each player i ∈ N controls a
single item with size ai ∈ (0, 1] and selects the bin to which this item is packed. We identify
the player with the item he wishes to pack. Thus, the set of players corresponds to the set
of items. The set of strategies Bi for each item i ∈ N is the set of all possible bins. Each
item can be assigned to one bin only. Splitting items among several bins is not allowed.
The outcome of the game is a particular assignment b = (bj)j∈N ∈ ×j∈NBj of the items to
bins, that respects the capacity of the bins. LetX denote the set of all possible assignments.
All the bins have the same fixed cost which equals their capacity and the cost of a bin is
proportionally shared among all the items it contains. The cost function of item i is ci. If
we scale the cost and the size of each bin to one, the cost paid by item i for choosing to be
packed in bin Bj such that j ∈ Bi is defined by ci(j, b−i) = ai∑
k:bk=j
ak
, when b−i ∈ X−i;
i.e, an item is charged with a cost which is proportional to the portion of the bin it occupies
in a given packing. We charge an item for being packed in a bin in which it does not fit
with an infinite cost. The selfish items are interested in being packed in a bin so as to
minimize their cost. Thus, item i packed into Bj in a particular assignment (bj)j∈N will
migrate from Bj each time it will detect another bin Bj′ such that ci(j′, b−i) < ci(j, b−i).
This inequality holds for each j′ such that
∑
k:bk=j′
ak+ai >
∑
k:bk=j
ak, thus an item will
perform an improving step each time it will detect a strictly more loaded bin in which it
fits. At a Nash equilibrium, no item can unilaterally reduce its cost by moving to a different
bin (see Figure 3.1(b) for an example). We call a packing that admits the Nash conditions
an NE packing. The social cost function that we want to minimize is the number of used
bins (which equals the sum of players’ individual costs): SC(b) =∑i∈N ci(b).
The selfish bin packing problem defined above can be also interpreted as a routing prob-
lem. Consider a network consisting of two nodes, a source and a destination, connected by
a potentially infinite number of parallel links having the same bandwidth capacity, and a
set of users wishing to send a certain amount of unsplittable flow between the two nodes.
To establish a link, one has to pay a fixed cost, which equals the capacity of the link. The
cost of each link is shared among the users routing their flow on that link according to
the normalized fraction of bandwidth utilized by each. For such a reason, users, who are
assumed to be selfish, want to route their traffic on the most loaded link available that can
accommodate their load. The social goal is to minimize the total number of links used.
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In the cooperative version of the game, we consider all possible (non-empty) groups
of items A ⊆ N . A group can contain a single item. The cost functions of the players
are defined the same as in the non-cooperative case. Each group of items is interested
to be packed in a way so as to minimize the costs of all group members. Thus, given a
particular assignment, all members of group A will perform a joint improving step if there
is a configuration in which, for each member, the new bin (it can be one of the already
existing bins, or a newly opened) will admit a strictly greater load than the bin of origin.
The costs of the non-members may be enlarged as a result of this improvement step. At
a Strong Nash equilibrium, no group of items can reduce the costs for all its members by
jointly moving to different bins (see Figure 3.1(c) for an example). We call a packing that
admits the Strong Nash conditions an SNE packing. The social cost function remains the
same one we consider in the non-cooperative setting.
Figure 3.1: (a) A packing that is not an equilibrium, as the item of size 1
3
on B1 will reduce
its cost by migrating to B2 (b) A packing that is Nash equilibrium but not a Strong Nash
equilibrium, since the five items of sizes {1
2
, 1
2
, 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
} will reduce their cost by deviating
(see (c)), (c) A packing which is a Strong Nash equilibrium.
It is well-known that Nash equilibria do not always optimize the social cost function,
and our bin packing game is no exception: an equilibrium packing does not necessarily
have minimum cost. See Figure 3.2 for example. Note also that not every optimal solution
is an equilibrium.
We measure the quality of the equilibria in this game with respect to the social opti-
mum. In the bin packing game, the social optimum is the number of bins used in a coordi-
nated optimal packing. We consider the Prices of Anarchy and Stability, that are prevalent
measures of the quality of the equilibria reached with uncoordinated selfish players.
The Price of Anarchy of a game G ∈ BP is defined to be the ratio between the cost
of the worst Nash equilibrium packing and the social optimum. The Price of Stability of
a game G ∈ BP is defined to be the ratio between the cost of the best Nash equilibrium
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Figure 3.2: An example of a non-optimal NE packing
packing and the social optimum. Formally,
PoA(G) = sup
b∈NE(G)
SC(b)
OPT (G)
, P oS(G) = inf
b∈NE(G)
SC(b)
OPT (G)
.
The bin packing problem is usually studied via asymptotic measures, as they are robust
against anomalies with a small number of bins in the optimum packing. The asymptotic
POA and POS of the bin packing game BP are defined by
PoA(BP ) = lim sup
OPT (G)→∞
sup
G∈BP
PoA(G), P oS(BP ) = lim sup
OPT (G)→∞
sup
G∈BP
PoS(G).
We also study stability measures that separate the effect of the lack of coordination
between players from the effect of their selfishness. The measures considered are the
Strong Prices of Anarchy snd Stability. These measures are defined similarly to the POA
and the POS but only Strong equilibria packings are considered. We define the Strong
Price of Anarchy of a game G ∈ BP as the ratio between the cost of the worst Strong
Nash equilibrium packing and the social optimum. The Strong Price of Stability is defined
as the ratio between the cost of the best Strong Nash equilibrium packing and the social
optimum. Formally,
SPoA(G) = sup
b∈SNE(G)
SC(b)
OPT (G)
, SPoS(G) = inf
b∈SNE(G)
SC(b)
OPT (G)
,
As before, we define the asymptotic SPOA and SPOS of the bin packing game BP as
SPoA(BP ) = lim sup
OPT (G)→∞
sup
G∈BP
SPoA(G), SPoS(BP ) = lim sup
OPT (G)→∞
sup
G∈BP
SPoS(G).
In the following discussion we will often drop the term “asymptotic” when we mention the
asymptotic stability measures.
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3.3 Related work and our contributions
Bilo` [18] was the first to study the bin packing problem with selfish items. He proved that
the bin packing game admits pure Nash equilibria and provided non-tight bounds on the
Price of Anarchy. He used a generalized potential function to prove that the bin packing
game converges to a pure Nash equilibrium in a finite sequence of selfish improving steps,
starting from any initial configuration of the items; however, the number of steps may be
exponential. This result implies that for every instance of bin packing game, among the
optimal packings there exists a packing which admits NE; in other words, POS(BP ) = 1.
It is also implicit from the work of Bilo` that the bin packing game admits Strong Nash
equilibria, as the optimal packing with the highest potential value is always an SNE.
Other related work includes recent papers by Miyazawa and Vignatti (see [88, 87]),
who consider the selfish bin packing problem, and study the convergence time to a Nash
equilibrium.
In this chaptr we consider the bin packing game, in a model originally proposed and
analyzed by Bilo` in [18]. We give improved (and nearly tight) lower and upper bounds of
1.6416 and 1.6428, respectively, on the POA of the bin packing game. This result appeared
in [43]. Later, Yu and Zhang [108], independently, used a similar construction to prove a
lower bound of the same value on the POA, and claimed an upper bound of 1.6575 on the
POA.
We give a characterization of the Strong Nash Equilibria in the bin packing game as the
outcomes of the Subset Sum2 algorithm for bin packing. Subset Sum is a greedy algorithm
that repeatedly solves a one-dimensional knapsack problem for packing each bin in turn.
It was originally suggested by Prim and first mentioned by Graham [64], who also gave
a lower bound of
∑∞
k=1
1
2k−1
≈ 1.6067 on its asymptotic worst-case approximation ratio.
The first non-trivial upper bound of 4
3
+ln 4
3
≈ 1.6210 was proved by Caprara and Pferschy
in [19]. The exact asymptotic worst-case approximation ratio of the Subset Sum algorithm
was recently established to be 1.6067 [46], which matches Grahams’ lower bound.
We also consider the strong measures of stability, and provide tight bounds on the SPOA
and the SPOS of this game. We show that the aforementioned Subset Sum algorithm in fact
produces an assignment that admits strong equilibrium. Therefore, we provide an exponen-
tial time deterministic algorithm with guaranteed (asymptotic) worst-case approximation
ratio [19] that actually calculates the Strong Nash assignment for each bin. Interestingly,
the SPOA equals the SPOS and we prove that this value is equal to the approximation ratio
of the Subset Sum algorithm. This allows us to characterize the SPOA/SPOS of the game in
terms of the approximation ratio of this algorithm.
2Also called fill bin or minimum bin slack in the literature.
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Our conclusions can be summarized by the following table:
Lower Bound Upper Bound
PoA Bilo` [18] 1.6 1.6667Our results 1.6416 1.6428
SPoA=SPoS Our results 1.6067 1.6067
PoS Bilo` [18] 1 1
Table 3.1: Summary of Results
Recently, Yu and Zhang [108] have designed a polynomial time algorithm which pro-
duces a packing which is a pure NE.
In this work we show that the problem of computing a Strong Nash packing, on the
other hand, is NP-hard, hence it is unlikely to come up with a polynomial time algorithm
which produces a packing that is an SNE, unless P = NP .
3.4 Price of Anarchy in the Bin Packing game
In this section we provide a lower bound for the Price of Anarchy of the bin packing game
and also prove a very close upper bound.
3.4.1 A lower bound: construction
In this section, we present our main technical contribution, which is a lower bound on the
PoA. We start with presenting a set of items. The set of items consists of multiple levels.
Such constructions are sometimes used to design lower bounds on specific bin packing
algorithms (see e.g., [80]). Our construction differs from these constructions since the
notion of order (in which packed bins are created) does not exist here, and each bin must
be stable with respect to all other bins. The resulting lower bound on the POA is different
from any bounds known on the asymptotic approximation ratio of well known algorithms
for bin packing. Since we prove an almost matching upper bound, we conclude that the
POA is probably not related directly to any natural algorithm.
We prove the following theorem.
Theorem 27. The Price of Anarchy of the bin packing game is at least the sum of the
following series: ∑∞j=1 2−j(j−1)/2, which is equal to approximately 1.64163.
Proof. Let s > 2 be an integer. We define a construction with s phases of indices 1 ≤ j ≤
s, where the items of phase j have sizes which are close to 1
2j
, but can be slightly smaller
or slightly larger than this value.
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Two sequences of positive integers rj and dj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ s, are used. We choose
the number rs to be an arbitrary sufficiently large value such that rs > 2s
3
. We recursively
define rj = 2j ·rj+1+1, for 1 ≤ j ≤ s−1. In addition, we let d1 = 0 and dj = rj−1−rj =
(2j−1 − 1)rj + 1, for 2 ≤ j ≤ s. Let n = r1. Clearly, rj ≤ n and dj ≤ n, for 1 ≤ j ≤ s.
Let OPT = n, and note that n ≥ rs > 2s3 . We use a sequence of small values,
δj , j = 1, . . . , s such that δj = 1(4n)3s−2j . Note that this implies δj+1 = (4n)
2δj for
1 ≤ j ≤ s− 1.
Observation 28. For each 1 ≤ j ≤ s, n
2j(j−1)/2
− 1 < rj ≤ n2j(j−1)/2 .
Proof. We use induction to prove this inequality. This holds for j = 1 by definition.
We next prove the property for j + 1 using the property for j (where j ≥ 1). We have
rj+1 =
rj−1
2j
. Clearly, using the inductive assumption, rj+1 < rj2j ≤ n2j(j−1)/2+j = n2j(j+1)/2 .
On the other hand, rj+1 = rj−12j >
n
2j(j−1)/2
−2
2j
≥ n
2j(j+1)/2
− 1.
Phase 1 simply consists of r1 items of size σ1 = 12 + 2(d1 + 1)δ1. For j ≥ 2, phase j
consists of the following 2dj + rj items. There are rj items of size σj = 12j + 2(dj + 1)δj ,
and for 1 ≤ i ≤ dj , there are two items of sizes πij = 12j + (2i− 1)δj and θij = 12j − 2iδj .
Note that πij + θij = 12j−1 − δj .
Claim 29. This set of items can be packed into n bins, i.e., OPT ≤ n
Proof. The optimal packing will contain dj bins of level j, for 2 ≤ j ≤ s, and the
remaining bins are of level s + 1, where a bin of level j, contains only items of phases
1, . . . , j.
To show that we can allocate these numbers of bins, and to calculate the number of
level s+ 1 bins, note that
s∑
j=2
dj = r1 − rs = n− rs. Thus, the number of level s+ 1 bins
is rs.
The packing of a bin of a given level is defined as follows. For 2 ≤ j ≤ s, a level j bin
contains one item of each size σk for 1 ≤ k ≤ j − 1, and in addition, one pair of items of
sizes πij and θij for a given value of i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ dj . A bin of level s + 1 contains
one item of each size σk for 1 ≤ k ≤ j − 1.
We show that every item was assigned into some bin. Consider first items of size πij
and θij . Such items exist for 1 ≤ i ≤ dj , and therefore, every such pair was assigned to
a bin together. Next, consider items of size σj for some 1 ≤ j ≤ s. The number of such
items is rj . The number of bins which received such items is
s∑
k=j+1
(dk) + rs = rj .
We further show that the sum of sizes of items in each bin does not exceed 1. Consider
a bin of level j for some 2 ≤ j ≤ s. The sum of items in it is
j−1∑
k=1
σk +
1
2j−1
− δj =
j−1∑
k=1
(
1
2k
+ 2(dk + 1)δk) +
1
2j−1
− δj = 1 +
j−1∑
k=1
(2(dk + 1)δk)− δj .
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As dk + 1 ≤ n (since rj is a strictly decreasing sequence of integers and r1 = n) and δi is
a strictly increasing sequence, we have 2(dk + 1)δk ≤ 2nδj−1, and since j − 1 ≤ s < n,
j−1∑
k=1
2(dk + 1)δk < 2n
2δj−1. Using δj = 16n2δj−1 we get that the sum is smaller than 1.
Consider a bin of level s+1. The sum of items in it is
s∑
k=1
σk =
s∑
k=1
( 1
2k
+2(dk+1)δk).
We have 2(dk + 1)δk ≤ 2nδs = 122s−1ns−1 . Since 2 < s < n, we get at most 1 − 12s +
n
22s−1ns−1
= 1− 1
2s
+ 1
22s−1ns−2
< 1.
We next define an alternative packing, which is a NE. In what follows, we apply a
modification to the input by removing a small number of items. Clearly, OPT ≤ n would
still hold for the modified input.
Our modification to the input is the removal of items π1j and θ
dj
j for all 2 ≤ j ≤ s. We
construct rj bins for phase j items. A bin of phase j consists of 2j − 1 items of phase j, as
follows. One item of size σj = 12j+2(di+1)δi, and 2
j−1−1 pairs of items of phase j. A pair
of items of phase j is defined to be the items of sizes πi+1j and θij , for some 1 ≤ i ≤ dj−1.
The sum of sizes of this pair of items is 1
2j
+ (2i + 1)δj +
1
2j
− 2iδj = 12j−1 + δj . Using
dj = (2
j−1 − 1)rj + 1 we get that all phase j items are packed. The sum of items in every
such bin is
1− 1
2j−1
+ (2j−1 − 1)δj + 1
2j
+ 2(dj + 1)δj = 1− 1
2j
+ δj(2
j−1 + 1 + 2dj).
Claim 30. The loads of the bins in the packing defined above are monotonically increasing
as a function of the phase.
Proof. It is enough to show that 1− 1
2j
+δj(2
j−1+1+2dj) < 1− 12j+1 , which is equivalent
to proving δj(2j−1 + 1 + 2dj)2j+1 < 1. Indeed, we have δj(2j−1 + 1 + 2dj)2j+1 <
δj(2
2j + 2j+2n) < 2δjn
2
, as n > 2s
3
. Using δj ≤ δs = 122sns < 116n3 we get 2δjn2 < 1.
Claim 31. The packing as defined above is a valid NE packing.
Proof. To show that this a NE, we need to show that an item of phase j > 1 cannot migrate
to a bin of a level k ≥ j, since this would result in a load larger than 1, and that it cannot
migrate to a bin of phase k < j, since this would result in a load smaller than the load of
a phase j bin. Due to the monotonicity we proved in Claim 30, we only need to consider
a possible migration of a phase j item into a phase j bin, and a phase j − 1 bin, if such
bins exist. Moreover, in the first case it is enough to consider the minimum size item and
in the second case, the maximum size item of phase j. For phase 1 items, since their sizes
are larger than 1
2
, and all other bins are loaded by more than 1
2
, such items clearly cannot
migrate.
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The smallest phase j item has size 1
2j
− δj(2dj − 2). If it migrates to another bin of
this phase, we get a total load of 1 − 1
2j
+ δj(2
j−1 + 1 + 2dj) +
1
2j
− δj(2dj − 2) =
1 + δj(3 + 2
j−1) > 1.
The largest phase j item has size 1
2j
+ 2(dj + 1)δj . If it migrates to a bin of phase
j − 1, we get a load of 1− 1
2j−1
+ δj−1(2
j−2 +1+2dj−1) +
1
2j
+2(dj +1)δj . We compare
this load with 1− 1
2j
+ δj(2
j−1 + 1 + 2dj), and prove that the first load is smaller. Indeed
δj−1(2
j−2+1+2dj−1) < δj(2
j−1−1) since δj = 16n2δj−1, n > 2s3 and (2j−2+1+2dj−1) <
4n < 16n2(2j−1 − 1).
The fact 1− 1
2j
+ δj(2
j−1 + 1 + 2dj) < 1− 12j+1 holds as we proved in Claim 30, also
implies that the load of each bin in the NE packing we construct is smaller than 1 for each
2 ≤ j ≤ s, therefore this NE packing is valid.
Finally, we bound the POA as follows. The cost of the resulting NE is
s∑
j=1
rj . Using
Observation 28 we get that
s∑
j=1
rj >
s∑
j=1
( n
2j(j−1)/2
− 1) and since OPT = n >> s, we get a
ratio of at least
s∑
j=1
2−j(j−1)/2. Letting s tend to infinity as well results in the claimed lower
bound.
Comment 32. In the lower bound construction, in each phase j we define sequences πij
and θij of items rather than just two types of items (items slightly smaller than 12j and items
slightly larger than 1
2j
). We use these items to construct pairs of items, where the total sum
of each pair is larger than 1
2j−1
in order to admit a NE, while the total size for πij and θij
together has to be smaller than 1
2j−1
in order to keep the optimal packing valid. Having
identical πj and θj items for a phase would violate the NE condition, as the largest item of
the phase benefits from migrating to a bin of the previous phase.
See Figure 3.3 for an illustration of the construction of a lower bound for s = 3.
3.4.2 An upper bound
To bound the POA from above, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 33. For any instance of the bin packing game G ∈ BP : Any NE packing uses
at most 1.64286 · OPT (G) + 2 bins, where OPT (G) is the number of bins used in a
coordinated optimal packing.
Proof. Let us consider a configuration b of bins which is yielded by a NE packing. We
classify the bins according to their loads into four mutually disjoint groups in the following
manner. GroupA- contains all bins with an item of size strictly greater than 1
2
(and possibly
other items as well); The rest of the bins contain items of size at most 1
2
. Group B- contains
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Figure 3.3: A lower bound of 1.625, the construction of Theorem 27 with s = 3.
bins with loads at least 7
8
; Group C- contains bins with loads in [0.8, 7
8
); GroupD- contains
bins with loads in (0, 0.8). We denote the cardinality of these groups by nA, nB, nC and
nD, respectively. We list the bins in each group from left to right in non-increasing order
w.r.t. their loads.
Our purpose is to find an upper bound on the total number of bins in these four groups.
This is obtained by formulating an integer linear mathematical program, in which the vari-
ables represent the number of bins for each group, and whose optimal solution value yields
an upper bound on the POA.
We first show that all the bins in group D are filled to at least 2
3
, except for at most two
bins.
Claim 34. Group D contains at most one bin with load in (0, 1
2
] and at most one bin with
load in (1
2
, 2
3
).
Proof. Assume by contradiction that there exist two bins in group D that are less than half
full. Then, as no bin inD contains an item of size greater than 1
2
, there would trivially exist
an improving step for some item in one of these bins to the other bin, in contradiction to the
assumption that the considered configuration yields a NE packing. Thus, we can conclude
that all the bins in group D have loads in (1
2
, 0.8), except for at most one bin.
Now, let us assume by contradiction that there exist two bins in group D that have
loads in (1
2
, 2
3
). Note that the rightmost of these two bins cannot contain any item with size
in (0, 1
3
], as such an item can make an improving step to the other bin, which has at least
the same load, as it fits in it. Thus, the rightmost such bin contains only items of sizes in
(1
3
, 1
2
]. As we have assumed its load is in the range (1
2
, 2
3
), we conclude it essentially has to
contain exactly two such items, sum of sizes of which exceed 2
3
, and yet again, we derive
a contradiction. Thus, only one such bin may exist in group D.
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We will split the rest of our analysis into three complementary cases, in accordance to
the loads admitted by bins in group A.
Case (1): There are no bins in group A.
In this case, a formulation of the aforementioned mathematical program is straightforward.
By Claim 34 and the definition of the groups, we know that all the bins in groups B, C and
D (except maybe for two) are filled by more than 2
3
. As there are no bins in group A
present, using OPT (G) ≥∑ni=1 ai we get:
OPT (G) ≥ 2
3
(nB + nC + nD − 2).
In total,
nB + nC + nD ≤ 1.5 · OPT (G) + 2.
Case (2): All bins in group A are loaded by more than 0.573.
All the bins in group A have a load of at least 0.573. By definition, each bin in this group
contains exactly one item of size strictly larger than 0.5. Thus, an optimal packing will
have to use at least nA bins. We also know that by the definition of the groups, bins in
groups B and C are loaded by at least 7
8
and 0.8, respectively. Also, by Claim 34 the bins
in group D (except maybe for two) are filled by more than 2
3
. The suitable mathematical
program is thus:
OPT (G) ≥ nA
OPT (G) ≥ 0.573nA + 7
8
nB + 0.8nC +
2
3
(nD − 2).
In total,
nA + nB + nC + nD ≤ 1.6405 · OPT (G) + 2.
Case (3): There exists at least one bin in groupA that has a loadL in the range (0.5, 0.573).
We first prove a useful general observation, that allows us to characterize the sizes of items
that are packed in bins of groups C and D in the packing induced by b.
Observation 35. Every bin of load less than y in a NE packing b does not contain items
of size in [y − 0.5, 0.427], and a group of bins with load less than y, at most one bin (the
leftmost one) may contain items of size in (0, 1− y].
Proof. No group of bins with load less than y can contain items of size in (0, 1−y] (except,
maybe, for the leftmost bin in the group), as the leftmost bin in that group is less than y full,
and in addition its load is no smaller than the load of any other bin in the group. Hence, if
there was an item with size in (0, 1− y] in any other bin in this group, it could move to the
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leftmost bin, thus reducing its cost. This contradicts the assumption that b is a NE packing.
Now, as there exists a bin in group A that has a load in (0.5, 0.573), any item x, such that
y − 0.5 ≤ x ≤ 0.427, that might have been in a bin which is loaded by less than y by
assumption, will benefit from migrating to this bin in group A, as it fits in, and the bin will
admit a load greater than y as a result of this migration. An existence of such improving
step contradicts the assumption that b is a NE packing. Thus, no bin in group that is loaded
by less than y contains an item of size in [y − 0.5, 0.427].
We will further split the analysis into two options:
Case(3.1) There are no bins in group D.
By the definition of the groups, we know that all the bins in groups B and C are loaded by
at least 0.8. We get the following linear program:
OPT (G) ≥ nA
OPT (G) ≥ 0.5nA + 0.8nB + 0.8nC.
that yields
nA + nB + nC ≤ 1.625 · OPT (G).
As by Claim 34 there can be at most two bins in group D that are less than 2
3
full,
nA + nB + nC + nD ≤ 1.625 · OPT (G) + 2.
Case(3.2) There exists at least one bin in group D.
In order to formulate the mathematical program, we first prove the following facts.
Claim 36. In the case there exists a bin in group A that has a load in (0.5, 0.573):
a. All the bins in group D have load in (3
4
, 0.8), except for at most one bin (the rightmost
bin in D).
b. Each bin in groupD contains at least two items of size larger than 1
4
, except for possibly
at most two bins (the leftmost and the rightmost bins in D).
Proof. First, we would like to characterize the items that are packed in bins of group D in
the packing induced by b.
As no bin in D contains an item of size greater than 0.5, using Observation 35 with
y = 0.8 we conclude that all bins in group D, except for at most one bin (the leftmost bin
in D), contain only items with sizes in (0.2, 0.3)⋃(0.427, 0.5].
For convenience, in the rest of our discussion we refer to items with sizes in (0.427, 0.5]
as items of type A, and to items with sizes in (1− y, y − 0.5) as items of type B.
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Let us consider what are the possible combinations of the items of types A and B in
the bins of group D, all of which, except for possibly two bins as was proven in Claim 34,
have loads in [2
3
, 0.8):
(i) A – There can be at most one bin that contains a single item of type A, as an A type
item has size of at most 0.5, and we know all bins in D (except maybe for one) are more
than 0.5 full.
(ii) B– Not possible, as this item will benefit from moving to a bin from the group A with
load L ∈ (0.5, 0.573) (which exists).
(iii) AB– Not possible, as an item of type B will benefit from moving to a bin from the
group A with load L ∈ (0.5, 0.573) (which exists), as it fits there, and L > 0.5 while the
size of type A item is at most 0.5.
(iv) AA– Not possible, as two type A items produce load greater than 0.8.
(v) BB– Not possible, as one of the type B items will benefit from moving to a bin from
group A with load L ∈ (0.5, 0.573), as it fits there, and its load would be at least 0.7 in
case of migration, which is greater than a load of two B type items (which can get only up
to 0.6).
(vi) BBB– Possible.
(vii) BBBB–Not possible, as any B type item has a size of at least 0.2, and four such
items would incur a load greater than 0.8. The same applies to ABB.
Other combinations are not possible as the items would simply do not fit into a bin of
unit capacity. Therefore, the only combination of items that is possible in bins of group D
is a triple of type B items (except for maybe two bins which we consider separately: the
bin with a single A type item (that corresponds to the bin with load in (0, 1
2
] we mentioned
earlier in the discussion), and the leftmost bin in D that may contain items other than of A
or B type).
Now we prove that all bins in D, except for at most one bin, are loaded by more than
3
4
. Consider any bin in D that contains three B type items, with sizes x, y, z ∈ (0.2, 0.3).
We would like to show that x+ y + z > 3
4
must hold. Observe, that each one of x, y and z
fits into the bin from groupA with load L ∈ (0.5, 0.573) (which exists). As we assume the
configuration discussed admits a NE packing, none of them would benefit from migrating
to this bin. Thus, we can conclude that the following holds:


x+ y + z > x+ L
x+ y + z > y + L
x+ y + z > z + L.
This set of inequalities yields x+ y + z > 3
2
L, and as L > 1
2
, we get x+ y + z > 3
4
.
To prove part (b) of the claim, we will split the B items into two types: items having
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sizes smaller than 0.25, that is, sizes in (1 − y, 0.25] and items having sizes larger than
0.25, that is, sizes in (0.25, y − 0.5). We refer to the former as B1 type items and to the
latter as B2 type items. There are four different combinations of triples of B1 and B2 type
items:
(i) B1B1B1– Not possible, as one of the type B1 items will benefit from moving to a bin
from group A with load L ∈ (0.5, 0.573), as it fits there, and L > 0.5, while the size of
two B1 is at most 0.5.
(ii) B1B1B2– Same as in case (i), only now B2 type item migrates.
(iii) B1B2B2– Possible.
(iv) B2B2B2– Possible.
We can see, that both possible combinations include two items of type B2, proving part
(b) of Claim 36. Recall, that there can be only two “poorly” loaded bins in D: one with
load in (0, 1
2
]- this is the bin with single A type item if such exists, and one with load in
(1
2
, 2
3
). We can observe that there can not be a bin with load in (1
2
, 2
3
) in group D, as any
such bin necessarily contains three B type items, but any of the two possible combinations
B1B2B2 and B2B2B2 admits a load strictly greater than 23 . We conclude that all bins in D,
except for maybe one bin with a load in (0, 1
2
], are loaded by more than 3
4
, thus finishing
the proof of part (a) of Claim 36.
In this point, we have established that (almost) all bins in group D have loads in
(0.75, 0.8). Again, we consider two complement cases separately:
Case (3.2.a) All bins in group D have loads in [0.775, 0.8) (except for maybe one bin with
load in (0, 1
2
]).
By Claim 36, we know that each bin in group D (except for at most two bins) contains
at least two items of size greater than 0.25. An optimal solution will have to use at least
2(nD−2)
3
bins to pack these items. Moreover, we can consider each item of size greater than
0.5 in bin of A as two items of size greater than 0.25. As all the bins in groups B and C are
loaded by at least 0.8, we obtain the following linear program:
OPT (G) ≥ nA
OPT (G) ≥ 0.5nA + 0.8nB + 0.8nC + 0.775(nD − 1)
OPT (G) ≥ 2
3
nA +
2
3
(nD − 2).
In total,
nA + nB + nC + nD ≤ 1.6406 · OPT (G) + 1.03125.
Case (3.2.b) There exists at least one bin in group D with load in (0.75, 0.775).
In order to formulate the mathematical program, we first prove the following fact.
47
Claim 37. In the case there exists a bin in group A that has a load in (0.5, 0.573):
Each bin in group C, except for possibly one bin (the leftmost bin in C), contains at least
two items of size larger than 1
4
.
Proof. First, we would like to characterize the items that are packed in bins of group C in
the packing induced by b.
As no bin in C contains an item of size greater than 0.5, using Observation 35 with
y = 7
8
we conclude that all bins in group C, except for at most one bin (the leftmost bin in
C), contain only items with sizes in (1
8
, 3
8
)
⋃
(0.427, 0.5].
Also, as we assumed that there is at least one bin in groupD having load in (0.75, 0.775),
an item with size in (1
8
, 0.225] will move to this bin as it fits there, and the load of this bin
will be strictly greater than y as a result of the migration. As b is a NE packing, no such
items exists in C. We get that all bins in group C, except for at most one bin, contain only
items with sizes in [0.225, 3
8
)
⋃
(0.427, 0.5].
Similarly to above, in the sequel of our discussion we refer to items with sizes in
(0.427, 0.5] as items of type A, and to items with sizes in [0.225, y − 0.5) as items of type
B.
Now, let us consider what are the possible combinations of items of types A and B in
the bins in group C, all of which have loads in [0.8, 7
8
):
(i) A– Not possible, as an A type item has size of at most 0.5, while all bins in C admit
a load greater than 0.8.
(ii) B– Not possible, as a B type item has size of at most 3
8
, while all bins in C admit a load
greater than 0.8.
(iii) AA– Possible.
(iv) BB– Not possible, as two B type items have size of at most 6
8
, while all bins in C are
loaded by more than 0.8.
(v) AB– Not possible, as the B type item will benefit from moving to a bin from the group
A with load L ∈ (0.5, 0.573) (which exists), as it fits there, and L > 0.5 while the size of
type A item is at most 0.5.
(vi) ABB– Not possible, as an A type item have size of at least 0.427 and two B type
items have size of at least 0.45, resulting in a load of 0.877, which exceeds the maximal
load of 7
8
for a bin in C. The same applies to BBBB, as four B type items incur load of at
least 0.9.
(vii) BBB– Possible.
Any other combination is not possible, as the items would simply not fit into a bin of
unit capacity.
Therefore, a bin in group C may contain either a pair of A type items or a triple of B
type items. For a bin in C which contains a pair of A type items, Claim 37 trivially holds.
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The case where a bin contains a triple of B type items has to be analyzed more thoroughly.
We will split the B items into two types: items having sizes smaller than 0.25, that is, sizes
in [0.225, 0.25] and items having sizes larger than 0.25, that is, sizes in (0.25, y − 0.5).
Using similar considerations as in Claim 36, we conclude that each bin in C, except for
maybe one bin, necessarily contains at least two items of size larger than 1
4
, proving Claim
37.
By Claims 36 and 37, we know that each bin in group C (except for at most one bin)
and each bin in group D (except for at most two bins) contains at least two items of size
greater than 0.25. An optimal solution will have to use at least 2
3
(nC+nD−3) bins to pack
these items. We consider each item of size greater than 0.5 in bin ofA as two items of size
greater than 0.25. As all the bins in group B are loaded by at least 7
8
, all bins in group C by
at least 0.8, and all bins in group D (except for at most one) by at least 3
4
(by Claim 36(a)),
we get the following program:
OPT (G) ≥ nA
OPT (G) ≥ 0.5nA + 7
8
nB + 0.8nC + 0.75(nD − 1)
OPT (G) ≥ 2
3
(nA + nC + nD − 3).
In total,
nA + nB + nC + nD ≤ 1.64286 ·OPT (G) + 1.2857.
Combining all the possible cases, we get that the number of bins in the packing induced
by b which yields a NE is at most 1.64286 · OPT (G) + 2.
Note that the choice of the constants that we used to define our groups is not incidental.
Constant 0.573 for group A was chosen s.t. it is large enough for the program for case 1
to yield an upper bound which is smaller than our claimed upper bound 1.64286, and such
that 1 − 0.573 is large enough so that there can not be a combination of items ABB in
both groups C and D, else we cannot claim that there are always 2 items of size larger than
1
4
in these groups. Constants 0.8 and 0.775 were chosen s.t. they are large enough for the
programs for case 3.1 and the for case 3.2.a to yield an upper bound which is smaller than
the claimed upper bound of 1.64286, and s.t. 1 − 0.8 and 1 − 0.775 are large enough so
that we cannot have four B type items in bins of group C and D.
From Theorem 33, we get
Corollary 38. PoA(BP ) ≤ 1.64286.
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Proof.
PoA(BP ) = lim sup
OPT (G)→∞
sup
G∈BP
sup
b∈NE(G)
nA + nB + nC + nD
OPT (G)
≤ lim sup
OPT (G)→∞
1.64286 · OPT (G) + 2
OPT (G)
= 1.64286.
From Theorem 27 and Corollary 38 we conclude that 1.64163 ≤ PoA(BP ) ≤ 1.64286.
We conjecture that the true bound is equal to the lower bound which we provide.
Conjecture 39. PoA(BP ) =∑∞j=1 2−j(j−1)/2 = 1.64163.
3.5 Strong Prices of Anarchy and Stability in the Bin Pack-
ing game
This section is dedicated to the analysis of the Strong Price of Anarchy and the Strong Price
of Stability of the bin packing game, and to establishing the fact that they admit the same
value, which is equal to the (asymptotic) approximation ratio of the Subset Sum algorithm.
Consider the Subset Sum algorithm for bin packing, that proceeds by filling one bin at
a time with a set of items that fills the bin as much as possible.
Theorem 40. For the Bin Packing game, the set of SNE and the set of outcomes of Subset
Sum algorithm coincide.
A proof of this result is given in two parts.
Claim 41. The output of the Subset Sum algorithm is always a SNE.
Proof. Let us consider a packing b of a set N of items produced by the Subset Sum
algorithm, where the output bins are numbered from left to right, in the order in which
they are packed by the algorithm. Let k be the number of bins, and let Li for i = 1, . . . k
be the load of bin Bi in the packing. By the definition of the Subset Sum algorithm, we
have L1(b) ≥ L2(b) ≥ . . . ≥ Lk(b).
Assume by contradiction that this packing is not an SNE. Then, by definition of SNE,
there exists a non-empty groupA of items i1, i2, . . . , im in this packing, all of which benefit
from migration to different bins, resulting in a packing b′. Note that in this cooperative
setting, unlike in the non cooperative case, the number of bins may grow as a result of the
improving step, since items may reduce their costs by jointly moving into a new bin.
Consider the leftmost bin in packing b that contains an item (or several items) from
coalition A. Let this bin be Bj , and let this item be ir. Consider the bin Bj∗ this item has
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migrated to. We know that the load observed by Bj∗ after the migration is strictly greater
than that of Bj . Observe, that Bj∗ cannot be one of the bins to the left of Bj with indices in
{1, . . . , j − 1}, as the loads of these bins were not affected by the migration; Indeed, since
they contain no item from A, their loads could not be decreased as a result of the step,
as no item has left them. Also, their loads could not get increased, because if one of the
items ih ∈ A would have migrated to one of these bins, say Bf where f ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1},
the contents of that bin together with this item would form a set of items that fits into a
unit-capacity bin and observes a greater load than the load of all candidate subsets of items
considered by the algorithm for the packing of bin Bf . That contradicts the fact that bins
with indices in {1, . . . , f} were filled by the Subset Sum algorithm.
We get that Li(b) = Li(b′) for i = 1, . . . j − 1. Thus, Bj∗ can be either one of the bins
to the right of Bj with indices in {j+1, . . . , k}, or a new bin that was opened as a result of
the improving step. As Lj(b) < Lj∗(b′), and bin Bj∗ contains only items from the bins Bi,
i = j, . . . k, this contradicts the fact that bin Bj was packed by the Subset Sum algorithm.
Therefore, the load of bin Bj∗ after the migration could not be greater than the load
of bin Bj in the original packing, contradicting that all members of A strictly reduce their
cost as a result of this migration, as it does not hold for the item ir.
Claim 42. Any SNE is an output of some execution of the Subset Sum algorithm.
Proof. Consider an SNE packing b of a set N of items, where the bins are ordered from left
to right in non-increasing order of their loads. Let k be the number of bins in b. We will
show that there exists a run of the Subset Sum algorithm on an input N which produces
exactly this packing, by constructing each bin, one at a time, and showing this construction
in every step is consistent with the actions of the Subset Sum algorithm. The construction
is done by induction on the index of the bin in the SNE packing.
Assume that contents of the bins B1, . . . ,Bj−1 that were packed by the Subset Sum
algorithm are identical to the contents of the bins with the corresponding indices in the
packing b, and we now use the Subset Sum algorithm to pack the next bin Bj . Denote the
load of the j-th bin in packing b by L. We would like to show that bin Bj packed by the
Subset Sum algorithm must have a load L, as well. First, observe the load of bin Bj can
not be smaller than L, as items that are packed in bins with indices {j, . . . , k} in b are still
available to Subset Sum algorithm at the point of packing of bin Bj .
Now, we show that the load of bin Bj can not be larger than L, either. Assume, by
contradiction, that the load of the items that were packed by the Subset Sum algorithm in
Bj is greater than the load observed by the j-th bin in b. Then, the contents of Bj forms a
coalition of items, all of which are packed in bins with indices {j, . . . , k} in b that observe
a load not greater than L (as the bins in b are sorted in non-increasing order of loads), and
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Figure 3.4: An example of two SNE packings of the same set of items with different social
costs.
all of which would benefit from moving to a new bin, in contradiction to the assumption
that b is an SNE packing. Thus, the load of bin Bj has to be exactly L.
As the first j − 1 bins in both packings are assumed to be identical, the items that are
packed in the j-th bin in b are still available for the Subset Sum algorithm to pack in Bj ,
and we can consider it taking exactly that action (since the Subset Sum algorithm does not
have a preference over sets of items of same load).
Note, that not all SNE of a certain instance of the bin packing game necessarily admit
the same social cost value, as the output of the Subset Sum algorithm for a set N of items
may not always be unique. The load and the contents of each consecutive bin is influenced
by the choices of the items made by the Subset Sum algorithm for filling the previous bins.
For example, see Figure 3.4.
Now, we would like to show that for the bin packing game, SPOA equals SPOS, and that
this value is equal to the approximation ratio of the Subset Sum algorithm. We denote this
approximation ratio by R∞SS .
Theorem 43. For the bin packing game introduced above, SPOS = SPOS = RSS.
Proof. Claim 41 implies that SPOA ≥ R∞SS, and Claim 42 implies that SPOA ≤ R∞SS . In
total, this proves SPOA = R∞SS. It is left to show that SPOS = R∞SS . In order to show
the equivalence between SPOS and R∞SS , we would have to prove the following sequence
of inequalities: SPOS ≤ SPOA ≤ R∞SS ≤ SPOS. Recall that for any game the leftmost
inequality holds by definition. The second inequality is shown by Claim 42. Thus, SPOS ≤
R∞SS . It therefore suffices to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 44. For the bin packing game, R∞SS ≤ SPOS.
Proof. A way to show this would be to show that every lower bound example for Subset
Sum can be converted into an example that has a unique SNE (or a unique run of Subset
Sum, which are equivalent by Claim 42). Then, the best (and the only) SNE of this example
will be the result of the execution of Subset Sum on this example.
The problem in this approach is that it is not clear which one of the solutions of Subset
Sum is to be considered, as it is not clear why Subset Sum should prefer any one set of
items over any other equally respectable set of items. However, it is possible to define a
closely related set of items, which does not offer Subset Sum any choice over the sets of
items it packs at each stage. We achieve this by modifying the sizes of the items in the
lower bound example of Subset Sum, in a way that determines its preferences over subsets
of items that were in the same size in the original example.
So, consider a packing b of a setN containing n items, which is a lower bound example
for Subset Sum, where the bins are numbered from left to right, in the order in which they
were packed by the algorithm. Let k be the number of bins in this packing. Let ℓ = 2n− 1
be the number of all possible subsets of items in N (except for the empty set), and let P be
the set of the distinct sums Pi of sizes of items in these subsets, arranged in non-increasing
order. We add the sum 1 to P even if there does not exist a subset of items in N that sums
up to 1. We define ρ = min
1≤i≤ℓ
Pi
Pi+1
. Denote β = 1+ ε, where ε is a small positive constant,
chosen such that βk < ρ holds. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we modify the sizes of all the items in
bin Bi in b by a multiplicative factor αi = 1
βi−1
, getting a new set of items N ′. By the
definition, α1 ≥ α2 ≥ . . . ≥ αk holds. Informally, we can say that this factor is defined
for each bin in a way that makes the items in the lower indexed bins in b more “desirable”
to Subset Sum than the items packed in the bins of higher index, by decreasing the sizes of
the latter by more than the sizes of the former.
The selection of ρ ensures for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ that Pi would not get below Pi+1 as a
result of this action, which preserves the global order between the sums in P . In what
follows, we show it also ensures that this modification will not turn a non-feasible subset
(i.e., a subset of items total size of which exceeds 1) of items of N into a feasible one. We
now show that the aforementioned modification of items in N achieves its purpose, that
is, enforces a unique run of Subset Sum algorithm on N ′, and on the other hand does not
decrease R∞SS by proving the following three claims.
We first show that the transformation is defined in a manner such that the sums decrease
monotonically, and the order between successive sums is preserved.
Claim 45. Consider two (not necessarily disjoint) sets of items, U1 and U2, such that the
total sizes of items in these sets are Q1 and Q2 (respectively) before the modification, and
Q′1 and Q′2 (respectively) after the modification. Then Q1 > Q2 implies Q′1 > Q′2.
Proof. Since the size of items were multiplied by factors no smaller than 1
βk−1
, we have
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Q′1 ≥ Q1βk−1 . Since Q1 > Q2, by the definition of ρ, we have Q1 ≥ ρQ2. Since the
modified item sizes are no larger than the original ones, we have Q2 ≥ Q′2. This gives
Q′1 ≥ Q1βk−1 > Q1ρ ≥ Q2 ≥ Q′2.
From Claim 45 we see that by adding the sum 1 to the set P we ensured that this
modification applied on a non-feasible subset of items from N does not make it feasible.
Next, we show that this modification does not decrease the worst-case approximation
ratio of the Subset Sum algorithm.
Claim 46. The Subset Sum algorithm has an unique run on N ′, which produces a packing
where each bin contains exactly the same set of items packed in the corresponding bin in
the packing b, after transformation.
Proof. Consider the packing b of the set N ′ of items produced by Subset Sum. The proof
is done by induction over the index of the bin in the packing. Assume that each bin Bi for
1 ≤ i ≤ j − 1 in this packing contains the modified set of items which were packed in the
i-th bin in the packing b, and consider the next bin Bj in this packing. We would like to
prove that Bj contains exactly the set of modified items from the j-th bin in b.
Denote the load of the j-th bin in the packing b by Lj . Observe, that whilst Subset Sum
decided to pack the j-th bin in b with some subset U = {u1, . . . , ur} of items from N ,
there could be more subsets of items with the same sum as U present in N , which could
have been equally considered by Subset Sum as candidates to be packed in this bin, instead
of U . We claim, that after the transformation was applied on N , upon packing the j-th
bin, the algorithm no longer had a choice over the corresponding subsets, as the modified
subset U ′ = {u′1, . . . , u′r} observed a greater load, and thus was preferable to it.
So, consider any subset of items from N other than U , say V = {v1, . . . , vt}, sizes of
items in which sum to Lj . We show that the transformed set V ′ = {v′1, . . . , v′t} admits a
strictly smaller load than that of U ′. Any subset V that we should consider contains at least
one item vh which was packed in one of the bins with index in {j + 1, . . . , k} in b (and no
item from bins with indices in {1, . . . , j−1} in b). By the definition of the transformation,
the sizes of all items {u1, . . . , ur} were multiplied by 1
βj−1
, while all the sizes of the items
packed in bins with indices in {j + 1, . . . , k} in b, and vh among them, were multiplied
by at most 1
βs
, such that s > j − 1. Thus, the sum of the sizes of items in V ′ is at most∑t
i=1 avi − avh
βj−1
+
avh
βs
, which is strictly smaller than the sum of the sizes of items in U ′
which equals
∑r
i=1 aui
βj−1
, as
∑r
i=1 aui =
∑t
i=1 avi and avh > 0, proving the claim. It is left
to mention that Subset Sum had to choose exactly the set U ′ having load Lj
βj−1
for packing
the bin Bj , that is, that no set of larger total size is available at that time of packing the jth
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bin. Consider the items which are available for packing after bin j − 1 has been created.
For the original sizes of items, the largest total size of a feasible subset of items is Lj .
Also, by Claim 45, no subset of items with load L could have been created as a result of
the transformation, such that L > Lj
βj−1
.
Claim 47. The number of bins in an optimal packing of N ′ is no larger than the number
of bins in an optimal packing of N .
Proof. Note that multiplying each item ij ∈ N , 1 ≤ j ≤ n by a factor 1
βi−1
for some
1 ≤ i ≤ k, where β > 1, does not increase the size of this item. Therefore, for each set
of items i1, . . . , ir packed in some bin of an optimal packing of N and the correspond-
ing set of items i′1, . . . , i′r received as a result of this multiplication aij ≤ ai′j holds, and
thus
∑r
j=1 ai′j ≤
∑r
j=1 aij ≤ 1. As this holds for each bin in an optimal packing of N , an
optimal packing of the set N ′ uses no more bins than an optimal packing of the set N .
Since this holds for any lower bound example, for any ε > 0 there exists an input
I for bin packing for which the approximation ratio of the Subset Sum algorithm is at least
R∞SS − ε. This would imply R∞SS − ε ≤ SPoS(Gε) for a game Gε ∈ BP where Nε = I
for any ε > 0 and thus R∞SS ≤ SPoS(BP )
In total, the above discussion proves SPOA = SPOS = R∞SS .
Theorem 43 implies that the problem of bounding the SPOA and the SPOS of the bin
packing game is equivalent to the problem of bounding the approximation worst-case ratio
R∞SS of the well known Subset Sum algorithm for bin packing. It was recently proved that
R∞SS =
∑∞
i=1
1
2i−1
≈ 1.6067 (see [46]), as it was conjectured in [64]. We conclude that
SPoS(BP ) = SPoA(BP ) ≈ 1.6067.
3.6 The complexity of computing a Strong Nash packing
In this section we prove that given an instance of the bin packing game, the problem of
finding a packing that admits Strong Nash is NP-hard. For this purpose we use a poly-
nomial time reduction from the PARTITION problem. This problem is well-known to be
NP-hard. The goal in the PARTITION problem is to decide whether a given set S of n
integers with total sum 2B can be partitioned into two disjoint subsets, where the sum of
elements in each such set equals B.
Given an instance S = {a1, a2, . . . , an} of the PARTITION problem we produce an
input N = {b1, b2, . . . , bn} to the bin packing game by scaling every element in S by B:
bi =
ai
B
for i = 1, . . . , n.
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Claim 48. S can be partitioned into two distinct subsets such that the sum of elements in
each subset is B iff any SNE packing of N uses exactly two unit-capacity bins. Thus, there
does not exist a polynomial time algorithm which computes an SNE packing, unless P=NP.
Proof. Assume that there exists a partition of S = {a1, a2, . . . , an} into two distinct
subsets S1 and S2, such that the sum of elements in each subset is B. Let the items in S1
according to this partition be ai1 , . . . , ail and the items in S2 be ail+1 , . . . , ain . We have∑l
j=1 bij =
∑l
j=1 aij/B = 1 and
∑n
j=l+1 bij =
∑n
j=l+1 aij/B = 1. Consider a SNE
packing of the set N . As there is (at least one) subset of items in N that have a total sum of
1, the Subset Sum algorithm (that produces the all possible SNE packings) will pack such
a set into one bin, and the remaining subset of items, which also has a total sum of 1, must
be packed in another bin. This implies any packing of N that admits SNE will use 2 fully
loaded bins.
Assume now that there does not exist a partition, in this case, at least three bins must
be used for any valid packing of the input items N , so clearly no SNE packing can use only
two bins.
3.7 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter we have studied the Bin Packing problem, where the items are controlled
by selfish agents, and the cost charged from each bin is shared among all the items packed
into it, both in non-cooperative and cooperative versions. We have provided improved and
almost tight upper and lower bounds on the Price of Anarchy of the induced game.
We also gave a simple deterministic algorithm that computes an SNEassignment for
any instance of the Bin Packing game, and proved that the asymptotic worst-case approx-
imation ratio of this algorithm equals the Strong Price of Anarchy and the Strong Price of
Stability values of the game, providing tight bound on these measures. We have shown
that the problem of computing an SNE assignment is NP-hard, which justifies the fact that
this algorithm has exponential running time.
As the SPOA and POA values of the Bin Packing game yield similar results, we conclude
that the efficiency loss in the Bin Packing game, as quantified by the POA, is derived
from selfishness alone, and coordination will not help. On the other hand, as the POS
yields significantly better results than the SPOS, and SPOS equals SPOA which, in turn, has
similar value to the POA, it implies that in the Bin Packing game the best equilibrium is
less efficient if coordination between the agents is allowed.
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Chapter 4
Parametric Bin Packing of selfish items
4.1 Introduction and Motivation
In this chapter we consider a parametric version of the Bin Packing problem which was
discussed in Chapter 3 (see [28] for a comprehensive survey on the Bin Packing problem
and its variants). In the classic Bin Packing problem, we are given a set of items N =
{1, 2, . . . , n}. The ith item in N has size ai ∈ (0, 1]. The objective is to pack the items into
unit capacity bins so as to minimize the number of bins used. In the parametric case, the
sizes of items are bounded from above by a given value. More precisely, given a parameter
α ≤ 1 we consider inputs in which the item sizes are taken from the interval (0, α]. Setting
α to 1 gives us the standard Bin Packing problem.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Bin Packing problem is encountered in a great variety of
networking problems, a fact that motivates the study of Bin Packing from a game theoretic
perspective. The parametric Bin Packing problem can be met in real applications where
the sizes of items are much smaller compared to the respective sizes of the recipient. For
example, a common computational model in distributed systems is that the nodes exchange
signals via a network. Most often, a signal represents the state of some hardware compo-
nent and has a signal size ranging from a single bit up to a few bytes. The communication
networks used are often based on a broadcast bus where fixed sized frames are transmitted.
The amount of data that can be transmitted in each frame is almost always bigger than
the size of a signal. Thus, from a resource perspective it would be desirable to transport
several signals in each frame so as to reduce the bandwidth consumption.
The Parametric Bin Packing problem also models the problem of efficient routing in
networks that consist of parallel links of same bounded bandwidth between two terminal
nodes—similar to the ones considered in [18, 43, 79]. As Internet Service Providers often
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impose a bandwidth consumption policy which restricts the amount of data that can be
downloaded/uploaded by each user, placing a restriction on the size of the items allowed
to transfer makes the model more realistic.
4.2 The model
We study the Parametric Bin Packing problem both in cooperative and non-cooperative
versions. In each case the problem is specified by a given parameter α. The Parametric
Bin Packing game is defined by a tuple BP (α) = 〈Nα, (Bi)i∈Nα, (ci)i∈Nα〉. Where Nα is
the set of the items, whose size is at most α. Each item is associated with a selfish player—
we sometimes consider the items themselves to be the players. The set of strategies Bi for
each player i ∈ Nα is the set of all bins. Each item can be assigned to one bin only. The
outcome of the game is a particular assignment b = (bj)j∈Nα ∈ ×j∈NαBj of items to bins.
All the bins have unit cost. The cost function ci of player i ∈ Nα is defined as follows. A
player pays ∞ if it requests to be packed in an invalid way, that is, a bin which is occupied
by a total size of items which exceeds 1. Otherwise, the set of players whose items are
packed into a common bin share its unit cost proportionally to their sizes. That is, if an
item i of size ai is packed into a bin which contains the set of items B then i’s payment
is ci = ai/
∑
k∈B ak. Notice that since
∑
k∈B ak ≤ 1 the cost ci is always greater than or
equal to ai. The social cost function that we want to minimize is the number of used bins
(which equals the sum of players’ individual costs).
Clearly, a selfish item prefers to be packed into a bin which is as full as possible. In
the non-cooperative version, an item will perform an improving step if there is a strictly
more loaded bin in which it fits. At a Nash equilibrium, no item can unilaterally reduce its
cost by moving to a different bin. We call a packing that admits the Nash conditions an NE
packing.
In the cooperative version of the Parametric Bin Packing game, we consider all (non-
empty) subgroups of items from Nα. The cost functions of the players are defined the same
as in the non-cooperative case. Each group of items is interested to be packed in a way so
as to minimize the costs for all group members. Thus, given a particular assignment, all
members of a group will perform a joint improving step (not necessarily into a same bin) if
there is an assignment in which, for each member, the new bin will admit a strictly greater
load than the bin of origin. The costs of the non-members may be enlarged as a result of
this improving step. At a strong Nash equilibrium, no group of items can reduce the costs
of all its members by moving to different bins. We call a packing that admits the Strong
Nash conditions an SNE packing.
To measure the extent of deterioration in the quality of Nash packing due to the effect of
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selfish and uncoordinated behavior of the players (items) in the worst-case we use the Price
of Anarchy (POA) and the Price of Stability (POS). These are the standard measures of the
quality of the equilibria reached in uncoordinated selfish setting [79, 95]. The POA / POS
of an instance G of the Parametric Bin Packing game are defined to be the ratio between
the social cost of the worst/best Nash equilibrium and the social optimum, respectively.
As packing problems are usually studied via asymptotic measures, we consider asymptotic
POA and POS of the Parametric Bin Packing game BP(α), that are defined by taking a
supremum over the POA and POS of all instances of the Parametric Bin Packing game, for
large sets Nα.
In addition, we consider stability measures that allow to separate the effect of the lack
of coordination between players from the effect of their selfishness [5, 55]. The measures
considered are the (asymptotic) Strong Price of Anarchy (SPOA) and the Strong Price of
Stability (SPOS). These measures are defined similarly to the (asymptotic) POA and the
POS but only strong equilibria are considered.
As we study the SPOA / SPOS measures in terms of the worst-case approximation ratio
of a greedy algorithm for bin packing, we define here the parametric asymptotic worst-case
ratio R∞A (α) of algorithm A by
R∞A (α) = lim
k→∞
sup
N∈Vα
〈
A(N)
OPT (N)
∣∣∣∣ OPT (N) = k
〉
,
where A(N) denotes the number of bins used by algorithm A to pack the set N of items,
OPT (N) denotes the number of bins used in the optimal packing of N and Vα is the set
of all sets N for which the maximum size of the items is bounded from above by α.
4.3 Related work and our contributions
The parametric Bin Packing problem is a well studied version of the classic Bin Packing
problem (see [75], [28] for surveys on various results attained for this problem).
Bilo` [18] was the first to study the classic unrestricted Bin Packing problem from a
game theoretic perspective. Among other results, he proved that the Bin Packing game
admits a pure Nash equilibrium and provided non-tight bounds on the Price of Anarchy
(that apply for the case 1
2
< α ≤ 1). His work also shows that the Price of Stability of
the Bin Packing game equals to 1. The quality of pure equilibria in this game was further
investigated (by us) in [43], where we gave improved and almost tight bounds for the Price
of Anarchy.
The quality of strong equilibria in this game in terms of SPOA and SPOS was analyzed
in [43].
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For this purpose we have considered a natural algorithm for the Bin Packing problem
called Subset Sum (or SS algorithm for short). In each iteration, this algorithm finds among
the unpacked items, a maximum size set of items that fits into a new bin.
Surprisingly, the worst-case approximation ratio of the Subset Sum algorithm (denoted
by R∞SS(1)) is deeply related to the Strong Price of Anarchy of the Bin Packing game.
Indeed, the two concepts are equivalent: Every output of the SS algorithm is a strong Nash
equilibrium, and every strong Nash equilibrium is the output of some execution of the SS
algorithm. We also proved that in this game SPOA=SPOS (see [43]). We used these facts
to show the existence of strong equilibria for the Bin Packing game and to characterize the
SPOA and SPOS in terms of this approximation ratio, which was established in [74] (lower
bound) and [46] (matching upper bound).
All results from [43] are fully presented in Chapter 3.
Here we consider the parametric Bin Packing problem where item sizes are all in an
interval (0, α] for some α < 1 from a game theoretic perspective.
In fact, results presented in Chapter 3 for the POA, SPOA and SPOS already apply for the
case 1
2
< α ≤ 1. In this chapter we complement these results and study the pure Price of
Anarchy for the parametric variant and show nearly tight upper bounds and lower bounds
on it for any α ≤ 1
2
.
The main analytical tool that we use to derive the claimed upper bounds is weight-
ing functions—a technique widely used for the analysis of algorithms for various packing
problems [74, 80, 103] and other greedy heuristics [71, 72]. The idea of such weights is
simple. Each item receives a weight according to its size and its assignment in some fixed
NE packing. The weights are assigned in a way that the cost of the packing (the number
of the bins used) is close to the total sum of weights. In order to complete the analysis, it
is usually necessary to bound the total weight that can be packed into a single bin of an
optimal solution.
The tight bound of 1 on the Price of Stability proved in [18] for the general unrestricted
Bin Packing game trivially carries over to the parametric case.
We also consider the Strong Prices of Anarchy and Stability of the Bin Packing game
for any α ≤ 1
2
. As our conclusions regarding the connections between the strong Prices
of Anarchy and Stability and the worst-case approximation ratio of SS still apply for the
parametric variant of the problem, we again use known results for the approximation ratio
of SS where item sizes are all in an interval (0, α] for some α ≤ 1
2
to get tight bounds on
the Strong Prices of Anarchy and Stability of the Bin Packing game.
The first non-trivial bounds lower and upper bounds on the worst-case performance of
the SS algorithm for α ≤ 1
2
were given by Caprara and Pferschy in [19]. Specifically, they
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showed that for t ≥ 1, if 1
t+1
< α ≤ 1
t
then R∞SS(α) ≥
∑∞
i=1
t
(t+1)i−1
and
R∞SS(α) ≤
{
2− 4t
3(t+1)
+ ln 4
3
if t ≤ 2
1 + ln t+1
t
if t ≥ 3.
The exact bounds on the worst-case performance of the SS algorithm for any α ≤ 1
were established recently by Epstein at. el. in [46] to be R∞SS(α) = 1 +
∑∞
i=1
1
(t+1)2i−1
.
Note that the ratio R∞SS(α) lies strictly between the upper and lower bounds of Caprara and
Pferschy for all α ≤ 1
2
.
4.4 Price of Anarchy in the parametric Bin Packing game
We now provide a lower bound for the Price of Anarchy of the parametric Bin Packing
game with bounded size items and, in addition, prove a very close upper bound for each
value of 1
t+1
< α ≤ 1
t
for a positive integer t ≥ 2, that is, for all 0 < α ≤ 1
2
. The case
1
2
< α ≤ 1 (t = 1) was extensively discussed in Chapter 3.
4.4.1 A lower bound: construction
In this section we give the construction of a lower bound on PoA(α). For each value of
t ≥ 2 we present a set of items which consists of multiple item lists. This construction is
related to the one that we gave in Chapter 3 for 1
2
< α ≤ 1, though it is not a generalization
of the former, which strongly relies on the fact that each item of size larger than 1
2
can be
packed alone in a bin of the NE solution, whereas in the parametric case there are no
such items. It is based upon techniques that are often used to design lower bounds on
Bin Packing algorithms (see for example [80]), but it differs from these constructions in
the notion of order in which packed bins are created (which does not exist here) and the
demand that each bin satisfies the Nash stability property. Our lower bound is given by the
following theorem.
Theorem 49. For each integer t ≥ 2 and α ∈ ( 1
t+1
, 1
t
], the PoA of the BP (α) game is at
least
t2+
∞∑
j=1
(t+1)−j ·2−j(j−1)/2
t(t−1)+1
.
Proof. Let s > 2 be an integer. We define a construction with s + 1 phases of indices
0 ≤ j ≤ s, where the items of phase j have sizes which are close to 1
(t+1)·2j
, but can
be slightly smaller or slightly larger than this value. For each t ≥ 2, t ∈ N we use two
sequences of positive integers rtj and dtj , for 0 ≤ j ≤ s. We choose the number rts to be
an arbitrary sufficiently large value such that rts > 2s
3
. For 0 ≤ j ≤ s − 1, we define
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recursively
rtj = 2
j · (t+ 1)rtj+1 + 1.
We define
dtj = r
t
j−1 − rtj = ((t+ 1) · 2j−1 − 1)rtj + 1,
for 1 ≤ j ≤ s. In addition, we let n = rt0 and dt0 = 0. Note that rt1 = n−1t+1 , dt1 = rt0 − rt1 =
nt+1
t+1
(using rt1 + dt1 = rt0 = n). Clearly rtj ≤ n and dtj ≤ n, for 0 ≤ j ≤ s.
We construct an input I for whichOPT (I) = t(t−1)·n+n, and note that n ≥ rsj > 2s3 ,
n >> t. We use a sequence of small values δj , 0 ≤ j ≤ s, such that δj = 1(4n)3s−2j . Note
that this implies δj+1 = (4n)2δj for 0 ≤ j ≤ s− 1.
Observation 50. For each 1 ≤ j ≤ s, n
(t+1)j ·2j(j−1)/2
− 1 ≤ rtj ≤ n(t+1)j ·2j(j−1)/2 .
Proof. For j = 1 it holds by definition. We next prove the property for j + 1 using the
property for j (where j ≥ 1). By definition of the sequence rtj , we have rtj+1 =
rtj−1
(t+1)·2j
for
j ≥ 1. Using the inductive assumption, we get
rtj+1 <
rtj
(t+ 1) · 2j ≤
n
(t+1)j ·2j(j−1)/2
(t + 1) · 2j =
n
(t+ 1)j+1 · 2j(j+1)/2 .
On the other hand,
rtj+1 =
rtj − 1
(t+ 1) · 2j >
n
(t+1)j ·2j(j−1)/2
− 2
(t + 1) · 2j ≥
n
(t+ 1)j+1 · 2j(j+1)/2 − 1.
The input set of items for t ≥ 2 consists of multiple phases. Phase 0 consists of the
following sets of items: nt items of size
σ01 =
1
t + 1
+∆nt2(t− 1) + ∆,
t(t− 1)n items of size
σ02 =
1
t+ 1
−∆nt(t− 1),
and pairs of items of sizes
σi03 =
1
t+1
+∆nt(t− 1) + i∆ and σi04 = 1t+1 − i∆
for 1 ≤ i ≤ t(t− 1)n, such that ∆ = 2δ0
nt(t−1)+1
.
Note that σi03 + σi04 = 2t+1 +∆nt(t− 1). There are also t(t− 1)(t− 2)n items of size
σ05 =
1
t+ 1
.
62
For 1 ≤ j ≤ s, phase j consists of the following 2dtj + rtj items. There are rtj items of size
σj =
1
(t+ 1) · 2j + 2(d
t
j + 1)δj,
and for 1 ≤ i ≤ dtj , there are two items of sizes
πij =
1
(t + 1) · 2j + (2i− 1)δj and θ
i
j =
1
(t+ 1) · 2j − 2iδj .
Note that πij+θij = 1(t+1)·2j−1 −δj . A bin of level j in the optimal packing contains only
items of phases 1, . . . , j. A bin of level s + 1 contains items of all phases. The optimal
packing contains t(t − 1)n bins of level 0, dtj bins of level j, for 1 ≤ j ≤ s, and the
remaining bins are of level s+ 1. We have
s∑
j=1
dtj = r
t
0 − rts = n− rts. Thus, if the number
of level s+1 bins is (at most) rts, we have at most n bins of levels 1 ≤ j ≤ s+1, in addition
to the t(t − 1)n bins of level 0. In total, the packing contains at most t(t − 1)n + n =
(t(t− 1) + 1)n bins. The optimal packing of the set of items specified above is defined as
follows. A level 0 bin contains t−2 items of size σ05, one item of size σ02 and, in addition,
one pair of items of sizes σi03 and σi04 for a given value of i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ t(t − 1)n.
For 1 ≤ j ≤ s, a level j bin contains t items of size σ01 and one item of each size σk for
1 ≤ k ≤ j − 1, and, also, one pair of items of sizes πij and θij for a given value of i such
that 1 ≤ i ≤ dtj . A bin of level s+ 1 contains t items of size σ01 and one item of each size
σk for 1 ≤ k ≤ s.
Claim 51. This set of items I can be packed into n + t(t − 1)n bins, i.e., OPT (I) ≤
(1 + t(t− 1))n
Proof. First, we show that every item was assigned into some bin. Consider the nt items
of size σ01. Each t-tuple of these items is assigned into a bin of level 1 ≤ j ≤ s together.
Consider items of size πij and θij . Such items exist for 1 ≤ i ≤ dtj , therefore, every such
pair is assigned into a bin (of level 1 ≤ j ≤ s) together. Next, consider items of size σj
for some 1 ≤ j ≤ s. The number of such items is rtj . The number of bins which received
such items is
s∑
k=j+1
dtk+ r
t
s = r
t
j . As to the items of size σ02, there are t(t−1)n such items,
each item is assigned into one of the t(t − 1)n bins of level 0. The items σi03 and σi04 that
exist for 1 ≤ i ≤ t(t − 1)n. Every such pair is assigned into one of the t(t − 1)n level 0
bins together. And, finally consider the (t− 2) · t(t− 1)n items of size σ05. Each (t − 2)
tuple of these items is assigned into one of the t(t− 1)n level 0 bins.
We further show that the sum of sizes of items in each bin does not exceed 1. Consider
a bin of level 0. The sum of items it contains is:
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(t−2)σ05+σ02+σi03+σi04 = (t−2)·
1
t+ 1
+
1
t + 1
−∆nt(t−1)+ 2
t+ 1
+∆nt(t−1) = 1.
Now, consider a bin of level j for some 1 ≤ j ≤ s. The sum of items packed in it is:
t · σ01 +
j−1∑
k=1
σk +
1
(t + 1) · 2j−1 − δj
= t · ( 1
t + 1
+∆nt2(t− 1) + ∆) +
j−1∑
k=1
(
1
(t+ 1) · 2k + 2(d
t
k + 1)δk) +
1
(t+ 1) · 2j−1 − δj
=
t
t + 1
+ t · (∆nt2(t− 1) + ∆) + 1
(t+ 1) · 2j−1 − δj +
1
t+ 1
j−1∑
k=1
1
2k
+ 2
j−1∑
k=1
(dtk + 1)δk
≤ t
t+ 1
+
1
(t+ 1) · 2j−1 +
1− (1
2
)j−1
t+ 1
+ t2 · 2δ0 − δj +
j−1∑
k=1
2(dtk + 1)δk
= 1 + t2 · 2δ0 +
j−1∑
k=1
2(dtk + 1)δk − δj .
It is left to show that t2 · 2δ0 +
j−1∑
k=1
2(dtk + 1)δk − δj ≤ 0 holds. As dtk + 1 ≤ n and δj is
a strictly increasing sequence, we have 2(dtk + 1)δk ≤ 2nδj−1, and since j − 1 ≤ s < n,
j−1∑
k=1
2(dtk + 1)δk < 4n
2δj−1. Also, as t < n, t2 · 2δ0 < 2n2δj−1. Using δj = 16n2δj−1 we
get that the sum t2 · 2δ0 +
j−1∑
k=1
2(dtk + 1)δk is smaller than δj .
It is left to consider a bin of level s+ 1. The sum of items in it is:
t · σ01 +
s∑
k=1
σk = t · ( 1
t + 1
+∆nt2(t− 1) + ∆) +
s∑
k=1
(
1
(t+ 1) · 2k + 2(d
t
k + 1)δk)
=
t
t + 1
+ t · (∆nt2(t− 1) + ∆) + 1− (
1
2
)s
(t+ 1)
+
s∑
k=1
2(dk + 1)δk
= 1− (
1
2
)s
(t+ 1)
+ t · 2δ0 +
s∑
k=1
2(dtk + 1)δk.
We have 2(dtk + 1)δk ≤ 2nδs = 122s−1ns−1 . Since 2 < s < n, t < n and t · 2δ0 < 2n2δs, we
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get that the quantity above is at most
1− (
1
2
)s
(t + 1)
+
n
22s−1ns−1
+ 2n2δs = 1− 1
2s(t+ 1)
+
1
22s−1ns−2
+ 2n2δs
= 1− 1
2s(t+ 1)
+
1
22s−1ns−2
+
2n2
(4n)s
= 1− 1
2s(t+ 1)
+
1
22s−1ns−2
+
1
22s−1ns−2
= 1− 1
2s(t+ 1)
+
1
22(s−1)ns−2
< 1.
Before introducing the NE packing for this set of items, we slightly modify the input by
removing a small number of items. Clearly, OPT (I ′) ≤ (1+t(t−1))n would still hold for
the modified input I ′. The modification applied to the input is a removal of items π1j and
θ
dtj
j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ s, the two items σ103 and σt(t−1)n04 and (t − 2) of the σ05 items from the
input. We now define an alternative packing, which is a NE. There are three types of bins
in this packing. The bins of the first type are bins with items of phase j, 1 ≤ j ≤ s+1. We
construct rtj such bins. A bin of phase j contains (t+1) ·2j−1 items, as follows. One item
of size σj = 1(t+1)·2j + 2(d
t
j + 1)δj , and (t+ 1) · 2j−1 − 1 pairs of items of phase j. A pair
of items of phase j is defined to be the items of sizes πi+1j and θij , for some 1 ≤ i ≤ dtj−1.
The sum of sizes of this pair of items is 1
(t+1)·2j
+(2i+1)δj+
1
(t+1)·2j
−2iδj = 2(t+1)·2j +δj =
1
(t+1)·2j−1
+ δj .
Using dtj = ((t + 1) · 2j−1 − 1)rtj + 1 we get that all phase j items, for 1 ≤ j ≤ s are
packed. The sum of items in every such bin is 1 − 1
(t+1)·2j−1
+ ((t + 1) · 2j−1 − 1)δj +
1
(t+1)·2j
+ 2(dtj + 1)δj = 1− 1(t+1)·2j + δj((t+ 1) · 2j−1 + 1 + 2dtj).
The nt bins of the second type in the NE packing contain (t − 1) items of size σ02 =
1
t+1
− ∆nt(t − 1) and one item of size σ01 = 1t+1 + ∆nt2(t − 1) + ∆, from the 0 phase
bins. The load of each such bin is
(t− 1)
(
1
t+ 1
−∆nt(t− 1)
)
+
1
t + 1
+∆nt2(t− 1) + ∆
=
t
t + 1
−∆nt(t− 1)2 +∆nt2(t− 1) + ∆ = t
t + 1
+∆nt(t− 1)(t− (t− 1)) + ∆
=
t
t + 1
+∆nt(t− 1) + ∆ = t
t + 1
+∆(nt(t− 1) + 1) = t
t+ 1
+ 2δ0,
by definition of ∆. As there are in total t(t−1)n identical items of size σ02 and nt identical
σ01 items in the input set, we get that all these items are packed in these nt second type
bins in the NE packing constructed above.
The t(t − 1)n − 1 bins of third type in the NE packing each contain (t − 2) items
of size σ05 = 1t+1 , and, in addition, one pair of items of sizes σ
i+1
03 and σi04, for some
1 ≤ i ≤ t(t − 1)n from the phase 0 bins. The sum of sizes of this pair of items is:
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σi+103 + σ
i
04 =
1
t+1
+ ∆nt(t − 1) + (i + 1)∆ + 1
t+1
− i∆ = 2
t+1
+ ∆(nt(t − 1) + 1) =
2
t+1
+ 2δ0. Thus, the total load of such bin is (t − 2) · 1t+1 + 2t+1 + 2δ0 = tt+1 + 2δ0,
which equals the load of the bins of the second type in the NE packing. As there are in total
((t−2)·t(t−1)n−(t−2)) = (t−2)(t(t−1)n−1) items of size σ05 and t(t−1)n−1 pairs
of σi03 and σi04 items, we conclude that all the items of size σ05 and σi03, σi04 are packed in
these t(t− 1)n− 1 NE bins of the third type, as defined above.
We now should verify that the sum of sizes of the items packed in the three types of
bins in the defined NE packing does not exceed 1. This holds for the second and the third
type bins, as:
t
t+ 1
+ 2δ0 <
t
t+ 1
+
1
(4n)3s
<
t
t+ 1
+
1
t+ 1
= 1.
For the bins of the first type, this property directly follows from the inequality proven in
the next claim.
Claim 52. The loads of the bins in the packing defined above are monotonically increasing
as a function of the phase.
Proof. It is sufficient to show 1− 1
(t+1)·2j
+ δj((t+1) · 2j−1+1+2dtj) < 1− 1(t+1)·2j+1 for
1 ≤ j ≤ s, t ≥ 2 which is equivalent to proving δj((t+1)·2j−1+1+2dtj)2j+1 < 1t+1 . Using
dtj < n, we have: δj((t+1)·2j−1+1+2dtj)2j+1 < δj((t+1)·22j+2j+2n) < (t+1)·2δjn2,
as n > 2s
3
. Recall that s ≥ 3. Using δj ≤ δs = 122sns ≤ 12n2(t+1) we get 2δjn2 < 1t+1 .
For j = 0, t
t+1
+ 2δ0 < 1− 1(t+1)·2j + δj((t + 1) · 2j−1 + 1 + 2dtj) holds for all j ≥ 1,
as 2δ0 ≤ δj((t + 1) · 2j−1 + 1 + 2dtj), since t ≥ 2 and δj is a strictly increasing sequence.
Claim 53. The packing defined above is a valid NE packing.
Proof. To show that this is a NE packing, we need to show that an item of phase j > 0
cannot migrate to a bin of a level k ≥ j, since this would result in a load larger than 1, and
that it cannot migrate to a bin of phase k < j, since this would result in a load smaller than
the load of a phase j bin. Due to the monotonicity we proved in Claim 52, we only need to
consider a possible migration of a phase j item into a phase j bin, and a phase j − 1 bin, if
such bins exist. Moreover, in the first case it is enough to consider the minimum size item
and in the second case, the maximum size item of phase j.
For phase 0 items, since the smallest phase 0 item has size 1
t+1
− ∆nt(t − 1), if it
migrates to another bin of this phase, we get a total load of t
t+1
+∆(nt(t−1)+1)+ 1
t+1
−
∆nt(t− 1) = 1 + ∆ > 1, as ∆ > 0.
For items of phase j ≥ 1: The smallest phase j item has size 1
(t+1)·2j
− δj(2(dtj−1)) =
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1
(t+1)·2j
− δj(2dtj − 2). If it migrates to another bin of this phase, we get a total load of
1− 1
(t+ 1) · 2j + δj((t+ 1) · 2
j−1 + 1 + 2dtj) +
1
(t + 1) · 2j − δj(2d
t
j − 2)
= 1 + δj((t+ 1) · 2j−1 + 1 + 2dtj)− 2dtjδj + 2δj
= 1 + δj(3 + (t+ 1) · 2j−1) > 1.
The check for the largest item in the phase should be done separately for cases j = 1
and j ≥ 2, because we want to show that the largest item of phase j = 1 (in first type bin)
cannot migrate into a phase 0 bin (a second or third type bin), while for the largest item of
phase j ≥ 2 we need to show that it cannot move into other bin of first type. For phase
j = 1: The largest phase item has size 1
2(t+1)
+2(dt1 +1)δ1. If it migrates to a bin of phase
0, we get a load of t
t+1
+ 2δ0 +
1
2(t+1)
+ 2(dt1 + 1)δ1 =
2t+1
2(t+1)
+ 2δ0 + 2(d
t
1 + 1)δ1. This
load is strictly smaller than a load of level 1 which is 1− 1
(t+1)·2
+ δ1((t+1)+ 1+ 2d
t
1) =
2t+1
2(t+1)
+ δ1((t+ 1) + 1 + 2d
t
1), as t ≥ 2 and δ1 > δ0.
For phase j ≥ 2: The largest phase j item has size 1
(t+1)·2j
+ 2(dtj + 1)δj . If it migrates
to a bin of phase j − 1, we get a load of
1− 1
(t+ 1) · 2j−1 + δj−1((t+ 1) · 2
j−2 + 1 + 2dtj−1) +
1
(t + 1) · 2j + 2(d
t
j + 1)δj
= 1− 1
(t+ 1) · 2j + δj−1((t+ 1) · 2
j−2 + 1 + 2dtj−1) + 2(d
t
j + 1)δj.
We compare this load with 1− 1
(t+1)·2j
+ δj((t+1) · 2j−1+1+2dtj), and prove that the
first load is smaller. Indeed δj−1((t+ 1) · 2j−2 + 1+ 2dtj−1) < δj((t+ 1) · 2j−1− 1) since
δj = 16n
2δj−1, n > 2
s3 and ((t+1)·2j−2+1+2dtj−1) < 4n(t+1) < 16n2((t+1)·2j−1−1).
Finally, we bound the PoA as follows. The cost of the resulting NE packing is nt +
t(t − 1)n − 1 +
s∑
j=1
rtj = t
2n − 1 +
s∑
j=1
rtj . Using Observation 50 we get that
s∑
j=1
rtj ≥
s∑
j=1
( n
(t+1)j ·2j(j−1)/2
− 1) and since OPT (I) = t(t− 1) ·n+ n and n >> s, we get a ratio of
at least
t2+
s∑
j=1
(t+1)−j ·2−j(j−1)/2
t(t−1)+1
. Letting s tend to infinity as well results in the claimed lower
bound.
The corresponding lower bound values for different values of α are given in Table 4.1.
67
4.4.2 An upper bound
We now provide a close upper bound on PoA(α) for a positive integer t ≥ 2. The technique
used in Chapter 3 can be considered as a refinement of the one we use here. However, here
we are required to use additional combinatorial properties of the NE packing. To bound the
POA from above, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 54. For each integer t ≥ 2, for any instance of the parametric bin packing game
G ∈ BP (1
t
): Any NE packing uses at most
(
2t3+t2+2
(2t+1)(t2−t+1)
) · OPT (G) + 5 bins, where
OPT (G) is the number of bins used in a coordinated optimal packing.
Proof. Let us consider a packing b of the items in NG which admits NE conditions. We
classify the bins according to their loads into four groups-A, B,C and D. The cases t = 2
and t ≥ 3 are treated separately. For t = 2: groupA- contains bins with loads of more than
5
6
; Group B- contains bins with loads in (3
4
, 5
6
]; Group C- contains bins with loads in (17
24
, 3
4
];
Group D- contains bins with loads not greater than 17
24
. For t ≥ 3: group A- contains bins
with loads of more than 2t+1
2(t+1)
; Group B- contains bins with loads in ( t+1
t+2
, 2t+1
2(t+1)
]; Group C-
contains bins with loads in ( t2−t+1
t2
, t+1
t+2
]; GroupD- contains bins with loads not greater than
t2−t+1
t2
. This partition is well defined, as t
t+1
< t
2−t+1
t2
,
t2−t+1
t2
< t+1
t+2
and t+1
t+2
< 2t+1
2(t+1)
for
any t ≥ 3. We denote the cardinality of these groups by nA, nB, nC and nD, respectively.
Hence, NE = nA + nB + nC + nD. We list the bins in each group from left to right in
non-increasing order w.r.t. their loads. Our purpose is to find an upper bound on the total
number of bins in these four groups.
In the case nD < 3, using the fact that OPT ≥
∑n
i=1 ai we get:
• For t = 2, this means that all bins in packing b (except for at most 2) have load of at
least 17
24
, thus OPT ≥ 17
24
NE, and PoA ≤ 24
17
< 22
15
.
• For t ≥ 3, this means that all bins in packing b (except for at most 2) have load of at
least t2−t+1
t2
, thus OPT ≥ t2−t+1
t2
NE, and PoA ≤ t2
t2−t+1
< 2t
3+t2+2
(2t+1)(t2−t+1)
.
In the rest of the analysis we assume that nD ≥ 3. We start with a simple lower bound
on the load of the bins (except possibly at most two bins) in a NE.
Claim 55. For a positive integer t ≥ 2, all the bins in an NE packing b (except for maybe
a constant number of bins) are at least t
t+1
full.
Proof. Consider the well-known First Fit algorithm (FF for short) for bin packing. FF
packs each item in turn into the lowest indexed bin to where it fits. It opens a new bin only
in the case where the item does not fit into any existing bin. It was shown in [74] that any
bin (accept for maybe two) in the packing produced by FF is more than t
t+1
full for any
t ≥ 2. For each NG instance it is possible to define, by reordering the items, an instance for
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which running the FF algorithm will produce exactly the packing b. This can be achieved
by going through all bins in b, bin by bin, bottom to top, and listing the items in this order.
So, as any NE packing b can be produced by a run of FF, it has all the properties of a FF
packing, including the one mentioned above.
Moreover, the fact that any NE packing can be produced by a run of FF implies that the
worst-case asymptotic ratio of FF, which is known to be t+1
t
for t ≥ 2 [74], upper-bounds
the POA. But, as we show further, the upper-bound we provide on the POA is tighter than
this trivial bound for any t ≥ 2.
From Claim 55 it is evident that all the bins (except for maybe two) in group D have
loads in (2
3
, 17
24
] for t = 2, or in ( t
t+1
, t
2−t+1
t2
] for t ≥ 3.
Claim 56. For a positive integer t ≥ 2, in an NE packing b, all bins that are filled by less
than 2t+1
2(t+1)
(i.e. bins in groups B, C and D), except for maybe a constant number of bins,
contain exactly t items with sizes in ( t−1
t2
, 1
t
].
Proof. First, consider the bins in group D. For t ≥ 3, as all bins in D are filled by no
more than t2−t+1
t2
, no bin in this group (except maybe the leftmost bin) contains an item
of size in (0, t−1
t2
], as such an item will reduce its cost by moving to the leftmost bin in D
(which is the bin with the largest load in D), contradicting the fact that b is an NE. Hence,
all the items in bins (except for maybe one) in group D have items of sizes in ( t−1
t2
, 1
t
]. For
t = 2, as all bins in D are filled by no more than 17
24
, no bin in this group (except maybe
the leftmost bin) contains an item of size in (0, 7
24
], as such an item will reduce its cost by
moving to the leftmost bin in D, which contradicts the fact that b is an NE. Hence, all the
items in bins (except for maybe one) in group D have items of sizes in ( 7
24
, 1
2
].
Now, consider the bins in group C. For t ≥ 3, as all bins in C are filled by no more
than t+1
t+2
, no bin in this group (except maybe the leftmost bin) contains an item of size in
(0, 1
t+2
], as such an item will reduce its cost by moving to the leftmost bin in C (which is
the bin with the largest load in C), contradicting the fact that b is an NE. Also, no bin in
C contains an item of size x ∈ ( 1
t+2
, t−1
t2
], as such an item will benefit from moving to a
bin in group D that is loaded by at most t2−t+1
t2
, as it fits there and x + t
t+1
> t+1
t+2
for any
x > 1
(t+2)
. Hence, all the items in bins in group C have sizes in ( t−1
t2
, 1
t
]. For t = 2, as
all bins in C are filled by no more than 3
4
, no bin in this group (except maybe the leftmost
bin) contains an item of size in (0, 1
4
], as such an item will reduce its cost by moving to the
leftmost bin in C, which contradicts the fact that b is an NE. Also, no bin in C contains an
item of size x ∈ (1
4
, 7
24
], as such an item will benefit from moving to a bin in group D, as
x + 2
3
> 3
4
for any x > 1
4
. Hence, all the items in bins (except for maybe one) in group C
have sizes in ( 7
24
, 1
2
].
Finally, consider the bins in group B. For t ≥ 3, as all bins in B are filled by no more
than 2t+1
2(t+1)
, no bin in this group (except maybe the leftmost bin) contains an item of size in
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(0, 1
2(t+1)
], as such an item will reduce its cost by moving to the leftmost bin in B (which
is the bin with the largest load in B), contradicting the fact that b is an NE. Also, no bin in
B contains an item of size x ∈ ( 1
2(t+1)
, t−1
t2
], as such an item will benefit from moving to a
bin in group D that is loaded by at most t2−t+1
t2
, as it fits there and x+ t
t+1
> 2t+1
2(t+1)
for any
x > 1
2(t+1)
. Hence, all the items in bins (except for maybe one) in group B have sizes in
( t−1
t2
, 1
t
]. For t = 2, as all bins in B are filled by no more than 5
6
, no bin in this group (except
maybe the leftmost bin) contains an item of size in (0, 1
6
], as such an item will reduce its
cost by moving to the leftmost bin in B, which contradicts the fact that b is an NE. Also,
no bin in B (except maybe the leftmost bin) contains an item of size x ∈ (1
6
, 7
24
], as such
an item will benefit from moving to a bin in group D, as x+ 2
3
> 5
6
for any x > 1
6
. Hence,
all the items in bins (except for maybe one) in group B have sizes in ( 7
24
, 1
2
].
We conclude, that any bin in groups B, C and D, except for maybe a constant number
of bins, contain only items of sizes in ( t−1
t2
, 1
t
] for t ≥ 3, and items of sizes in ( 7
24
, 1
2
] for
t = 2.
Now, we show that each one of these bins contains exactly t such items. Note, that by
definition of the groups all bins inB, C andD (except maybe two) have loads in ( t
t+1
, 2t+1
2(t+1)
]
for t ≥ 3, or in (2
3
, 5
6
] for t = 2.
If a bin contains at most t − 1 such items, then it has a load of at most (t − 1) · 1
t
= t−1
t
for t ≥ 3 of at most 7
24
for t = 2, which is less than the assumed load in these bins, so they
must have more than (t− 1) such items. If a bin contains at least t + 1 such items, then it
has a load of at least (t + 1) · t−1
t2
= 1 − 1
t2
, which is greater than 2t+1
2(t+1)
for t ≥ 3, or at
least 7
8
which is greater than 5
6
for t = 2, so they must have less than (t+ 1) such items.
We conclude that each bin in groups B, C and D, except for maybe 5 special bins (the
leftmost bins in groups B, C andD and the two rightmost bins inD) contain exactly t items
with sizes in ( t−1
t2
, 1
t
] for t ≥ 3, or exactly 2 items of sizes in ( 7
24
, 1
2
] for t = 2.
Note that the expressions that we use to define our groups are intentionally hand-tailored
in a way that the bins exhibit the combinatorial properties that we later use to get the upper
bound; The bound 2t+1
2(t+1)
is the average between t
t+1
and 1, so every item from a bin that is
loaded by at most 2t+1
2(t+1)
that has size greater than 1 − 2t+1
2(t+1)
= 1
2(t+1)
would benefit from
moving to a bin of group D, if it fits there. As t−1
t2
> 1
t+2
> 1
2(t+1)
, this allows us to show
that bins in groups B, C and D do not have items of sizes less or equal to t−1
t2
, and hence,
have to at most t such items. On the other hand t2−t+1
t2
,
t+1
t+2
and 2t+1
2(t+1)
are large enough
such that there are at least t items with sizes of at most t, which is large enough to yield
the asserted upper bound. The bound t2−t+1
t2
was chosen s.t. it is also large enough for
packing b to yield an upper bound which is smaller than our claimed upper bound for the
case where nD < 3.
We considered the case t = 2 separately, as t2−t+1
t2
< t+1
t+2
holds for t > 2.
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Henceforth, we call the bins in groups B, C and D that contain exactly t items with
sizes in ( t−1
t2
, 1
t
] for t ≥ 3, or exactly 2 items of sizes in ( 7
24
, 1
2
] for t = 2 regular bins, and
refer to each one of those items as t-item.
To derive the upper bound on the total number of bins in the NE packing b, we use the
weighting functions technique. We define for each value of t ≥ 2 a weighting function
wt on the items, in the following manner. The weight wt(x) of an item of size x which is
packed in a bin of group A in a packing b is:
wt(x) =
2(t+ 1)
2t+ 1
x.
The weight wt(x) of an item of size x which is packed in a regular bin of load L < 2t+12(t+1)
in a packing b is:
wt(x) =
2(t+ 1)
2t+ 1
x+
(1− 2(t+1)
2t+1
L)
k
,
where k is the number of items in the bin of x. The purpose of the additive term (1−
2(t+1)
2t+1
L)
k
is to complete the weight of any bin in the packing to 1. Clearly, any bin in groupA (which
is full by more than 2t+1
2(t+1)
) will have a total weight of at least 1. Any of the less filled bins
from groups B, C and D will have a weight of 1 as 2(t+1)
2t+1
·L+ (1−
2(t+1)
2t+1
L)
t
· t = 1, and each
of the t items packed in each one of these bins (except maybe 5 bins) will get an addition
of at most 1−
2(t+1)
2t+1
· t
t+1
t
= 1
t(2t+1)
.
As we study asymptotic measures, we will disregard these 5 special bins in the rest of
the analysis, and consider all the bins with load in ( t
t+1
, 2t+1
2(t+1)
] to have exactly t items with
sizes in ( t−1
t2
, 1
t
], and the weight of these 5 bins will be taken into account in the additive
constant.
Now, we bound from above the weight observed by a bin in the optimal packing of
these items. First, note that in a bin of the optimal packing for t ≥ 2 there can be at most
t + 1 t-items from the regular bins of groups B, C and D. For t = 2 the size of these
items is greater than 7
24
, and the size of four of these items exceeds 1. For t ≥ 3 the size
of these items is greater than t−1
t2
, and the size of t + 2 of these items, which is at least
(t+ 2) · t−1
t2
= 1 + t−2
t2
, exceeds 1.
The weight of a bin in an optimal packing that has a load S and contains t + 1 t-items
that come from bins of groups B, C and D in b, is at most
2(t+ 1)
2t+ 1
· S + (t + 1) · 1
t(2t + 1)
≤ 2(t+ 1)
2t+ 1
+
t+ 1
t(2t+ 1)
=
2t2 + 3t+ 1
t(2t + 1)
=
t+ 1
t
.
The weight of a bin in an optimal packing that has a load S and contains at most t t-items
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that came from bins of groups B, C and D in b, is at most
2(t+ 1)
2t+ 1
· S + t · 1
t(2t+ 1)
≤ 2(t+ 1)
2t+ 1
+
t
t(2t+ 1)
=
2t2 + 3t
t(2t+ 1)
.
We claim that in any optimal packing, the fraction of the number of bins that contain
t+ 1 t-items from bins of groups B, C and D out of total number of bins is at most t(t−1)
t2−t+1
.
To establish this, we consider all the bins in the optimal packing that contain exactly t+ 1
t-items from groups B, C and D (and maybe additional items as well), let the number of
such bins be Nt.
If Nt = 0, we are done as then the total weight of all the items in NG is at most
W (NG) ≤
(
2t+3
2t+1
) · OPT (G). As nA + nB + nC + nD − 5 ≤ W (NG), we get that NE ≤(
2t+3
2t+1
) ·OPT (G)+5 < ( 2t3+t2+2
(2t+1)(t2−t+1)
) ·OPT (G)+5. Else, we prove the following claim.
Claim 57. Among the Nt · (t + 1) t-items that are packed in (t + 1)-tuples in the bins of
the optimal packing, only at most (Nt − 1) · t are packed together in t-tuples, in bins that
belong to groups B, C and D in the NE packing.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that (Nt + k) · t of these items for k ≥ 0 are packed
together in t-tuples in bins of groups B, C and D in the NE packing. Consider the first
Nt such bins in the NE packing. Call them B1, B2, . . . , BNt . In a slight abuse of notation,
we use Bi to indicate both the i-th bin and its load. Denote the sizes of the remaining Nt
t-items by t1, t2, . . . , tNt . These items are also packed in bins of groups B, C and D in b,
and share their bin with t− 1 t-items (when at least one of these items is not packed in any
of the aforementioned Nt bins in the optimal packing). Obviously, as all these Nt · (t+ 1)
t-items fit into Nt unit-capacity bins, t1+ . . .+ tNt+B1+ . . .+BNt ≤ Nt holds. To derive
a contradiction, we use the following observation:
Observation 58. A t-tuple of items with sizes in ( t−1
t2
, 1
t
] always has a greater total size
than any (t− 1)-tuple of such items.
Proof. The total size of any (t − 1) items with sizes in ( t−1
t2
, 1
t
] is at most t−1
t
, while the
total size of any t items with sizes in ( t−1
t2
, 1
t
] is strictly greater than t(t−1)
t2
= t−1
t
.
Thus, any item ti, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nt would be better off sharing a bin with other t items of size
in ( t−1
t2
, 1
t
] instead of just t−1 such items as it does in the NE packing b. For an item which
shares a bin with t−1 t-items we conclude that the only reason it does not move to another
bin with t such items in b is that it does not fit there.
So, we know that no item t1, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nt fits in any of the bins B1, B2, . . . , BNt in
b. We get that for any 1 ≤ i ≤ Nt, for any 1 ≤ j ≤ Nt, the inequality ti + Bj >
1 holds. Summing these inequalities over all 1 ≤ i ≤ Nt and 1 ≤ j ≤ Nt we get
t1 + . . .+ tNt +B1 + . . .+BNt > Nt, which is a contradiction.
72
Hence, at most (Nt − 1) · t t-items out of Nt · (t+ 1) are packed together in t-tuples in
bins from groups B, C and D in the NE packing b. The remaining t-items (at least Nt + t
in number) are also packed in bins of groups B, C and D in b, but they share their bin with
at most (t − 2) other t-items from the Nt bins from the optimal packing, and at least one
t-item that is not packed in one of these Nt bins. In total, there are at least Nt+tt−1 t-items
that are not packed in one of the Nt bins in discussion, and they are packed with at most
t− 1 other such items in the optimal packing.
Thus, in the optimal packing for anyNt bins with t+1 items of size in ( t−1t2 ,
1
t
] there are
at least Nt+t
t(t−1)
bins that have at most t such items. Letting Nt be very large in comparison
to t gives us the claimed proportions. We conclude that in average, the weight of any bin
of the optimal packing is at most
t(t− 1) · t+1
t
+ 2t+3
2t+1
t(t− 1) + 1 =
2t3 + t2 + 2
(2t+ 1)(t2 − t + 1) .
Hence, the total weight of all the items in NG is at most W (NG) ≤
(
2t3+t2+2
(2t+1)(t2−t+1)
) ·
OPT (G). As nA + nB + nC + nD − 5 ≤ W (NG), we get that NE ≤
(
2t3+t2+2
(2t+1)(t2−t+1)
) ·
OPT (G) + 5
A more careful consideration of the contents of special bins allows to reduce the addi-
tive constant to 2.
Theorem 59. For each integer t ≥ 2 and α ∈ ( 1
t+1
, 1
t
], the PoA of the parametric Bin
Packing game BP (α) is at most 2t3+t2+2
(2t+1)(t2−t+1)
.
Proof. The asserted upper bound on the POA follows directly from Theorem 54.
We conjecture that the true value of the PoA(α) equals our lower bound from Theo-
rem 49, for each α ≤ 1
2
.
Comment 60. Note that in our construction of the lower bound for t ≥ 2 there are also
two types of bins in the optimal packing: bins that contain exactly t + 1 items of sizes in
( t−1
t2
, 1
t
], and bins that contain at most t such items. These items are packed in t-tuples in
the NE packing of the instance. The proportion between the numbers of these two types of
bins in the optimal solution is t(t − 1) to 1, similarly to our conclusion in the analysis of
the upper bound.
The corresponding upper bound values for different values of α are given in Table 4.1.
We illustrate our almost matching lower and upper bound values for PoA(α) in Figure
4.1 below.
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Figure 4.1: Almost matching upper and lower bounds for the PoA(α) of the Parametric
Bin Packing game.
4.5 Strong Prices of Anarchy and Stability in the Para-
metric Bin Packing game
In this section we show tight bounds for SPoA(α) and SPoS(α) for each α ≤ 1
2
.
It was proved in Chapter 3 that the strong equilibria in the Bin Packing game coincide
with the packings produced by the Subset Sum algorithm for Bin Packing. The equivalence
of the SPoA, SPoS and the worst-case performance ratio of the Subset Sum algorithm
which was also proved in Chapter 3 still applies for the Parametric Bin Packing game;
indeed, it holds for all possible lists of items (players), and in particular to lists where all
items have size at most α. This allows us to characterize the SPoA(α)/SPoS(α) in terms
of R∞A (α), which was completely settled in [46]. We formulate this result in the following
theorem.
Theorem 61. For each integer t ≥ 2 and α ∈ ( 1
t+1
, 1
t
], the Subset Sum algorithm has an
approximation ratio ofR∞SS(α) = 1+
∑∞
i=1
1
(t+1)2i−1
. Furthermore, the SPoA(α)/SPoS(α)
of the BP (α) game has the same value.
4.6 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter we have studied the Parametric Bin Packing problem, where the items that
have sizes in (0, α], for α ≤ 1
2
, are controlled by selfish agents, and the cost charged
from each bin is shared among all the items packed into it, both in non-cooperative and
cooperative versions. We have provided almost tight upper and lower bounds on the Price
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of Anarchy of the induced game, and tight bounds on the Strong Prices of Anarchy and
Stability for each α ≤ 1
2
, the former done by using the equivalence of the strong stability
measures in this game to the worst-case performance ratio of the Subset Sum algorithm.
In order to illustrate the results, we report in Table 4.1 the values for the worst-case
ratio of the Subset Sum algorithm and the range of possible values for the PoA for various
values of α. We also include the worst-case approximation ratios of First Fit (FF) and First
Fit Decreasing (FFD) algorithms for bin packing for these values of α.
RFFD(α) [74] RSS (α)[46] PoA(α) RFF (α) [74]
t = 1 1.222222 1.606695 [1.641632, 1.642857] [43] 1.700000
t = 2 1.183333 1.376643 [1.464571, 1.466667] 1.500000
t = 3 1.166667 1.273361 [1.326180, 1.326530] 1.333333
t = 4 1.150000 1.214594 [1.247771, 1.247863] 1.250000
t = 5 1.138095 1.176643 [1.199102, 1.199134] 1.200000
t = 6 1.119048 1.150106 [1.166239, 1.166253] 1.166667
t = 7 1.109127 1.130504 [1.142629, 1.142635] 1.142857
t = 8 1.097222 1.115433 [1.124867, 1.124871] 1.125000
t = 9 1.089899 1.103483 [1.111029, 1.111031] 1.111111
t = 10 1.081818 1.093776 [1.099946, 1.099947] 1.100000
Table 4.1: Comparison of the worst-case ratio of FFD, SS, FF and PoA as a function of α
when α ≤ 1
t
, for t = 1, . . . , 10.
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Chapter 5
Machine Covering with selfish jobs on iden-
tical machines
5.1 Introduction and motivation
In this chapter we consider a scheduling problem on identical machines where the goal is
maximization of the minimum load.
This goal function is motivated by issues of Quality of Service and fair resource al-
location. It is useful for describing systems where the complete system relies on keeping
all the machines productive for as long as possible, as the entire system fails in case even
one of the machines ceases to be active. From the networking aspect, this problem has
applications to basic problems in network optimization such as fair bandwidth allocation.
Consider pairs of terminal nodes that wish to communicate; we would like to allocate
bandwidth to the connections in a way that no link unnecessarily suffers from starvation,
and all links get a fair amount of resources. Another motivation is efficient routing of
traffic. Consider a network that consists of parallel links between pairs of terminal nodes.
Requests for shifting flow are assigned to the links. We are interested in having the loads
of the links balanced, in the sense that each link should be assigned a reasonable amount
of flow, compared to the other links.
Yet another incentive to consider this goal function is congestion control by fair queu-
ing. Consider a router that can serve m shifting requests at a time. The data pieces of
various sizes, need to be shifted, are arranged in m queues (each queue may have a differ-
ent data rate), each pays a price which equals the delay that it causes in the waiting line.
Our goal function ensures that no piece gets a “preferred treatment” and that they all get at
least some amount of delay.
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Figure 5.1: An example of two schedules with different social values. This example
demonstrates the non-triviality of the problem. There are three jobs of size 0.8, three
jobs of size 0.4 and two jobs of size 0.1. The three machines are identical. The assignment
on the right hand side is not a Nash equilibrium, since a job of size 0.1 would reduce its
delay from 1.4 to 1.3 by migrating to another machine. The social value of this assignment
is 1.2. The assignment on the left hand side is a Nash equilibrium, but its social value is
only 1.
The problem of maximizing the minimum load, seeing jobs as selfish agents, can be
modeled as a routing problem. In this setting, machines are associated with parallel links
between a source and a destination. The links have bounded capacities, and a set of users
request to send a certain amount of unsplitable flow between the two nodes. Requests are
to be assigned to links and consume bandwidth which depends on their sizes. The cost
charged from a user for using a link equals to the total amount of the utilized bandwidth
of that link. Thus, the selfish users prefer to route their traffic on a link with small load.
This scenario is similar to the model proposed by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou in [79],
but our model has a different social goal function. To demonstrate the non-triviality of the
problem, see Figure 5.1.
The novelty of our study compared to other work in the area is that the social goal is
very different from the private goals of the players. As we study a maximization problem,
the Price of Anarchy (POA) in our scheduling model is the worst case ratio between the so-
cial value (i.e., minimum delay of any machine, or cover) of an optimal schedule, denoted
by OPT, and the value of any Nash equilibrium. If both these values are 0 then we define
the POA to be 1. The Price of Stability (POS) is the worst case ratio between the social
value of an optimal solution, and the value of the best Nash equilibrium. Similarly, if both
these values are 0 then we define the POS to be 1.
In addition, we study the mixed POA (MPOA), where we consider mixed Nash equilibria
that result from mixed strategies, where the player’s choices are not deterministic and are
regulated by probability distributions on a set of pure strategies (in our case, over the set
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M of the machines). A mixed Nash equilibrium is characterized by the property that
there is no incentive for any job to deviate from its probability distribution (a deviation is
any modification of its probability vector over machines), while probability distributions
of other players remain unchanged. The existence of such an equilibrium over mixed
strategies for non-cooperative games was shown by Nash in his famous work [90]. The
values MPOA and MPOS are defined similarly to the pure ones, but mixed Nash equilibria
are being considered instead of pure ones. Clearly, any pure NE is also a mixed NE.
5.2 Related work and our results
The non-selfish version of the problem has been well studied (known by different names
such as “machine covering” and “Santa Claus problem”) in the computer science literature
(see e.g. [37, 15, 40]). Various game-theoretic aspects of max-min fairness in resource
allocation games were considered before this paper (e.g. in [17, 63, 8, 22, 51, 9, 97]),
but unlike the makespan minimization problem POA and POS of which were extensively
studied (see e.g. [79, 36, 84]), these measures were not previously considered for the
uncoordinated machine covering problem in the setting of selfish jobs. A different model,
where machines are selfish rather than jobs with the same social goal was studied recently
in [48, 38, 26].
For identical machines, we show that the POS is equal to 1. As our main result, we
study the pure POA and show close bounds on the overall value of the POA (POA =
supm POA(m), where POA(m) is the POA on m machines), i.e., that it is at least 1.691 and
at most 1.7. This in contrast with the makespan minimization problem, where it is known
that the POA for m identical machines is 2m
m+1
, giving an overall bound of 2 [56, 99]. This is
rather unusual, as the cover maximization problem is typically harder than the makespan
minimization problem, thus it could be expected that the POA for the covering problem
would be higher.
For the analysis of our upper bound we use the weighting function technique, which
is uncommon in scheduling problems. Moreover, we use not only the weight function
but also its inverse function in our analysis. Surprisingly, these lower and upper bounds
are approximation ratios of well known algorithms for Bin-Packing (Harmonic [80] and
First-Fit [73], respectively). We furthermore prove that the POA is monotonically non-
decreasing as a function of m. For small numbers of machines we provide the exact values
of POA: we find that POA(2) = POA(3) = 3/2 and POA(4) = 13/8 = 1.625. We show
that POA(m) ≥ 5
3
for m > 5. As for the MPOA, we show that its value is very large as a
function of m, and MPOA(2) = 2.
In this chapter we focus on identical machines. For uniformly related machines, we
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show in Chapter 6 that even the POS is unbounded already for two machines with a speed
ratio larger than 2, and the POA is unbounded for a speed ratio of at least 2. The same
property holds for m machines (where the speed ratio is defined to be the maximum speed
ratio between any pair of machines). This is very different from the results in the situation
of the makespan minimization social goal, where the POA is finite [36, 54]. In Chapter 6
we also study the POA and POS for the complementary cases.
In Section 5.7 we present a different model where the social goal is to minimize the
ratio between the load of the most loaded machine and the least loaded machine, and we
show tight bounds on the POS and POA for any number of identical machines. Similarly to
the results of Chapter 6, one can argue that for any number of uniformly related machines
these measures are unbounded.
5.3 The model
In this section, we define the more general model of scheduling on related machines. A set
of n jobs J = {1, 2, . . . . , n} is to be assigned to a set of mmachinesM = {M1, . . . ,Mm},
where machine Mi has a speed si. If si = 1 for i = 1, . . . , m, the machines are called
identical, and this is the case on which we focus here. This is an important and widely
studied special case of uniformly related machines. The size of job 1 ≤ k ≤ n is denoted
by pk. An assignment or schedule is a function A : J → M . The load of machine Mi,
which is also called the delay of this machine, is Li =
∑
k:A(k)=Mi
pk
si
. The value, or the
social value of a schedule is the minimum delay of any machine in this schedule, also
known as the cover. We denote it by COVER(A). This problem is a dual to the makespan
scheduling problem.
The non-cooperative machine covering game MC is characterized by a tuple MC =
〈N, (Mk)k∈N , (ck)k∈N〉, whereN is the set of atomic players. Each player k ∈ N controls
a single job of size pk > 0 and selects the machine to which it will be assigned. We
associate each player with the job it wishes to run, that is, N = J . The set of strategies
Mk for each job k ∈ N is the set M of all machines. i.e. Mk = M . Each job must
be assigned to one machine only. Preemption is not allowed. The outcome of the game
is an assignment A = (Ak)k∈N ∈ ×k∈NMk of jobs to the machines, where Ak for each
1 ≤ k ≤ n is the index of the machine that job k chooses to run on. Let S denote the set of
all possible assignments. The cost function of job k ∈ N is denoted by ck : S → R. The
cost cik charged from job k for running on machine Mi in a given assignment A is defined
to be the load observed by machine i in this assignment, that is ck(i,A−k) = Li(A), when
A−k ∈ S−k; here S−k = ×j∈N\{k}Sj denotes the actions of all players except for player k.
The goal of the selfish jobs is to run on a machine with a load which is as small as
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possible. At an assignment that is a (pure) Nash equilibrium or NE assignment for short,
there exists no machine Mi′ for which Li′(A) + pksi′ < Li(A) for some job k which is
assigned to machine Mi (see Figure 5.1(a) for an example). For this selfish goal of players,
a pure Nash equilibrium (with deterministic agent choices) always exists [57, 49]. We
can also consider mixed strategies, where players use probability distributions. Let tik
denote the probability that job k ∈ N chooses to run on machine Mi. A strategy profile
is a vector p = (tik)k∈N,i∈M that specifies the probabilities for all jobs and all machines.
Every strategy profile p induces a random schedule. The expected load E(Li) of machine
Mi in setting of mixed strategies is E(Li) = 1si
∑
k∈N pkt
i
k. The expected cost of job k
if assigned on machine Mi (or its expected delay when it is allocated to machine Mi) is
E(cik) =
pk
si
+
∑
j 6=k pjt
i
j/si = E(Li) + (1− tik)pksi . The probabilities (tik)k∈N,i∈M give rise
to a (mixed) Nash equilibrium if and only if any job k will assign non-zero probabilities
only to machines Mi that minimize cik, that is, tik > 0 implies cik ≤ cjk for any j ∈ M .
The social value of a strategy profile p is the expected minimum load over all machines,
i.e. E(mini∈M Li).
5.4 The Price of Anarchy for identical machines
Figure 5.1 clearly demonstrates that not every NE schedule is optimal. We next measure
the extent of deterioration in the quality of NE schedules due to the effect of selfish and
uncoordinated behavior of the players (jobs), in the worst case. As mentioned before, the
measure metrics that we use are the POA and the POS.
Before we present the proof of our bounds on the POA for general m, to get the notion
of the problem, we prove tight bounds on the the POA for simple cases where m = 2,
m = 3 and m = 4. Finally we discuss the MPOA in Section 5.6.
5.4.1 Small numbers of machines
Consider a pure NE assignment of jobs to machines, denoted by A, for an instance of the
machine covering game. We assume that the social value of A, that is, the load of the least
loaded machine inA, is 1. Otherwise, we can simply scale all sizes of jobs in the instances
which we consider so that COVER(A) = 1.
We denote a machine which is loaded by 1 in A by P . All other machines are called
tall machines. We would like to estimate the load of P in the optimal assignment. Let C =
COVER(OPT). Obviously, C ≥ 1, and the total sum of jobs sizes, denoted by W , satisfies
W ≥ mC. First, we introduce some assumptions on A. Note that the modifications
needed to be applied such that this instance will satisfy these assumptions do not increase
COVER(A), do not violate the conditions for NE and do not decrease COVER(OPT).
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1. Machine P contains only tiny jobs, that is, jobs of arbitrarily small size.
Since no machine has a smaller load, replacing the jobs on this machine by tiny jobs
keeps the schedule as an NE. The value COVER(OPT) may only increase.
2. For a tall machine in A which has two jobs, both jobs have a size of 1.
If one of them is larger, then the second job would want to move to P , so this case
cannot occur. If some such job is smaller, its size can be increased up to 1 without
affecting the NE.
3. For every tall machine inA which contains a single job, this job has a size of exactly
C.
A larger size of a job can be decreased without decreasing COVER(OPT), while a
smaller size can be increased without disturbing the equilibrium.
Observation 62. On identical machines, POA(m) is monotonically non-decreasing as a
function of the number of machines m.
Proof. An NE with m − 1 machines becomes one for m machines by adding a machine
with a single job of size C both to A and OPT.
We now prove tight upper and lower bounds on the POA for m = 2, m = 3 and m = 4
machines.
Our analysis of the upper bound on the POA for small values of m strongly relies on
the following two observations, which apply for any m.
Observation 63. For an NE assignment A, the total size of jobs assigned to a machine
which has t ≥ 2 jobs assigned to it is at most t
t−1
, which is a decreasing function of t.
Proof. Every t−1 of these jobs have a size of at most 1, otherwise the remaining job would
benefit from moving to P . Summing this up over all subsets of (t − 1) jobs produces the
claimed inequality.
Observation 64. For all m, C < 2.
Proof. Let x be the number of tall machines in A with at least two jobs and y the number
of tall machines with a single job. Due to Assumption 1, x+y = m−1. From Observation
63 and Assumptions 2 and 3, we get mC ≤W ≤ 2x+Cy+1 = 2x+C(m− 1−x) + 1,
which gives C ≤ 2x+1
x+1
< 2 since x ≥ 0.
Theorem 65. Consider identical machines. i. For two machines, POA(2) = 3
2
. ii. For
three machines, POA(3) = 3
2
. iii. For four machines, POA(4) = 13
8
.
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Figure 5.2: Lower bounds for the Price of Anarchy. Machines are on the horizontal axis,
jobs are on the vertical axis. The squares in the first few figures represent jobs of size 1. In
the figures for m = 42, the job sizes are 1, 1/2, 1/6 and 1/42.
Proof. The lower bounds are shown in Figure 5.2. It is straightforward to verify that the
assignments in the top row are Nash equilibria.
i. We show that the POA for two machines is at most 3
2
. Given an assignment, there is
exactly one tall machine. If this machine has just one job assigned to it, then P must have
a total size of at least C. Hence this is an optimal assignment. Otherwise, the tall machine
has t ≥ 2 jobs, and the total size of jobs assigned to P is 1. Using the fact that in an
optimal solution each one of the machines is covered by at least C and from Observation
63 for t = 2 we get that 2C ≤W ≤ 3 which implies C ≤ 3
2
, and thus POA≤ 3
2
.
ii. We show that the POA for three machines is at most 3
2
. We can assume that no tall
machine has a single job, as by removing the machine with the job from the NE and the
machine with it from OPT (and re-assigning the remaining jobs for OPT), results in a value
COVER(OPT) which cannot be smaller, thus reducing us to the case with a smaller number
of machines, which we had already considered. There are two cases need to be considered.
If at least one tall machine has at least three jobs, using the fact that in an optimal solution
each one of the machines is covered by at least C, and applying Observation 63 for t ≥ 3
we get 3C ≤ W ≤ 2 + 3
2
+ 1 = 9
2
which implies C ≤ 3
2
. Otherwise, there are two tall
machines that have two jobs, where each job has a size of 1. In total, there are at least four
jobs of size 1, so by the pigeonhole principle, the optimal assignment has a machine with
two such jobs. Therefore, 2 + 2C ≤W ≤ 5, thus C ≤ 3
2
. In total, POA≤ 3
2
.
iii. The POA for four machines is at most 13
8
. The case where a tall machine in A has
a single job and the case where more than one machine has minimum load can be reduced
to the case of a smaller number of machines.
There are two additional cases need to be considered. If at least one tall machine has
at least three jobs, using the fact that in an optimal solution each one of the machines
is covered by at least C and applying Observation 63 for t ≥ 3 we get 4C ≤ W ≤
2 + 2 + 3
2
+ 1 = 13
2
which implies C ≤ 13
8
.
Otherwise, there are three tall machines that have two jobs, where each jobs has a size
of 1. In total, there are at least six jobs of size 1, so the optimal assignment has at least two
machines with two jobs of size 1, or at least one machine with three such jobs. Therefore,
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max{3 + 3C, 4 + 2C} = 4+ 2C ≤W ≤ 7, thus C ≤ 3
2
, and POA≤ 3
2
. In total, POA≤ 13
8
.
We note that similar constructions and observations allow us to find the exact POA for
additional small numbers of machines. Thus, e.g., POA(5) = 13
8
and POA(6) = 5
3
. By
Observation 62, this implies POA(m) ≥ 5/3 for m ≥ 6, and hence POA ≥ 5/3.
5.4.2 The POA for m identical machines
In this section, we prove that the POA for m machines is at most 1.7. Consider a pure NE
assignmentA. Scale the sizes of the jobs such that the social value of this assignment is 1.
Let C = COVER(OPT) ≥ 1. Denote by P a machine of load 1. We state some assumptions
on A, and modifications needed to be applied to the instance so it would satisfy these
assumptions. To begin with, we still use Assumptions 1 and 2 from before. We no longer
use Assumption 3, but instead use the following.
3. This assignment is minimal with respect to the number of machines (among assign-
ments for which COVER(OPT) ≥ C). In particular, no machine in A has a single
job.
Else, if some machine has a single job, remove this machine and the job from A,
and the machine with it from the optimal assignment OPT. Assign any remaining
jobs that ran on this machine in OPT arbitrarily among the remaining machines. This
gives a new assignment with COVER(OPT) ≥ C, and less machines.
4. Given jobs of sizes p1 ≤ p2 ≤ . . . ≤ pt assigned to a machine Q in A, then p2 +
. . . + pt = 1. In fact, p2 + . . . + pt > 1 is impossible since this would mean that
the job of size p1 has an incentive to move. If the sum is less, enlarge the size pt to
1 − pt−1 − . . .− p2. This does not affect the NE conditions, and keeps the property
COVER(OPT) ≥ C.
5. Consider a machine Q 6= P in A which has t ≥ 3 jobs assigned to it. Let a, b denote
the sizes of the smallest and largest jobs on it, respectively. Then, b < 2a.
Otherwise, if we have an assignment where b ≥ 2a, replace b with two jobs of size
b
2
. This modification preserves the NE, as the new jobs do not have an incentive to
move; Let T denote the total size of jobs on machine Q. As a does not want to move
to P , T ≤ 1 + a holds. As in this case a ≤ b
2
, we have T ≤ 1 + b
2
, whereas 1 + b
2
would have been the load of P if the job b
2
moved there.
Claim 66. No job has a size larger than 1.
Proof. This follows from the fact that there is no machine in A with a single job.
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Claim 67. There is no job of size in [2
3
, 1) assigned to a machine Q (Q 6= P ) in A.
Proof. If there is such job, then it has at least two jobs assigned together with it, each of
size greater than 1
3
(due to assumption 5), which contradicts assumption 4.
We define a weight function w(x) on sizes of jobs.
w(x) =


1
2
, for x = 1
x
2−x
, for x ∈ (1
2
, 2
3
)
x
x+1
, for x ∈ (0, 1
2
]
For illustration of the function see Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3: The functions w(x) (left hand side) and f(y) (right hand side).
The motivation for the weight function is to define the weight of a job j to be at least
the fraction of its size out of the total size of jobs assigned to the same machine in A. In
fact, for a job j of size x, the total size of jobs assigned in an NE to the same machine as j
is no larger than 1+ x. Moreover if x > 2
3
, then by our assumptions, it is possible to prove
that the total size of these jobs is at most 2− x.
Its inverse function f(y) is
f(y) =


1 , for y = 1
2
2y
y+1
, for y ∈ (1
3
, 1
2
)
y
1−y
, for y ∈ (0, 1
3
]
Note that f(y) is continuous at 1
3
but not at 1
2
. Both functions are monotonically increasing.
We now state several claims, which follow from the properties of this weight function
defined above.
Claim 68. The total weight (by w) of jobs on P in A is less than 1.
Proof. Follows from the fact that P has a load 1 and for any x, w(x) < x.
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Claim 69. The total weight (by w) of jobs assigned to a machine Q 6= P in A is at most 1.
Proof. By Assumption 3, each machine Q in A has at least two jobs. The claim clearly
holds for a machine with two jobs, as by Assumption 2 both these jobs have size 1, and by
the definition of w have a total weight of 1
2
+ 1
2
= 1. For a machine which has at least three
jobs assigned to it, there are two possible cases. If there are no jobs with size in (1
2
, 2
3
) (i.e.,
all jobs are of size in (0, 1
2
]), then let T be the total size of jobs on Q. For each job of size
xi, as the job does not want to move to machine P , xi+1 ≥ T holds. Combining this with
the definition of w for jobs of size in (0, 1
2
], we get that w(xi) = xixi+1 ≤ xiT . Summing this
up over all the jobs on Q proves the claim.
Else, for a job xi ∈ (12 , 23) (there can be only one such job assigned toQ, by Assumption
5), we have T ≤ 2 − xi. Otherwise, let a be the size of the smallest job on Q. Then, by
Assumption 4, T = 1 + a. As T > 2 − xi, we get xi + a > 1. Therefore, as there is an
additional job of size of at least a assigned to Q, we get that the total size of all jobs except
for the smallest job is more than 1, contradicting Assumption 4.
Combining this with the definition of w for jobs of size in (1
2
, 2
3
), we get that w(xi) =
xi
2−xi
≤ xi
T
for this job too.
Claim 70. There is a machine in the optimal assignment with a total weight strictly smaller
than 1.
Proof. The total weight of all jobs is less than m by Claims 68 and 69.
Claim 71. The total size of any set of jobs with total weight below 1 is at most 1.7.
Proof. To prove the claim, we use the property that there is at most one item of weight
1. If it exists, then there is at most one item of weight larger than 1
3
. If such an item of
weight 1 does not exist, then the ratio between size and weight is at most 1.5. We find the
supremum possible weight in each one of three cases. Consider a set of jobs I of a total
weight strictly below 1. Note that for any x, w(x) ≤ 1
2
. If there is no job of weight 1
2
in I ,
then since 2
y+1
≤ 3
2
for y ≥ 1
3
and 1
1−y
≤ 3
2
for y ≤ 1
3
, the size of any job is at most 3
2
times
its weight, and thus the total size of the jobs in I does not exceed 3
2
.
Otherwise, there is exactly one job of weight 1
2
, and its size is 1. We therefore need to
show that the total size of any set of jobs I ′ which has total weight below 1
2
is at most 0.7.
There is at most one job of weight in (1
3
, 1
2
) in I ′. If there is one such job we show that
without loss of generality, there is at most one other job in I ′, and its weight is in (0, 1
3
]).
Else, we show that there are at most two jobs, and their weights are in (0, 1
3
]).
Note that f1(y) = y1−y is a convex function, thus, for any pair of jobs of weights
α, β ∈ (0, 1
3
], f1(0) + f1(α + β) ≥ f1(α) + f1(β) holds. As we can define f1(0) = 0, it
turns into f1(α+ β) ≥ f1(α) + f1(β).
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Thus, any two jobs of total weight of at most 1
3
can be combined into a single job while
as a result, their total size cannot decrease. This is due to the convexity of f1 and the fact
that it is monotonically increasing. The replacement may only increase the weight, and
respectively, the size. If there exists a job of weight larger than 1
3
, then the total weight
of jobs of weight at most 1
3
is at most 1
6
, so they can all be combined into a single job.
Moreover, among any three jobs of a total weight of at most 1
2
, there exists a pair of jobs
of total weight no larger than 1
3
, which can be combined as described above, so if there is
no job of weight larger than 1
3
, still jobs can be combined until at most two jobs remain.
Thus, there are only two cases to consider.
Case 1 There is one job of weight in (0, 1
3
] and one job of weight in (1
3
, 1
2
).
Since the inverse function f is monotonically increasing as a function of y and their
weight does not exceed 1
2
, we can assume that their total weight is 1
2
− γ for a negligible
value of γ > 0 (by increasing the weight the job of the smaller weight, which may only
increase the total size). Letting d < 1
6
denote the weight of the smaller job (since if d ≥ 1
6
then 1
2
− γ − d < 1
3
), we get a size of at most
d
1− d +
2(1
2
− γ − d)
1
2
− γ − d+ 1 <
d
1− d +
2− 4d
3− 2d
(by letting γ → 0). This function is increasing (as a function of d) so its greatest value is
for d → 1
6
and it is 0.7. As the inverse function f is monotonically increasing, this case
also encompass the case where there is only one job of weight in (1
3
, 1
2
), and no jobs of
weight in (1
3
, 1
2
).
Case 2 There are at most two jobs, where each job has a weight in (0, 1
3
]. If there is at
most one job, then its size is at most 1
2
. We therefore focus on the case of exactly two
such jobs. Recall that the total size of the two jobs is larger than 1
3
(since they cannot be
combined). The total weight of these jobs is less than 1
2
, so we can assume that their total
weight is 1/2 − γ for a negligible value of γ > 0 (increasing the respective size). Let the
weight of the large of these jobs be d > 1
6
. We get (by letting γ → 0) a total size of at most
d
1− d +
1
2
− γ − d
1
2
+ d+ γ
<
d
1− d +
1− 2d
2d+ 1
,
where 1
6
< d ≤ 1
3
. This function is monotonically decreasing in (1
6
, 1
4
] and increasing in
(1
4
, 1
3
], and its values at the endpoints 1
6
and 1
3
are both 0.7.
Theorem 72. For covering identical machines, the POA is at most 1.7.
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Proof. This follows from Claims 70 and 71.
We conjecture that the true bound is equal to the upper bound which we provided
above.
Theorem 73. For covering identical machines, the POA is at least 1.691.
Proof. We first define a sequence ti of positive integers, which is often used in the literature
for analysis and proving of lower bounds for online bin packing algorithms. Let t1 = 1
and ti+1 = ti(ti + 1) for i ≥ 1. The sequence starts with {1, 2, 6, 42, 1806, . . .} and grows
rapidly.
Let m = tk for an integer k. Consider the following assignment A, that has mti+1
machines with ti + 1 jobs of size 1ti , (for 1 ≤ i < k) and one machine (i.e., mtk machines)
with tk jobs of size 1tk . For an example, see the rightmost diagrams in Figure 5.2. We
assume that the machines are sorted in a non-increasing order w.r.t. their load. We define
the load class i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k as the subset of m
ti+1
machines with the same load Li = ti+1ti =
1+ 1
ti
> 1 in this assignment. As ti is an increasing sequence of integers, it follows that Li
is monotonically non-increasing as a function of i. Since Lk = 1, the social value of this
assignment is 1. We now verify that it is a Nash equilibrium. As Li > 1 for any 1 ≤ i < k,
no job will benefit from leaving the machine of class Lk. It is enough to show that any job
assigned to a machine of a class Li (1 ≤ i < k − 1) would not benefit from moving to the
machine of class k. Since machine i has ti+1 jobs of size 1ti , the migration of such a job to
the machine of load 1 would again result in a load of 1 + 1
ti
, thus the job would not benefit
from the migration.
In the socially optimal assignment, each machine has a set of jobs of distinct sizes, 1,
1
2
,
1
6
, . . . ,
1
tk−1
,
1
tk
. The social value of this assignment is
∑k
i=1
1
ti
. Thus, the POA equals∑k
i=1
1
ti
. For k → ∞, this value tends to h∞ =
∑∞
i=1
1
ti
= 1.69103 . . ., the well-known
worst-case ratio of the Harmonic algorithm for bin packing. As the POA is monotonically
non-decreasing as a function of the number of the machines, we conclude that this is a
lower bound for any number of machines larger than tk. In particular, the overall POA for
identical machines is at least 1.69103.
5.5 The Price of Stability for m identical machines
Theorem 74. On identical machines, POS = 1 for any m.
Proof. We show that for every instance of the machine covering game, among the optimal
assignments there exists an optimal assignment which is also an NE. Our proof technique
is based upon the technique which was used in [49, 57] to prove that in job scheduling
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games where the selfish goal of the players is run on the least loaded machine (like in our
machine covering game), any sequence of improvement steps converges to an NE.
We first define a complete order relation on the assignments, and then show that an
optimal assignment which is the “highest” among all optimal assignments with respect to
this order is always an NE.
Definition 75. A vector (l1, l2, . . . , lm) is larger than (l′1, l′2, . . . , l′m) with respect to the
inverted lexicographic order, if for some i, li > l′i and lk = l′k for all k > i. An assignment
s is called larger than s′ according to the inverted lexicographic order if the vector of
machine loads L(s) = (L1(s), L2(s), . . . , Lm(s)), sorted in non-increasing order, is larger
in the inverted lexicographic order than the vector L(s′) = (L1(s′), L2(s′), . . . , Lm(s′)),
sorted in non-increasing order. We denote this relation by s ≻L−1 s′.
The inverted lexicographic order ≻L−1 defines a total order on the assignments.
Lemma 76. For any instance of the machine covering game, a maximal optimal schedule
w.r.t. the inverted lexicographic order is an NE.
Proof. Let A∗ be an optimal assignment such that no other optimal assignment A satisfies
A ≻L−1 A∗. We show thatA∗ is an NE assignment. Order the machines inA∗ according to
a non-increasing order of loads. Assume by contradiction that A∗ is not NE, that is, there
is at least one job that would benefit from moving to another (lower) machine. Consider
the rightmost machine with such a job, call it Mi and let the job be denoted by pr. Job pr
is selfish, and will move to the least-loaded machine (or one of the least-loaded machines
if there are several such machines) in A∗. Denote this machine by Mj , j > i, and the
resulting assignment by A′.
Case 1 If there is no machine in A∗ other than Mj having load that equals to Lj(A∗).
First, observe that Li(A∗)− pr > Lj(A∗), otherwise job pr would not have migrated.
Note that this migration has an effect on the loads of only two machines Mi and Mj in A∗.
If machine Mj with load Lj(A′) = Lj(A∗)+ pr is the lowest machine inA′ as well, as
the loads of the other machines remain unchanged, except for Li(A′), which is larger than
Lj(A∗), thus minq Lq(A′) > minq Lq(A∗) contradicting the optimality of the assignment
A∗. If Mj is not the lowest machine in A′, there is a new lowest machine Mt in A′ such
that Lt(A′) > Lj(A∗) (as there was no additional machine with load Lj(A∗) in A∗), again
contradicting the optimality of A∗.
Case 2 If there are k ≥ 2 machines in A∗ having load that equals to Lj(A∗).
After the migration the social value of A′ remains the same as the social value of A∗
was, as there is (at least one) other machine besides Mj with load Lj(A∗) in A∗, and its
88
load is not influenced by the migration. As there are k machines with the same lowest load
Lj(A∗) inA∗, in the new assignmentA′ the loads of the k−1 least loaded machines do not
change, and either Mj with load Lj(A′) = Lj(A∗) + pr > Lj(A∗) becomes the k-th least
loaded machine, or other machine Mt, t < k such that Lt(A∗) > Lj(A∗) becomes the k-th
least loaded machine. Thus, by definition 75 A′ ≻L−1 A∗, contradicting the maximality of
A∗ with respect to the inverted lexicographic order.
Thus A∗ is an NE assignment.
Since for any set of n jobs there are finitely many possible assignments, among the
assignments that are optimal with respect to our social goal there exists at least one which
is maximal w.r.t. the total order ≻L−1 , and according to Lemma 76 this assignment is an
NE. As no NE assignment can have a strictly greater social value than the optimal one, we
conclude that POS = 1.
5.6 The mixed Price of Anarchy
In the setting of mixed strategies we consider the case of identical machines, similarly to
[79]. In that work, it was shown that the mixed POA for two machines is 3
2
. In this section
we prove that the mixed POA for two machines is equal to 2.
We start by showing that form identical machines, the mixed POA can be exponentially
large as a function ofm, unlike the makespan minimization problem, where the mixed POA
is Θ( logm
log logm
) [79, 36].
Theorem 77. The mixed POA for m identical machines is at least mm
m!
.
Proof. Consider the following instance G ∈ MC of the Machine Covering game. N =
{1, 2, . . .} such that p1 = . . . = pn = 1, and let Mj = {M1, . . . ,Mm}, for j = 1, . . . , n.
Each of the jobs pi, i = 1, . . . , n chooses each machine with probability tji = 1/m. Each
jobs sees the same expected load for each machine, and thus has no incentive to change
its probability distribution vector. We get a schedule having a non-zero cover, where each
job chooses to run on a different machine, with a probability of m!
mm
. So, for the mixed
Nash equilibrium the expected minimum load is m!
mm
. But the coordinated optimal solution
achieved by deterministically allocating each job to its own machine has a social value
COVER(OPT(G)) = 1, and so it follows that the MPOA(G) = mm
m!
. We conclude that the
MPOA ≥ mm
m!
.
Theorem 78. The mixed POA for two identical machines is exactly 2.
Proof. The lower bound follows from Theorem 77.
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Consider a specific job i and let qi be the probability that the job (which has a size of pi)
is assigned to the most loaded machine of the two. It was shown in [79] that the expected
maximum load over the two machines, call it E(MAKESPAN), is at most
∑
k qkpk = (
3
2
−
qi)
∑
k pk+(2qi− 32)pi. As there are two machines, this implies that the expected minimum
load over the two machines, E(COVER) =
∑
k (1− qk)pk =
∑
k pk−
∑
k qkpk =
∑
k pk−
E(MAKESPAN), is at least
∑
k pk− (32−qi)
∑
k pk+(2qi− 32)pi = (qi− 12)
∑
k pk− (2qi−
3
2
)pi).
Note that COVER(OPT) ≤
∑
k pk
2
, which is the case if we can distribute the weight of
each job in an equal manner over the two machines. Also, if there exists a job pi such that
pi >
∑
k 6=i pk, then COVER(OPT) ≤
∑
k 6=i pk. In total, COVER(OPT) ≤ min{
∑
k 6=i pk,
∑
k pk
2
}.
One of the following may occur:
1. There exists a job pi such that qi > 34 . Therefore, E(COVER) ≥ (qi − 12)
∑
k 6=i pk +
(1− qi)pi = (1− qi)
∑
k pk +
∑
k 6=i pk(2qi − 32) ≥ (2(1− qi) + 2qi − 32)COVER(OPT) ≥
1
2
COVER(OPT).
2. For any job pi, qi ≤ 34 . Therefore, E(COVER) =
∑
k (1− qk)pk ≥ 14
∑
k pk ≥ 14 ·
2COVER(OPT) = 1
2
COVER(OPT).
In both cases, we get that E(COVER) ≥ 1
2
COVER(OPT), which proves our claim.
5.7 The maximum envy ratio objective
In this chapter we investigated up until now the tradeoff between fairness and optimality of
a NE schedule, when the fairness was considered with respect to maximizing the minimum
load in the schedule. However, there are different accepted notions of fairness of a job
allocation. Other suitable fairness criterion that we can consider in the same setting is the
so-called maximum envy ratio.
The envy-ratio of job i for job j is the cost of i over the cost of j. As before, the set
of players is the set of n jobs to be scheduled on m identical machines. Every job has a
positive processing time and the load of every machine is the sum of the processing times
of the jobs assigned to it. The cost of a job equals the load of the machine it is assigned
on. The objective is to schedule the jobs so as to minimize the ratio of the maximum load
over the minimum load of the machines in the assignment.
Going back to the application of data routing on identical parallel links, this objective
aims to reduce the “envy” of the job (or jobs) that suffers the greatest delay towards the job
(or jobs) that suffers the smallest delay in the network (assuming that each machine has at
least one job assigned to it).
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For the study of this problem, we use the following notations.
Lmax(A) = max
1≤i≤m
Li and Lmin(A) = min
1≤i≤m
Li .
The envy ratio of schedule A is defined by
e(A) = Lmax(A)
Lmin(A) .
Accordingly, we denote the envy ratio of an optimal schedule OPT (with respect to the
envy ratio) by
e(OPT) =
Lmax(OPT)
Lmin(OPT)
.
This objective was previously considered in the context of scheduling by [29]. It is
shown that Graham’s greedy algorithm [65] has an approximation ratio of 1.4 for the envy-
ratio problem.
This fairness criterion was considered in a game theoretic setting by Lipton at. el. in
[81]. They consider the envy-ratio objective for the problem of envy-free allocation of
indivisible goods. In the special case where all the players have the same utility function
for each good, one can think of the players as identical machines and the set of goods as
a set of jobs, and then this problem is equivalent to minimizing the ratio of the maximum
completion time over the minimum completion time.
The measures POA and POS were not previously considered for this objective in the
setting of selfish jobs. We show tight bounds of 2 on the POA for any m ≥ 2 and that the
value of the POS is 1 for any m ≥ 2.
5.7.1 Price of Anarchy for m identical machines
We start with an upper bound.
Theorem 79. For the problem of envy ratio minimization on identical machines, for any
fixed m ≥ 2, the POA is at most 2.
Proof. Consider a NE assignment A on m machines. Denote the largest load observed by
a machine in A by Lmax, and the smallest load by Lmin. If all machines in A are assigned
at most one job then the schedule is optimal. Consider a machine Mi in A which has at
least two jobs assigned to it, having a maximum load among such machines. Consider the
size of a smallest job running on Mi, denoted by p. As this job is assigned with at least
one more job, p ≤ 1
2
Li. As this schedule is a NE, Lmin + p > Li holds, since the job does
not benefit from moving to a machine with load of Lmin. Hence Lmin > Li − p ≥ 12Li.
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If Li = Lmax, then it immediately follows that e(A) ≤ 2, and as the envy ratio of
the optimal schedule e(OPT) ≥ 1, we get that POA ≤ 2. Otherwise, let 1 ≤ k ≤ m − 1
denote the number of machines in A having a load strictly above Li. By definition of
i, each such machine has a single job. We denote the set of those jobs by Jlong, and
the other jobs by Jshort. Jlong must contain at least one job of size at least Lmax and so
Lmax(OPT) ≥ Lmax, since any schedule must assign this job. In OPT there are at least
m − k machines which have no jobs of Jlong, and the total size of jobs in Jshort is at
most (m − k)Li. Therefore, Lmin(OPT) ≤ Li. We get e(OPT) ≥ Lmax(OPT)Lmin(OPT) ≥ LmaxLi and
POA ≤ e(A)
e(OPT) ≤ Lmax/LminLmax/Li =
Li
Lmin
≤ 2.
We next provide a matching lower bound, which is derived using the construction of
[99].
Theorem 80. For the problem of envy ratio minimization on identical machines, for any
fixed m ≥ 2, the POA is at least 2.
Proof. Consider the following game instance with m machines, the set of the jobs contains
m(m−1) jobs of size 1
m
and two jobs of size 1. One can verify that the schedule described
in figure 5.4, where each machine M1, . . . ,Mm−1 runs m of the jobs of size 1m and has a
load of 1, and machine Mm runs the two jobs of size 1 is a NE; moving one of the “heavy”
jobs of size 1 from Mm to any other machine will not decrease their cost. The load of Mm
is 2 while all other loads are 1. Thus, the envy ratio of this schedule is exactly 2 for any
value of m. The optimal envy ratio is obtained by moving one of the two heavy jobs from
Mm to M1 and equally distributing the m jobs of M1 among all machines. This results in
a schedule with an envy ratio of 1. The POA of this instance of the game is 2.
Figure 5.4: A NE schedule with envy ratio 2.
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5.7.2 Price of Stability for m identical machines
Theorem 81. On identical machines, POS = 1 for any m.
Proof. We show that for every instance of the game, among the optimal assignments there
exists one which is also an NE. Our arguments resemble the ones we used to show that
POS = 1 in the machine covering game.
We will define a complete order relation on the assignments, and then show that an
optimal assignment which is the “lowest” among all optimal assignments with respect to
this order is always an NE.
Definition 82. A vector (l1, l2, . . . , lm) is smaller than (l′1, l′2, . . . , l′m) with respect to the
lexicographic order, if for some i, li < l′i and lk = l′k for all k < i. An assignment
s is called smaller than s′ according to the lexicographic order if the vector of machine
loads L(s) = (L1(s), L2(s), . . . , Lm(s)), sorted in non-increasing order, is smaller in the
lexicographic order than the vector L(s′) = (L1(s′), L2(s′), . . . , Lm(s′)), sorted in non-
increasing order. We denote this relation by s ≺L s′.
The lexicographic order ≺L defines a total order on the assignments.
Lemma 83. For any instance of the game, a minimal optimal schedule w.r.t. the lexico-
graphic order is an NE.
Proof. Let A∗ be an optimal assignment such that no other optimal assignment A satisfies
A ≺L A∗. We show thatA∗ is an NE assignment. Order the machines inA∗ according to a
non-increasing order of loads. Assume by contradiction that A∗ is not NE, that is, there is
at least one job that would benefit from moving to another (lower) machine. Consider the
leftmost machine with such a job, let it be Mi and denote the job by pr. In a slight abuse of
the notation we use pr to denote both the job and its size. Job pr is selfish, and will want to
move to the least-loaded machine (or one of the least-loaded machines if there are several
such machines) in A∗. Denote this machine by Mj , j > i, and the resulting assignment by
A′.
First, we observe that Lmax(A∗) = Lmax(A′):
If there is a unique machine with maximum load in A∗, then pr could not be from this
machine. Else, if it moves to the least loaded machine in A∗, then Lmin(A∗) > Lmin(A′)
if there is a single machine with load LminA∗ in A∗, or Lmin(A∗) = Lmin(A′) if there are
several such machines in A∗, while Lmax(A′) < Lmax(A∗) as pr > 0. Hence e(A∗) >
e(A′), which contradicts the optimality of A∗ with respect to the envy-ratio objective.
Therefore Lmax(A∗) = Lmax(A′).
Obviously if there are several machines with maximum load in A, then Lmax(A) =
Lmax(A′), no matter where pr comes from.
As for the load of the least loaded machine in A′ we consider two cases.
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Case 1 If there is a unique machine with minimum load in A∗:
First, observe that Li(A∗)− pr > Lj(A∗), otherwise job pr would not have migrated.
Note that this migration has an effect on the loads of only two machines Mi and Mj in A∗.
If machine Mj with load Lj(A′) = Lj(A∗) + pr is the lowest machine in A′ as well,
as the loads of the other machines remain unchanged, except for Li(A′), which is larger
than Lj(A∗), thus Lmin(A′) > Lmin(A∗), and as the load of the highest machine remains
the same in A′, e(A′) < e(A∗) contradicting the optimality of assignment A∗. If Mj is
not the lowest machine in A′, there is a new lowest machine Mt, t > i in A′ such that
Lt(A′) > Lj(A∗) (as there is no additional machine with load Lj(A∗) in A∗), which
implies that e(A′) < e(A∗), again contradicting the optimality of A∗.
Case 2 If there are at least two machines with minimum load in A∗:
After the migration the envy ratio of A′ remains the same as the envy ratio of A∗ was,
as there is (at least one) other machine besides Mj with load Lj(A∗) in A∗, and its load is
not influenced by the migration.
After the migration, Lj(A′) = Lj(A∗) + pr > Lj(A∗). Also, Li(A′) < Li(A∗), as a
job with a positive size left Mi.
Finally, note that Li(A∗) > Lj(A∗), otherwise job pr would not have migrated.
Therefore, as A∗ and A′ differ only in machines Mi and Mj , by definition 82 A′ ≺L
A∗, contradicting the minimality of A∗ with respect to the lexicographic order.
We got a contradiction in all cases, thus A∗ is an NE assignment.
Since for any set of n jobs there are finitely many possible assignments, among the
assignments that are optimal with respect to this social goal there exists at least one which
is minimal w.r.t. the total order ≺L, and according to Lemma 83 this assignment is an
NE. As we have established that there exists an optimal solution which is also a NE, we
conclude that POS = 1.
5.8 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter we have studied a non-cooperative variant of the machine covering problem
for identical machines, where the selfish agents are the jobs. We considered both pure
and mixed strategies of the agents. We provided various results for the POA and the POS
that are the prevalent measures of the quality of the equilibria reached with uncoordinated
selfish agents.
For the pure POA for m identical machines, we provided nearly tight lower and upper
bounds of 1.691 and 1.7, respectively. An obvious challenge would be bridging this gap.
As stated previously, we believe that the actual bound is the upper bound we gave.
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We had also provided values for pure POS and POA (1 and 2, respectively) for machine
scheduling game on m identical machines with the envy-ratio minimization objective.
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Chapter 6
Machine Covering with selfish jobs on uni-
formly related machines
6.1 Introduction and results
In this chapter we consider a scheduling problem where the goal is maximization of the
minimum load, seeing jobs as selfish agents, in the same model introduced in Chapter 5,
now in the setting of uniformly related machines.
The motivations to study this problem can be found, for example, in the routing and
queuing applications that were presented in Chapter 5, as in real-world applications the
data rate of each of the links/queues can vary.
As we did previously for the case of identical machines, we consider the quality of the
NE in the induced game on related machines via the prevalent measures of POA and POS.
In Chapter 5, we considered the problem for identical machines. We showed that the
POS is equal to 1 while the POA and show close bounds on the overall value of the POA is
at least 1.691 and at most 1.7 for an arbitrary number of machines. For small numbers of
machines, namely, 2,3 and 4 machines, the POA is 3
2
,
3
2
and 13
8
, respectively.
In contrast to these results, we show that for uniformly related machines even the POS
is unbounded already for two machines with a speed ratio larger than 2, and the POA
is unbounded for a speed ratio of at least 2. The same property holds for m machines
(where the speed ratio, denoted by smax, or simply s) is defined to be the maximum speed
ratio between any pair of machines). Surprisingly, we prove that the POS is equal to 3
2
for
two machines with the threshold speed ratio 2. We show that the POS is constant for m
machines of speed ratio at most 2, and the POA is Θ( 1
2−s
) for m machines of speed ratio
s < 2. Finally, we focus on the case of two machines and the exact resulting values of
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POA. Specifically, we use a linear program to derive tight upper and lower bounds on the
POA for speed ratios in the interval (1, 2), and provide tight lower and upper bounds for
the POS for speed ratios in the intervals [1, 4/3] and [1.78, 2]. We give additional results for
the more general problem of m uniformly related machines, and in particular show cases
where the POA and POS are unbounded. These results are very different from the situation
for the makespan minimization social goal. For that problem, the POS is 1 for any speed
combination. Chumaj and Vo¨cking [36] showed that the overall POA is Θ( logm
log logm
) (see
also [54, 79]).
Note that for identical machines, the results given in Chapter 5 are more similar to the
situation for makespan minimization, where the POS is 1 and the POA is constant [56, 99].
6.2 m related machines
In the setting of related machines, we show that for large enough speed ratios the POA and
the POS are unbounded already for two machines.
Denote the speeds of themmachines by s1, s2, . . . , sm, where si ≤ si+1 and let s = sms1 .
Without loss of generality, we assume that the fastest machine has speed s ≥ 1, and the
slowest machine has speed 1.
We now characterize the situation in all cases.
Theorem 84. On related machines with speed ratio s, POA(s) = ∞ for s ≥ 2 and
POS(s) =∞ for s > 2.
Proof. Consider an instance that contains m identical sized jobs of size s. Clearly,
COVER(OPT) = 1 for this input.
For s > 2, we show that any assignment where each job is assigned to a different
machine is not a Nash equilibrium. In fact, in such an assignment, any job assigned to
the first machine sees a load of s, while if it moves to the m-th machine, its load becomes
2s
s
= 2 < s. Thus, any NE assignment has a cost of 0 and the claim follows.
For s = 2, consider the assignmentA where each machine is assigned a single job, the
first machine has no jobs, and the m-th machine has two jobs. It is not difficult to see that
this is an NE. Each job assigned to the m-th machine will not move to the first machine,
since it will have the same load. It would not move to another machine since it would
be assigned there together with another job, and this machine is not faster than its current
machine. A job assigned to another machine would not move to the first machine, since it
is not faster. Moving to a machine which has at least one job assigned to it would result
in load of at least 2, while the current load that the job sees is at most 2. Thus, we have
presented an instance for which COVER(OPT) = 1 and COVER(A) = 0, which implies the
claim for s = 2.
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We next characterize the situation in all other cases.
We can in fact show that if we define ε = 2− s, the POA grows with 1/ε.
Theorem 85. Let ε = 2− s. The POA as a function of ε has the order of growth Θ(1
ε
).
Proof. For the upper bound, consider an instance with COVER(OPT) = 1, and an arbitrary
NE assignmentA for this instance. We define a weight function g(x) to be applied on sizes
of jobs.
g(x) =
{
1 , for x ≥ 1
x , for 0 < x < 1
We show that the total size of jobs in any set I is at least 1 if and only if their total weight
(by g(x)) is at least 1. In addition, if their total weight is strictly larger than 1, then |I| ≥ 2.
Claim 86. Let I be a set of jobs. The total size of jobs in I is at least 1 if and only if their
total weight is at least 1. In addition, if their total weight is strictly larger than 1, then
|I| ≥ 2.
Proof. If I has a total size of at least 1, we consider two cases. If it contains a job of size
at least 1, then the total weight is at least its weight, which is 1. Otherwise, it contains only
jobs of sizes less than 1, thus their total weight is equal to their total size. In both cases we
get a total weight of at least 1.
If I has a total weight of at least 1, we consider two cases. If it contains a job of weight
1, then the total size is at least its size, which is 1. Otherwise, it contains only jobs of
weight less than 1, thus their total size is equal to their total weight. In both cases we get a
total weight of at least 1.
If |I| = 1, then the weight of jobs in I is at most 1. Thus if the total weight exceeds 1,
then |I| > 1.
Let P be the least loaded machine in A, and let G denote the total weight of jobs
assigned to P (if this set is empty then G = 0). Let sp denote the speed of P .
If G ≥ 1, then the total size of jobs is at least 1, thus the load of P is at least 1
sp
≥ 1
2
.
If G < 1, then since every machine of OPT has a load of at least 1 and all speeds are at
least 1, each such machine has a total size of jobs of at least 1 and thus weight of at least 1.
Therefore, the total weight of all jobs is at least m. Therefore, there exists a machine of A
with a total weight of jobs of more than 1, and thus at least two jobs assigned to it. Denote
this machine by Q and its speed by sq.
Let p denote the total size of jobs assigned to P and let q denote the total size of jobs
assigned to Q. Since the total weight of jobs assigned to Q is at least 1, we have q ≥ 1. Let
a be the size of a smallest size job assigned to Q (and thus q ≥ 2a). Since the job of size a
has no incentive to move, we have p+a
sp
≥ q
sq
or p
sp
> q
sq
− a
sp
≥ q
2−ε
− a, using 1 ≤ sp and
sq ≤ 2− ε.
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If a ≥ 1
3
, using q ≥ 2awe have q
2−ε
−a ≥ 2a−2a+aε
2−ε
≥ ε
6
. If a < 1
3
, we have q
2−ε
−a ≥ 1
6
since q ≥ 1. Thus the load of P is Ω(1
ε
), and since COVER(OPT) = 1, we have a ratio of
O(1
ε
).
For the lower bound, consider an instance with m identical jobs of size s = 2− ε, and
one job of size ε. We show that the schedule which assigns one large job to each machine,
except for machine m which receives two such jobs, and machine 1 which receives the
small job.
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 84 the large jobs assigned to machines 2, 3, . . . , m−1
have no incentive to move. Similarly, the jobs assigned to machine m have no incentive
to move to any machine, except for possibly the first machine. We have 2s
s
= 2 = s + ε,
and therefore these jobs do not have an incentive to move. Finally, the small job would not
move since every machine except for machine 1 is already loaded by at least 1. For this
instance, COVER(OPT) ≥ 1, while COVER(A) = ε.
We next show that the POS has a finite value for any s ≤ 2. For this purpose we use a
well-known algorithm for scheduling, called LPT (see [65]). This algorithm sorts the jobs
in a non-increasing order of their sizes, and greedily assigns each job to the machine which
would have a smaller load (taking the speed into account) as a result of assignment of the
job. In a case of a tie (a job can go to either machine), it assigns the job to the slowest
machine which has the largest index among the slowest candidate machines.
It is known that for scheduling games on uniformly related machines with the same
selfish goal of the players, LPT produces a pure NE schedule [57]. As this algorithm is
deterministic, the value of POS is upper-bounded by its approximation ratio. We use this
to derive an upper bound on the POS.
We first show that a ratio between the optimal cover and the cover of the schedule it
creates (and accordingly the POS) is finite for s ≤ 2.
Theorem 87. On related machines with speed ratio s, POS ≤ 2 for any s ≤ 2.
Proof. Suppose a counterexample exists, which shows that POS > 2 onm related machines
that all have speeds in [1, 2]. Let z > 2 be a ratio which can be achieved by an example,
i.e., the ratio between the cover of an optimal solution, and the maximum cover achieved
by every Nash equilibrium, for a specific set of jobs. By normalizing, we may assume the
optimal cover of the counterexample has a value of 1. Then, the total size of the jobs in
it is at least m. There may be an unbounded number of (normalized) counterexamples for
which the cover of the best Nash equilibrium assignment is 1/z. Let Tz be the infimum
total size of jobs in all normalized counterexamples with a best NE cover of 1/z. Let I be
such a counterexample for which the total size of all the jobs is at most Tz +1/(16m). We
will derive a contradiction.
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Consider the Nash equilibrium assignment A which is determined by the LPT assign-
ment of the jobs in I . LPT begins by sorting the machines in order of nonincreasing speed,
and gives each machine a fixed index according to this sorting. Let P be the least loaded
machine in A. By assumption, the load of P is exactly 1/z < 1/2, implying that the total
size of the jobs assigned to P is less than 1 (since sP ≤ 2).
We herein prove a set of claims regarding qualities of assignment A, which will lead
us to a contradiction to the existence of such I .
Claim 88. If there are at least m jobs in the input, then for s ≤ 2, LPT assigns the i-th job
(for 1 ≤ i ≤ m) to machine m− i+ 1.
Proof. Consider a sorted list of m jobs, where the size of the i-th job is denoted by pi.
We have p1 ≥ p2 ≥ . . . ≥ pm. We show the claim by induction. By definition, the
first job is assigned to the m-th machine. Assume that jobs 1, 2, . . . , k (k ≤ m − 1) have
been assigned as claimed. Consider the job of size pk. If the machine to which this job is
assigned is chosen among the machines of indices 1, 2, . . . , m− k + 1, then by definition
it should be assigned to the machine of index m− k + 1. If the job is assigned to machine
j > m− k + 1, the resulting load would become pm−j+1+pk
sj
≥ pk (since pm−j+1 ≥ pk and
sj ≤ 2). The load resulting from assigning the job to machine m− k + 1 is pksm−k+1 ≤ pk.
Thus, by definition, the job is assigned to machine m− k + 1, as claimed.
We show in the next claim that the set of machines with load at least 1 is fixed until the
end of LPT run after the first m jobs have been assigned.
Claim 89. The set of machines with load at least 1 is fixed after the first m jobs have been
assigned. These machines do not receive further jobs.
Proof. By the definition of LPT, P received one of the m largest jobs (Claim 88). After
this and until LPT is finished, P had load of less than 1/2, so any additional single job that
P received after its first job could not by itself increase the load of P to 1 or more. This
means that no assignment of any later job j increases a load of any machine above 1 once
each machine has a job, because LPT would assign j to P instead. In addition, a machine
which already has a load of 1 or more cannot receive this job.
A job that is among the m largest jobs and that on assignment by LPT makes the load
of its machine 1 or more is called huge. By Claim 89, the precise size of any huge job does
not affect the assignment of LPT. As long as the size satisfies the following conditions, the
LPT assignment is fixed:
• the size is at least the speed of the machine that it is assigned to (because then that
machine receives no further jobs),
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• the size is at least the size of the next job in the LPT ordering, and
• the size is at most the size of the previous job in the LPT ordering.
However, the size may of course affect the value of the optimal cover. Regarding the last
two conditions, if we have two jobs of different sizes, then making those sizes equal might
lead LPT to assign them in a different order. However, we ignore this and still say that the
assignment is the same (i.e., we do not distinguish between jobs that have the same size).
In the remainder of our proof, we will sometimes change the size of a huge job, but always
in such a way that the LPT assignment (and its cover) remain unchanged, and the value of
an optimal cover would not be affected. In particular, we will not increase the size of any
huge job.
We furthermore show that there is a machine with load at least 1 + 1/(4m).
Let Q′ be a machine with maximum load.
Claim 90. Q′ has load at least 1 + 1/(4m).
Proof. Suppose not. Then all machines have load less than 1 + 1/(4m), whereas P has
load less than 1. The total load on all the machines in A is then at most
m∑
i=1
si
(
1 +
1
4m
)
− sP
(
1 +
1
4m
)
+
sP
2
<
m∑
i=1
si +
2m
4m
− sP
2
≤
m∑
i=1
si.
On the other hand, since OPT = 1, the total load of all the jobs must be at least ∑mi=1 si.
This is a contradiction.
We will return now to the proof of the main theorem.
Let Q be the machine with load at least 1 + 1/(4m), which has the smallest index out
of such machines. Machine Q exists by Claim 90. Let A be the set of machines which
received their first job before Q did, and let A′ = A ∪ {Q}. Let m′ = |A′|. By Claim
89, all machines in A′ that have load more than 1 have only one job. In particular, Q has a
single, huge job jQ of size
x ≥
(
1 +
1
4m
)
sQ ≥ 1 + 1
4m
> 1.
All machines in A′ have at least one job of size at least x > 1. All machines that are not in
A′ have speed at most sQ.
We say that the jobs on machines with load at least 1+ 1
4m
are threshold jobs (they have
size at least x, and are huge) while the first jobs on the other machines in A′ are called big
(their size is also at least x). Together, these are m′ jobs that all have size at least x due to
the definition of LPT. All big jobs were assigned before jQ by LPT.
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Consider an optimal schedule OPT. We may assume that no threshold job j is assigned
to a machine of smaller index than a big job j′ of the same size (j and j′ can be switched
if necessary).
If OPT has any threshold job j on Q or on a machine that is not in A′ (and hence is
not faster than Q), we claim that j can be made smaller. Let M(j) be the machine that
j is assigned to by LPT. First, note that j must be one of the first m − 1 jobs in the LPT
ordering, since all machines that get a job before M(j) have a job of size at least x and
hence a load at least x/2 > 1/2. Hence, none of these machines can be P , and M(j) 6= P
as well. This shows that M(j) must be one of the first m − 1 machines in the ordering
used by LPT.
We now decrease pj by 1/(8m). As a result, LPT may assign pj to some later machine,
but pj is still more than 1 and j remains one of the m− 1 largest jobs (otherwise, there are
m jobs of size more than 1, so both before and after the modification, P receives a load
more than 1/2 which is a contradiction).
If LPT still assigns j to M(j), then the load of M(j) remains more than 1, so A and
cover(A) do not change. If LPT assigns j to a later machine M ′(j), then the machines
M ′(j), . . . ,M(j) all have a load at least 1 after assignment of their first job, both before
and after the change. This holds because they all have a job of size at least pj − 1/(8m)
(by definition of LPT) and all these machines have speed at most sM(j) ≤ pj/(1 + 14m) <
pj − 1/(8m). Hence they receive no more jobs and the assignment of all later jobs and
cover(A) remain unchanged.
Hence, the value pj can be decreased by at least 1/(8m) without affecting cover(A).
This also does not affect the value of OPT, since OPT assigns j to a machine which is not
faster than Q. We have now found a counterexample with total size of jobs below Tz, a
contradiction. Hence, all threshold jobs are on machines in A in the optimal assignment.
If any threshold job j is together with a big job on machine M ′ in the optimal assign-
ment, it can again be made 1/(8m) smaller without affecting the value of OPT, since this
means the load on M ′ is at least 2x/2 ≥ 1 + 1
4m
on that machine (since sM ′ ≤ 2). (Again,
the LPT assignment remains unchanged apart from possibly the order of some huge jobs,
as above.)
If any big job j is on a machine with higher index than Q (i.e., not in A′) in the optimal
assignment, or if j is together with another big job on machine M ′, j can be switched with
jQ (which is assigned to a machine in A by the above) without decreasing the value of OPT
(since the size of jQ is more than sQ, but not more than that of j, and M ′ has a load of at
least 1+ 1
4m
as above). After this, the size of jQ can again be decreased for a contradiction.
We thus find that we may assume that all big and threshold jobs are onA′ in the optimal
assignment, one per machine. But then, Q must have a big job j′ since it does not have
a threshold job, and then jQ and j′ can again be switched in the optimal assignment (and,
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after this, jQ can be made smaller as described above). We find a contradiction to the
definition of I in all cases.
We note that unlike the POA which continuously grows from constant values to infinite
values, the POS jumps from a constant value for s = 2 to ∞ for s > 2.
6.3 Two related machines
In this section we study the problem on two uniformly related machines. Recall that we
denote the speed of the faster machine by s ≥ 1, and the other machine has speed 1. We
analyze the POA and the POS as a function of s. Thus POA(s) and POS(s) denote the POA
and POS (respectively) of instances where the speed ratio between the machines is s.
The case where s = 1 was already analyzed in Section 1, and it was shown that
POA(1) = 3
2
and POS(1) = 1. Hence, from now on, we assume that s > 1. More-
over, Theorem 84 restricts us to the case s < 2 in the analysis of the POA as a function of
s.
We give a complete analysis of the exact POA as a function of the speed of the faster
machine, s, for s < 2.
Theorem 91. For two related machines and 1 < s < 2,
POA(s) = min
{
s+ 2
(s + 1)(2− s) ,
2
s(2− s)
}
=
{
s+2
(s+1)(2−s)
for 1 < s < √2
2
s(2−s)
for √2 ≤ s < 2
Proof. In order to generate the bounds on the value of the POA we use Linear Program-
ming. First, we show that we can restrict our analysis for the upper bound to instances
involving no more than 4 jobs. Thus, we need to consider a small number of cases. We
then formulate for each one of these cases a linear program (LP) whose optimal objective
function is exactly the POA for any s (or for some subinterval of s, depends on the case). It
is possible to find the tight values using the solution for the corresponding dual linear pro-
gram (DLP). Since we have several cases, we choose our bound on POA for each 1 < s < 2
to be the highest bound accepted among all the cases. The idea for this analysis is moti-
vated by the classic paper by Graham [65], where he used a similar approach to analyze the
performance of an algorithm for a variant of the makespan minimization problem for m
identical machines, and is often used since in the study of various scheduling problems. To
the best of our knowledge, it was not applied to analyze the POA for any non-cooperative
version of a scheduling problem before.
Consider an input instance I and an arbitrary Nash equilibrium assignment A for it.
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Claim 92. We can assume that I contains at most four jobs.
Proof. If there are at least 5 jobs, then one of the machines in the optimal schedule has at
least three jobs assigned to it. If a pair of jobs share a machine in both A and OPT (which
must happen in this case), we can merge them. This is applied to any pair of jobs that
behave the same in both solutions. The equilibrium properties are kept, so an alternative
NE is created, which has at most four jobs, and the same ratio between the values of the
optimal solution and the value of the NE solution.
Thus we have to consider only a small number of cases. Yet, since crucial constraints
in the linear programs state the fact that a given job does not have an incentive to move, it
is not always possible to assume that a job, which does not exist, simply has a size of zero.
Thus we need to consider the cases of one, two, three and four jobs, but some of the cases
of three jobs would be seen as special cases of four jobs.
The case of one job is trivial as any schedule has a value 0, and we defined that in this
case POA = 1. Consider a schedule with two jobs. Let A and B denote both the jobs and
their sizes. A schedule where both are assigned to the same machine cannot be optimal.
Moreover, such a schedule cannot be an NE either. Specifically, if both jobs are assigned to
M1, then any job has an incentive to move. If they are both assigned to M2, then the job of
size min{A,B} would have a load of at most min{A,B} ≤ A+B
2
being assigned to M1,
while the load of M2 when both jobs are assigned to it is A+Bs > A+B2 .
Otherwise, COVER(OPT) > 0 and COVER(A) > 0. Thus each schedule has one job on
each machine. We prove that for s < 2, POA ≤ s. Suppose that the optimum schedule
has job A assigned to M1 and job B assigned to M2. If A gives the same assignment we
have have a ratio of 1. Else, we consider the four possibilities: If A ≤ B
s
and B ≤ A
s
,
COVER(OPT) = A and NE = B, we have the ratio A
B
≤ 1
s
< 1 for s < 2. If A ≤ B
s
and B > A
s
, COVER(OPT) = A and NE = A
s
, and AA
s
≤ s. If A > B
s
and B ≤ A
s
,
COVER(OPT) = B
s
and NE = B, and the ratio is at most
B
s
B
≤ 1
s
< 1. If A > B
s
and
B > A
s
, COVER(OPT) = B
s
and NE = A
s
, and the ratio is at most
B
s
A
s
< s for s < 2.
We conclude that the asserted upper-bound of s holds. For s ≥ √2, since 2
s(2−s)
≥ 2,
and s < 2, the obtained ratio s does not exceed the claimed bound. For s <
√
2, since
s+2
(s+1)(2−s)
≥ 3
2
, and s < 3
2
, the obtained ratio s again does not exceed the claimed bound.
We next consider the cases of three and four jobs. Whenever it is possible, we study
the case of three jobs as a special case of the case of four jobs, with one of the jobs having
size 0. There are four cases of three jobs, when each time a different job of the four has
size 0. Also, we need two linear programs for every configuration, that is, one for the case
where in A the slow machine is less loaded (which we call the short machine), and one for
the opposite case. The linear programs do not state the fact that no job would benefit from
leaving the short machine, which always holds.
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We assume COVER(OPT) = 1 which can be achieved by scaling all instances.
So, suppose that the four jobs (and their sizes) are denoted by A, B, C and D. Both
A and OPT assign exactly two jobs to each machine. Suppose also that the optimum
schedule has jobs A and B assigned to M1, and jobs C and D assigned to M2. Suppose
further that A assigns jobs A and C to M1 and jobs B and D to M2. Given these NE and
optimal assignments and knowing that COVER(OPT) = 1, we illustrate the following linear
programs, where all variables are non-negative.
The constraints first state the properties of OPT (that both machines have a load of
at least 1), next the fact that the jobs assigned to the more loaded machine do not have
an incentive to move, and finally, the relation between the loads of the two machines in
A. We wish to minimize the minimum load, which is the inverse of the ratio between
COVER(OPT) = 1 and COVER(A).
Since we would like to provide an example which achieves the POA for each value of
s, it is sufficient that we use only the primal linear programs and prove an upper bound on
the POA, which is later matched by our examples.
The programs for four jobs are as follows.
(i) There are four jobs and the slow machine is short:
minA+C subject to: A+B ≥ 1, C+D ≥ s, A+C+B ≥ B+D
s
, A+C+D ≥ B+D
s
,
B+D
s
≥ A+ C.
(ii) There are four jobs and the fast machine is short:
min B+D
s
subject to: A + B ≥ 1, C + D ≥ s, A+D+B
s
≥ A + C, C+D+B
s
≥ A + C,
A+ C ≥ B+D
s
.
In the first program, it is assumed that B > 0 and D > 0, thus each one of the cases
B = 0 and D = 0 need to be considered separately. In the second program, it is assumed
that A > 0 and C > 0, thus each one of the cases A = 0 and C = 0 need to be considered
separately. Thus we have additional four programs.
(iii) There are 3 jobs with non-zero sizes, A = 0, and the fast machine is short:
min B+D
s
subject to: B ≥ 1, C +D ≥ s, C+B+D
s
≥ C, C ≥ B+D
s
.
(iv) There are 3 jobs with non-zero sizes, B = 0, and the slow machine is short:
minA+ C subject to: A ≥ 1, C +D ≥ s, D + A+ C ≥ D
s
,
D
s
≥ A+ C.
(v) There are 3 jobs with non-zero sizes, C = 0, and the fast machine is short:
min B+D
s
subject to: A+B ≥ 1, D ≥ s, A+B+D
s
≥ A, A ≥ B+D
s
.
(vi) There are 3 jobs with non-zero sizes, D = 0, and the slow machine is short:
minA+ C, subject to: A+B ≥ 1, C ≥ s, B + A + C ≥ B
s
,
B
s
≥ A+ C.
Before we consider the first two programs, we show that the last four programs do not give
a ratio larger than s.
Program (iii) gives a worst case ratio of at most s; as B ≥ 1 and D ≥ 0, we get that
B+D
s
≥ 1
s
= OPT
s
.
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Program (iv) gives a worst case ratio of at most 1; as A ≥ 1 and C ≥ 0, we get that
A+ C ≥ A ≥ 1 = OPT.
Program (v) gives a worst case ratio of at most 1; as D ≥ s and B ≥ 0, we get that
B+D
s
≥ D
s
≥ 1 = OPT.
Program (vi) gives a worst case ratio of at most 1; as C ≥ s and A ≥ 0, we get that
A+ C ≥ C ≥ s ≥ 1 = OPT.
We next consider the first two programs. Though it is possible to solve the programs
parametrically and together with solving the corresponding parametric dual programs for
all values of 1 < s < 2. The minimum of the solutions is the POA (provided that it is not
below s, the upper bound which we got for the case of two jobs).
For Program (i) with s ≤ √2, we multiply the first two constraints by 2 − s, and
the next two constraints by s, and sum all of the four resulting constraints. This gives
(2 + s)(A+C) + 2(B +D) ≥ 2(B +D) + (s+ 1)(2− s), and thus A+C ≥ (s+1)(2−s)
s+2
.
This gives an upper bound of s+2
(s+1)(2−s)
.
For Program (i) with s ≥ √2, we multiply the second two constraint by 2−s, the third
constraint by 1, the fourth constraint by s− 1, the constraint A ≥ 0 by 2 − s, and sum all
of the four resulting constraints. This gives 2(A+C) +B +D ≥ B +D + s(2− s), and
thus A+ C ≥ s(2−s)
2
. This gives an upper bound of 2
s(2−s)
.
For Program (ii) we multiply the first two constraints by 2s − 1, and the next two
constraints by s, and sum all of the four resulting constraints. This gives 2s(A+C)+(2s+
1)(B +D) ≥ 2s(A + C) + (s + 1)(2s − 1), and thus B+D
s
≥ (s+1)(2s−1)
s(2s+1)
. This gives an
upper bound of s(2s+1)
(s+1)(2s−1)
. It is easy to verify that for 1 ≤ s < 2, s(2s+1)
(s+1)(2s−1)
≤ s+2
(s+1)(2−s)
and s(2s+1)
(s+1)(2s−1)
≤ 2
s(2−s)
hold.
We can see from this discussion that Program (i) gives an upper bound of s+2
(s+1)(2−s)
on
the POA for 1 < s <
√
2 and gives an upper bound of 2
s(2−s)
on the POA for
√
2 ≤ s < 2.
We conclude that
POA(s) ≤
{
s+2
(s+1)(2−s)
, for 1 < s <
√
2
2
s(2−s)
, for
√
2 ≤ s < 2 .
This bound is tight, as can be seen from the following two feasible solutions to the
corresponding LPs.
For 1 < s <
√
2, consider the following 4 jobs of sizes: A = 2−A2
s+2
, B = s(s+1)
s+2
,
C = s
s+2
and D = s(s+1)
s+2
. The optimal solution has a balanced schedule of value 1. In the
NE, the load of M1 is 2+s−A
2
s+2
, and the load of M2 is 2(s+1)s+2 . Moving a job of size s(s+1)s+2 from
M2 to M1 would result in a load of 2(s+1)s+2 , thus this is indeed a NE. Its value is
(s+1)(2−s)
s+2
.
For
√
2 ≤ s < 2, consider the following 3 jobs of sizes (where the job of size A is
absent): B = A2
2
, C = (2−s)s
2
and D = A2
2
. The optimal solution has a load of 1 on M2
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and a load of A2
2
≥ 1 on M1. In the NE, the load of M1 is 2s−A22 , and the load of M2 is s.
Moving a job of size A2
2
from M2 to M1 would result in a load of s, thus this is indeed a
NE. Its value is (2−s)s
2
.
We can see that as s approaches 2, POA(s) tends to infinity, as implied by Theorem 85.
Theorem 93. For two related machines and s ≤ 2, POS ≤ 2 − 1/s. For s ≤ 3/2,
POS ≤ 1/(2s− s2). These bounds are tight for s ∈ [1, 4/3] and s ∈ [1
4
(3 +
√
17), 2]. (We
have 1
4
(3 +
√
17) ≈ 1.78078).
Proof. Consider an instance I that shows a POS of at least 2− 1/s for some s ∈ [1, 2]. For
this instance, the optimal solution OPT is not a Nash equilibrium. Hence, there must be at
least one job in OPT that could improve its delay by moving.
Suppose there is such a job j that is alone on its machine in the optimal assignment.
Then it must be on the slow machine, else it could not improve. Normalize all the job
sizes so that j has size 1. The total size q of all other jobs must be less than 1, else
(1 + q)/s ≥ 2/s ≥ 1, contradicting that job j can improve. Consider what happens if we
switch the contents of the two machines. The cover is min(1/s, q), whereas in the optimal
assignment, it was min(q/s, 1). Since q < 1, we have min(q/s, 1) = q/s. However, the
cover of the new schedule is either 1/s > q/s or q > q/s, contradicting that the original
schedule is optimal. This shows that this situation cannot happen.
Therefore, any job that can improve its delay in the optimal assignment is sharing its
machine with at least one other job. We consider the smallest job that can improve and
denote it by j. We now normalize such that this job has size 1. Denote the delay that j
experiences by D, and the delay on the other machine by D′. If j is on the fast machine,
then D′ must be less than D−1 < D−1/s. But then the current assignment does not give
an optimal cover, since the cover is at most D′ < D − 1/s and min(D − 1/s,D′ + 1) can
be achieved by moving j.
We conclude that j must be on the slow machine. Then D ≥ 2. Since j can improve
by moving, we have
D′ + 1/s < D.
We also have
D′ ≥ D − 1,
else the cover of the optimal assignment could be improved by moving j. Hence, after j
moves, no other job can improve its delay by moving to the fast machine, since the delay
on the slow machine is now only D − 1 < D′ + 1/s. The cover of the new assignment is
hence min(D − 1, D′ + 1/s) = D − 1, whereas the cover of the optimal assignment was
min(D,D′) = D′ < D− 1/s, where the equality holds because j can improve. This gives
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us a ratio of
D′
D − 1 <
D − 1/s
D − 1 ≤
2− 1
s
1
= 2− 1
s
. (6.1)
We have now reached a Nash equilibrium unless there are jobs on the fast machine which
can improve. Any such job must have size strictly smaller than 1, since j preferred the fast
machine.
We let such jobs move one by one, starting with the largest. Note that any job q which
moves towards the slow machine (and thereby improves its delay) strictly improves the
cover. The only case where this is not immediately clear is where the minimum load is
achieved on the fast machine after q moves. Denote the loads before q moves by D1 on the
fast machine and D2 on the slow machine. Then D2 + q < D1, the old cover was D2 and
the new cover is D1 − q/s > D2.
We claim that we end up in a Nash equilibrium. Suppose not. Then some job r can
improve by moving back to the fast machine. Since all the jobs that moved to the slow
machine have size strictly less than 1, this must be one of the jobs that moved in our
process (after j moved). It cannot be the last job that moved. Consider the first time that
r can improve. This happens just after another job r′ moves to the slow machine which
is not larger than r. But then, if r′ prefers the slow machine at this point, r must do so as
well, a contradiction. Since we showed that the cover only improves after job j moves,
this process ends in a Nash equilibrium with a cover of at least 2− 1/s due to (6.1).
We now improve this upper bound for s ≤ 3/2. Consider the schedule OPT− that we
get by switching the jobs on the fast and the slow machines. The new loads are D′s and
D/s.
The optimal cover is min(D′, D) = D′. The cover of OPT− is min(D/s,D′s). For
s ∈ [1, 3/2], we have D′s ≥ (D − 1)s > D/s since D ≥ 1/(s − 1). For s ∈ [3/2, 2],
this holds because D ≥ 2. Therefore, COVER(OPT−) = D/s. This cannot be more
than COVER(OPT) = D′ < D − 1/s. We conclude that D/s < D − 1/s and hence
D > 1/(s− 1). This is a stronger condition than D ≥ 2 for s ≤ 3/2. Instead of (6.1) we
now get
POS ≤ D − 1/s
D − 1 <
1
s−1
− 1
s
1
s−1
− 1 =
s− (s− 1)
s− s(s− 1) =
1
2s− s2 for s ≤ 3/2.
Since D/s < D′s, the only job that might be able to improve in OPT− is a job which
is now on the slow machine. Such a job currently experiences a delay of D′s, and after
moving, has a delay of at most D/s +D′ (the bound is reached if there is a single job on
the slow machine).
We now present lower bounds for the subintervals s ∈ [1, 4/3] and s ∈ [1.78, 2]. Let
s0 =
1
4
(3 +
√
17). Consider some value s0 ≤ s ≤ 2. Let M1 be the slow machine and M2
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be the fast machine. Consider a list of 3 jobs, having sizes 2s − 1, 1 + ε (for some small
ε > 0) and 1. The jobs are listed in a non-increasing order of the sizes, as 2s− 1 > 1 + ε
for any s > 1 + ε
2
, which is the case here. The LPT algorithm applied to this list of jobs
first assigns the job of size 2s − 1 to M2, then assigns the job of size 1 + ε to M1, and
as 2 + ε > 2s−1+1
s
= 2, assigns the job of size 1 to M2. This schedule is an NE(as any
schedule produced by the LPT rule), and has a value of 1 + ε. Obviously, LPT produces
an NEschedule, but there may exist other schedules that are NEfor this list of jobs. We
claim that for s ≥ s0 this is the best NEschedule, that is, this is a schedule with the largest
cover among all possible NEschedules for this instance. A different schedule, that assigns
a job of size 1 to M1 and the jobs of sizes 2s − 1 and 1 + ε to M2, is also an NE, but has
a smaller cover (of 1). Clearly, no schedule that has all three jobs assigned to one of the
machines and has a cover of value 0 is stable. Now consider a schedule that has the job
of size 2s − 1 assigned to M1 and the two jobs of sizes 1 + ε and 1 assigned to M2. As
2+ε
s
> 2s− 1 for any s > 1.28, it has a cover of 2s− 1, which is larger than the cover of
the schedule produced by the LPT for s in the considered interval. This is not a NEschedule
for s ≥ s0 though, as for these values of s we find 2s− 1 > 2s−1+2+εs holds, and the job of
size 2s− 1 will benefit from moving to M2. The optimal schedule assigns the two jobs of
sizes 1 + ε and 1 to M1, and the job of size 2s− 1 to M2, and has a cover of 2s−1s = 2− 1s
and (2 − 1
s
< 2, for positive s). It is not stable, though, as the job of size 1, for example,
will benefit from moving to M2. We conclude that POS(s) ≥ 2 − 1s for s ∈ [s0, 2] (letting
ε tend to 0).
Now consider the case 1 ≤ s ≤ 4/3. We now use an instance with four jobs, two
of size 2 − s + ε and two of size s − 1 (note that 2(s − 1) < 2 − s + ε). The optimal
cover is (1 + ε)/s (two jobs on each machine). Consider the possible allocations of the
jobs. If there is a machine with one job, then the cover is at most 2 − s + ε for a bound
that tends to 1/(2s − s2) as desired. If the two small jobs are on one machine, the cover
is at most 2(s − 1), which is even less. If each machine has two different jobs, we do
not have a Nash equilibrium, because the small job on the slow machine can improve
by moving. Its current delay is 1 + ε, and the delay on the fast machine would be only
(2(s−1)+2− s+ ε)/s = 1+ ε/s. Hence in all cases, either the cover is at most 2− s+ ε
or the schedule is not a Nash equilibrium.
It is interesting to note that while the POS is equal to 3
2
for s = 2, it becomes infinite
already for s = 2 + ε for arbitrary small positive ε.
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6.4 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter we studied the Prices of Anarchy and Stability for the Machine Covering
problem on related machines, as a function of the parameter the maximum speed ratio smax
between any two machines. We show that on m related machines, the Price of Stability
is unbounded smax > 2, and the Price of Anarchy is unbounded for smax ≥ 2. In an
interesting manner, the behavior of these measures for smax close to the threshold speed
ratio of 2 is very different; We show that while the Price of Anarchy tends to grow to
infinity as smax tends to 2, the Price of Stability is constant and has a value of at most 2 for
any smax ≤ 2.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and open problems
This chapter presents the conclusion of this thesis, coming back on the main issues. Our
contributions are also mentioned with the main results we established. Finally, we describe
the limits of this thesis throughout the suggestion of interesting further works.
7.1 Context
This thesis continues the line of research that studies the effect of selfishness and lack of
coordination on functionality of distributed systems by considering combinatorial prob-
lems that are appropriate to describe such settings, using a game theoretic approach.
The objective of this thesis is to contribute to the existing body of work by studying
various combinatorial problems that model routing and networking problems. In particular,
we consider the Bin Packing problem in both classic and parametric versions, the Job
Scheduling and the Machine Covering problems in different machine models with various
objective functions.
We address various aspects concerning different economic solution concepts in the
induced games, such as existence, quality, recognition, computation etc..
This is achieved by applying combination of both game-theoretic tools that are tailored
to analyze consequences of strategic interactions and combinatorial techniques that are
commonly used for these problems.
The quality measures featured include the well known regular and Strong Prices of
Anarchy and Stability, as well as the newly introduced (weak and strict) Pareto Prices of
Anarchy and Stability.
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7.2 Contribution
First, we considered the (Pareto) efficiency of NE schedules in the Job Scheduling game
with makespan minimization objective and established tight bounds on the (weak and
strict) Pareto Prices of Anarchy and Stability in the identical, uniformly related and un-
related machines models. We gave a complete classification of recognition complexity of
weakly and strictly Pareto schedules. In the cases where it is possible, we provided effi-
cient algorithms to recognize such schedules. We also considered the effect of preserving
deviations on such schedules.
Next, we considered the classic and the parametric versions of the Bin Packing problem
and provided nearly tight bounds on the regular Prices of Anarchy for any value of the
parameter α ≥ 1. As previously stated, we believe that their exact values match the
respective lower bounds. We also gave tight bounds on the Strong Prices of Anarchy and
Stability (which have identical value in the considered game), provided a characterization
of SNE packings in this game and gave an (exponential time) algorithm that calculates such
packings. We showed that computing an SNE packing is, in fact, NP-hard.
Finally, we considered the quality of NE schedules in the Job Scheduling game, with
respect to the following fair optimality criteria: minimization of the maximal load over
the machines in the schedule (which gives rise to the Machine Covering game) and mini-
mization of the envy-ratio (that is the ratio between loads of the most and the least loaded
machines in the schedule). In the model of identical machines, we established nearly tight
bounds on the Price of Anarchy and tight bounds on the Price of Stability for the former
fairness criterion, and tight bounds on these measures for the latter. For the first fairness
criterion we have also considered mixed NE schedules, and showed that the mixed Price of
Anarchy grows exponentially in the number of machines.
In the model of uniformly related machines, we considered the Price of Anarchy to-
wards the first fairness criterion as a function of the maximum speed ratio between any
two machines in the schedule. We showed that for ratios greater than 2 already the Price
of Stability may be arbitrarily unbounded, and the Price of Anarchy may be arbitrarily un-
bounded starting at 2. We considered the behavior of these measures for remaining ratios,
and finally proceeded to analyze these measures for schedules on two machines.
7.3 Further works
This thesis leaves some open issues which we list here, chapter by chapter.
In Chapter 2 we gave a full classification of the complexity of recognition of weak and
strict Pareto efficient NE schedules in the Job Scheduling game. It can be interesting to
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consider the complexity of computation of such schedules, as well. In the cases of identi-
cal machines and weak/strict Pareto NE (where, as we proved, any NE schedule is strictly
Pareto efficient) and also for uniformly-related machines and weak Pareto NE (where any
NE schedule is weakly Pareto efficient, as proved in [11]) this question becomes equivalent
to the question of complexity of computation of a regular (pure) NE schedule that can be
answered easily as it was shown that any run of the (polynomial time) LPT scheduling al-
gorithm on uniformly-related machines produces a pure NE schedule [57]. The complexity
of computing strict Pareto NE in the model of uniformly-related machines as well as of
weak and strict Pareto NE schedules in the model of unrelated machines remains open.
In Chapters 3 and 4 we gave nearly tight bounds on the Price of Anarchy in the classic
and in the parametric Bin Packing games. Finding the exact values is an open problem. As
previously stated, we believe that the values equal to the lower bound that we provided.
In Chapter 5 we gave nearly tight bounds on the Price of Anarchy in the Machine
Covering game in identical machines model. Bridging this gap is an obvious challenge.
As previously stated, we believe that the value equals to the upper bound that we provided.
Another interesting direction is to consider the Strong Prices of Anarchy and Stability in
this game.
In Chapter 6 (among other things) we considered the Price of Stability as a function of
the maximum speed ratio s between machines in the schedule for a setting of two machines.
Whereas for s ∈ [1, 4/3] and s ∈ [1.78, 2] the given bounds are tight, determining its exact
value for s ∈ (4
3
, 1.78) is left for further study.
Other than resolving these issues, there are other possible directions for further study.
The first option is to study similar matters for the restricted variants of these combi-
natorial problems that can be used to describe real life scenarios which the simple models
neglect to consider. They are all natural extensions of basic problems from a theoretical
point of view, and their behavior gives useful hints on the significance of previously known
results. For example, if we talk about the bin packing problem, the possible variants to be
considered include the bin packing with variable sized bins, which can be used to describe
a parallel link network where the links are of various capacities, and the bin packing with
cardinality constrains, where in addition to the capacity constraint a cardinality constraint
is imposed on each link, which demands that the number of users that may utilize the link
at the same time is limited. This latter cardinality restriction is often important in order to
maintain transmission quality over the link due to ‘noise’ considerations.
Another direction is to define different cost sharing schemes and analyze the resulting
models (for the classic problems and additional variants) with comparison to the previously
studied model. For example, in this thesis we considered the bin packing game where the
cost of each bin in a packing is proportionally shared among the items it contains according
to their sizes. However, we can consider a more general cost scheme and charge the cost
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of the bin to the items according to some more complex function of their sizes, that, for
instance, can charge more cost from a ‘very large’ item that occupies more than half a bin.
Also, the activation cost of a bin that is charged to the items sharing it in our model equals
bin’s capacity. We can consider a more general problem with a non-uniform cost structure,
where the activation cost of a bin depends on a number of bins used in a packing.
It can be also interesting to further explore similar issues to those considered in this the-
sis for fair NE schedules (fair according to various fairness criteria), which is very important
from an economic point of view. This is especially relevant to modern computer networks
and communication networks, where time, bandwidth and other expensive resources are
scarce. A very well known fairness notion that can be considered is, for example, is the
min-max fairness. It is defined as follows:
Definition 94. A configuration x is called min-max fair if moving to another configuration
y, for every player i ∈ N , if ci(y) < ci(x) then there either exists a player j ∈ N \ i such
that cj(x) ≥ ci(x) and cj(y) > cj(x) or a player j ∈ N \ i such that cj(x) < ci(x) and
cj(y) ≥ ci(x).
That is, min-max fairness requires that there is no improvement at the cost of someone
who pays already higher cost while an improvement that increases the cost of a player
with smaller original cost (but not by more than the original cost of an improving player)
is allowed. Every min-max fair configuration is also strictly Pareto (and therefore also
weakly Pareto) optimal.
The existence of such min-max fair NE schedule in the Job Scheduling game was
proved in [67]. For a scheduling game with the makespan minimization objective the min-
max-fair Price of Anarchy (and Stability) is 1, as it easy to verify that any schedule which
is not optimal with respect to makespan is not min-max-fair. However, for a scheduling
game with the covering maximization objective this is not necessarily so, and this problem
requires further study.
Obviously, any other relevant packing, scheduling and covering problem can also be
considered for study.
We believe that this research has both theoretical as well as practical importance. From
a theoretical point of view, the motivation to study these optimization core problems us-
ing the game-theoretic approach is clear. Combination of concepts and tools drawn from
different application domains already had and will produce elegant results and proofs.
From a practical point of view, many of these problems simulate actual current sys-
tems and proposed systems. The analysis of equilibria with various efficiency and fairness
properties can lead to conclusions on whether a system can survive even without a central-
ized protocol. These results will be of a great help for system designers when they plan a
multi-user multi-component systems with no central control, that have to be economically
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and computationally efficient despite the inability of the parties involved to communicate.
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